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ABSTRACTION 
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1.1 What NeoFregeanism is about 
NeoFregeanism is an highly original and much discussed view on the 
relation between language and reality.1 It is widely believed that a 
certain portion of our language, that constituted by assertions, namely 
sentences that intuitively can be true or false, stands in a certain 
relation with reality. It is often said that assertions are about reality 
and reality makes some assertions true and some other false. These 
two claims, though extremely appealing, are quite generic. What does 
it mean for a sentence to be about reality? What kind of relation is in 
play here? Moreover: what does it mean for a portion of reality to 
make a sentence true or false? Reality seems to be so discouragingly 
complex and many-sided that it’s not easy to imagine how a certain 
portion of it can be assigned as a truthmaker for a sentence, while that 
same portion can be thought as making true another, very different, 
sentence or the negation of a sentence. These questions have given 
rise to a variegated and fruitful research program and they are still 
matter of curiosity and puzzlement. 
An interesting side of this problem is constituted by existential 
statements, namely those sentences in which an existential quantifier 
features, like, for example ‘there is a key in my pocket’, ‘there are 
infinitely many prime numbers’, ‘there are no dragons in the world’. 
The sentences whose general form is ∃x1,x2,...,xnφ(x1,x2,...,xn) are 
supposed to be made true by the fact that, among the things that 
                                                          
1 A general introduction to NeoFregeanism can be found in MacBride (2003), Zalta & 
Linsky (2006), Hale & Wright (2001). Wright (1983) and Dummett (1956) can still be 
considered fundamental introductory readings. 
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furnish the world, there are the objects a1,a2,...,an capable of satisfying 
the conditions imposed by φ.  It is widely accepted that the truth of a 
statement of that form depends on the occurrence of facts of the kind 
just outlined. The consequences of this general thesis are very 
important. Consider the subfield of our natural language constituted 
by arithmetical statements. Within this domain of discourse, 
existential statements are quite common and many of them are 
demonstrably true. ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’ is a 
good example of this kind of statements. It is certainly an existentially 
quantified statement and it is known to be true, at least since Euclid’s 
time. The general thesis about the relation between existential 
statements and reality that we have just outlined entails that the 
statement at issue cannot be true without there being infinitely many 
prime numbers among the objects of the world. It is the fact infinitely 
many prime numbers are part of reality that makes that well known 
theorem true.  
This last point may appear puzzling, at least for two reasons. On 
the one hand the fact that infinitely many prime numbers furnish the 
world doesn’t seems to be the reason why we believe that the theorem 
above is true. No serious mathematician would accept such an answer 
to the question ‘why is it true that there are infinitely many prime 
numbers?’ The answer that such a question requires is a mathematical 
proof, namely an argument in behalf of that theorem that respects the 
epistemic standards holding in mathematical discourse. One may 
object ‘you are confusing the issue! There are two different questions: 
one is the question of what makes a statement true and the other is 
why we believe that such a statement is true. The former is about 
truthmaking, the second is about epistemic justification’. This might 
seem to be a good point, but is it really convincing? I could easily 
11 
 
reply  that the question worth asking is ‘why don’t we make the same 
distinction in all the other cases?’ If the sentence at issue were ‘there 
are finitely many stars in the universe’ we would never consider what 
makes it true and why we (common speakers) believe that this is true 
as two different things. The fact that there are finitely many stars in 
the universe is what makes that sentence true and it’s the reason why 
we assert that the sentence ‘there are finitely many stars in the 
universe’ is true. No speaker, unless she is a professional astronomer, 
knows exactly how to prove that there are finitely many stars in the 
universe. Anyway a scientific argument in favour of the truth of this 
sentence is not part of its meaning, unless we embrace a strong 
verificationist view (and nobody is keen to do so). There’s no serious 
reason to introduce the distinction in question when only the meaning 
of a sentence is in play; what makes it true and what makes us assert 
that it’s true are the same. Getting back to our arithmetical example, 
we are compelled to notice that the existence of infinitely many prime 
numbers doesn’t seem to be generally taken as the truthmaker of the 
theorem in question or, equivalently, as the reason why we assert that 
such a theorem is true. Indeed some philosophers believe that there are 
no numbers at all; nevertheless they believe that statements like the 
theorem of prime numbers are true. It seems that, at least within the 
subfield of arithmetic language, the truth of existential statements may 
not depend upon a portion of reality being such and such. 
The second reason to be puzzled about the thesis that, in 
general, existential statements are made true by the fact that certain 
objects furnish the world, is about the enormous ontological inflation 
that it seems to elicit. We have already cited the case of arithmetical 
discourse. The thesis at issue poses us in a predicament: either we 
accept the existence of numbers and so we save the truth of arithmetic 
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(existential) statements or we favour a sober ontology giving up with 
the claim that arithmetical (existential) statements are true. It’s worth 
noticing that, in arithmetic, existential statement are not the only ones 
to be problematic. Every atomic sentence in which number terms 
occur is subject to this dilemma. For example, ‘5 is bigger than 3’ 
requires us to choose between its truth and our predilection for a 
parsimonious ontology. Analogous problems arise in many other 
domains of discourse outside arithmetic. 
NeoFregianism constitutes an alternative view of the relation 
between language and reality. As we have already said, the traditional 
view holds that the truth of existential and atomic statements depend 
on the existence of some objects. NeoFregeanism reverses this order 
of explanation, maintaining that the existence of some objects depends 
on the truth of some existential or atomic statements. Let’s try to give 
a loose formulation of this thesis: 
PRIORITY: the following two facts: 
a) the singular term ‘a’ in the atomic sentence ‘Fa’ refers to an 
existing object 
b) the existence of objects satisfying the condition φ that features in 
the sentence ‘∃xφ(x)’ 
are grounded respectively in the following two facts: 
a’) ‘Fa’ is a true sentence 
b’) ‘∃xφ(x)’ is a true sentence 
I purposely use the term general ‘ground’ to indicate the relation that 
links the existence of certain objects with the truth of certain 
sentences. The term, at least according to the most authoritative 
13 
 
authors, 2  indicates a relation of metaphysical explanation. It’s not 
merely a matter of modal dependence. For sure if φ grounds ψ, then if 
it happens to be the case that φ, it is necessarily the case that ψ. 
Nevertheless this is not a sufficient condition for a grounding relation. 
Grounding is a relation of metaphysical explanation: if φ grounds ψ 
then, in some sense the definition/essence of φ determine the 
definition/essence of ψ. In the case of Priority, what we mean is that, 
for example, in reality there are objects that satisfy condition φ if the 
sentence ‘∃xφ(x)’ is true, because of the very nature of truth and 
reality. So defined, Priority is a very general thesis; as we are going to 
see there are various ways to articulate and defend it. 
I believe that one of the essential characteristic of 
NeoFregeanism, intended as a thesis about the relation between 
language and reality, is the endorsement of Priority. Certainly there 
are some philosophers, inspired by Fregean philosophy of 
mathematics, who try to revive the Logicist Program in philosophy of 
mathematics. Although some of them would apply the label 
‘NeoFregean’ to their own views, I prefer to reserve this term for the 
philosophical attempts to justify and develop Priority and some other 
related theses. For the broadly Frege-inspired theories that defend the 
idea of an epistemic access to mathematical truths by means of sole 
logic, I would prefer to reserve the term NeoLogicism.  
The present doctoral dissertation is exclusively about what I call 
NeoFregeanism. Its first aim is to examine Priority showing the 
different ways in which it can be justified. Its second aim requires the 
introduction of a second key-player in the theoretical landscape that 
we have just outlined. 
                                                          
2 See, for example Fine (2012), Audi (2012) or Schaffer (2009). 
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There’s a natural, though not necessary, link between Priority 
and an ontological view known as Platonism. When it comes to 
entities, whose existence is controversial because of their being 
“immaterial” or “abstract”, e.g. numbers, propositions, geometrical 
shapes, universals, Platonists are those who claim that these entities 
really exist and their existence is independent from the existence of 
other things.3 Usually a philosopher is not Platonist without further 
specification, but rather Platonist about certain entities. Indeed the 
endorsement of Platonism about, say, numbers doesn’t involve to be 
Platonist about everything else. A Platonist not only believes that 
there really are the objects she is committed to; she also believes that 
these objects don’t depend upon other objects (like, for example, 
properties depends on their bearers). As a matter of fact, supporters of 
NeoFregeanism are Platonist about abstract entities. In particular they 
believe that Priority offers a robust ground for such a position. In the 
course of this introduction we are going to see in greater details why 
they believe so; for the moment it’s sufficient to observe that Priority, 
plus the claim that arithmetical existential theorems are true, entails 
the existence of natural numbers. Applications of analogous 
arguments to sentences talking about other abstract entities would lead 
to analogous results. Hence we can certainly say that Priority is 
closely related to the following thesis: 
PLATONISM : there are self-subsistent abstract objects 
Frege was certainly a Platonist about numbers and about other abstract 
entities. Some passages of his Grundlagen der Arithmetik suggest that 
he believed that the existence of abstract entities is not as demanding 
                                                          
3 There are various notions of independence. Here we adopt a rather generic one; when 
we speak of ‘independence of abstract objects’ we mean  that their existence is not 
grounded in our thought and practices. For an introduction to Platonism in Philosophy of 
Mathematics see Linnebo (2013). 
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as it could appear. In particular he seems to claim that the existence of 
some abstract entities amounts to the fact that some absolutely not 
controversial concrete entities stand in a certain reciprocal relation. 
Abstraction principles are exactly about this. They are statements of 
the following form: 
A(a) = A(b) ↔ Req(a,b) 
The symbol ‘A’ stands for a function assigning abstract objects to the 
entities designed by the terms ‘a’ and ‘b’, ‘Req’ is an equivalence 
relation.4 An abstraction principle in general asserts that two objects 
stands in an equivalence relation if and only if they are associated to 
the same abstract item. Abstraction principles are the other key-
players I was referring to. As we are going to see they play an 
important theoretical role in the theoretical framework that 
NeoFregeanism consist in. The first, very intuitive, example of 
abstraction principle is provided by Frege’s Grundlagen and it is the 
following one: 
DIRECTION ABSTRACTION: D(r) = D(s) ↔ P(r,s) 
In words: the direction of the straight line r is identical with the 
direction of the straight line s if and only if r and s are parallel. This is 
an example of objectual abstraction principle, since the domain on 
which the equivalence relation holds includes only objects. There are 
also conceptual abstraction principles; they differ from the objectual 
ones for the fact that the equivalence relation applies to a domain 
whose members are (also) concepts. An example provided by Frege is 
the following one: 
                                                          
4 A relation R is an equivalence relation if and only if i) it’s reflexive, i.e. for every a, 
R(a,a); ii) it’s symmetric, i.e. for every a,b, if R(a,b) then R(b,a); iii) it’s transitive, i.e. for 
every a,b,c, if R(a,b) and R(b,c), then R(a,c). Examples of equivalence relations are: 
identity, parallelism among straight lines, 1-1 correspondence among sets, simultaneity, 
and many others. 
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HUME PRINCIPLE: N(F) = N(G) ↔ F ≡ G  
In words: the numbers of Fs is identical with the number of Gs if and 
only if the Fs and the Gs stand in 1-1 relation. Conceptual abstraction 
principles are notoriously more powerful than objectual ones and 
potentially unstable.5 Some of them play a significant role in some 
theories of foundation of arithmetic and set theory.6 
From a purely ontological point of view, abstraction principles 
are interesting because of the equivalence that they establish between 
two different states of affairs. The logical symbol employed to signify 
this equivalence is a normal biconditional. I will use it, because it’s 
quite common in the subject’s literature to write abstraction principles 
in such a way. Nevertheless we clearly attach to the symbol ‘↔’ a 
stronger meaning.  Consider, for example, Direction Abstraction. The 
reason why such a statement is considered so interesting (and 
philosophically controversial) lies in the fact that, in Frege’s intention, 
its two sides are internally related in a stronger sense than mere 
identity of truth values signified by the biconditional. They have, in 
some sense to be made precise, the same meaning. In Hale’s words, 
‘anyone who understands both of them can tell, without determining 
their truth values individually, that they have the same truth value’ 
(Hale 2001b, p. 13). Certainly this view enjoys an intuitive support, 
since, presumably, anyone who is ready to accept that two lines are 
parallel is also ready to accept that they have the same direction and 
                                                          
5 Some principles like, for example, the infamous Basic Law V of Frege’s Grundgesetze 
der Arithmetik, require the existence of more objects than the domain they apply to 
contains. They are defined unstable (see Hale & Wright 2001) essentially because, 
whatever the cardinality of the domain is, they require a larger domain. 
6 Frege’s Theorem asserts that a second order theory enriched with impredicative Hume 
Principle is equi-interpretable with full second-order Peano Arithmetic. This stunning 
mathematical result was correctly proven by Frege in its Grundgesetze, as shown by Heck 
(1993). Conceptual abstraction principles has proven to be powerful axioms also for set 
theory (see, for example,  Shapiro 2003). 
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vice versa (granted that she masters the concepts of <line> and 
<direction>). Nevertheless it’s easy to see that the ontological 
commitments associated with the two sides of Direction Abstraction 
differ heavily: the right hand side requires the existence of lines, while 
the left hand side cannot be true without being the case that there are 
directions. How can two sentences with so different ontological carry-
on have the same meaning or, alternatively, describe the same state of 
affair?  
As we are going to see in the course of this dissertation, there’s 
no easy answer to this question. Robust theorizing is needed in order 
to face this challenge. What we can say without doubts is that, if a 
theorist want to employ abstraction principles for her theoretical 
purposes, she need to find some compelling arguments in behalf of the 
following thesis: 
ABSTRACTION EFFECTIVENESS: some abstraction principles 
are effective stipulations, i.e. they are such that their two sides share 
the same content. 
Another distinctive feature of abstraction principles is a particular 
kind of asymmetry between its two sides. The entities mentioned in its 
right hand side are less problematic than those mentioned in its left 
hand side. Loosely speaking, the right hand side is the place of 
concrete entities, while the left hand side is the place of the 
(relatively) abstract ones. This asymmetry is explanatorily 
meaningful: for example, the fact that two lines are parallel explains 
why their direction is the same, while the converse does not hold. The 
“concreteness” of the right hand side, as we are going to see soon, 
plays an important role in the theoretical framework we are outlining. 
Now, we will leave this problem aside for a moment and focus 
exclusively on the link between Priority and Abstraction Principles. 
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As we have already said, Priority is a thesis that reverses what appears 
to be the natural order of explanation between the truth of certain 
sentences and the existence of (reference to) certain objects: instead of 
going from existence of (reference to) certain object to the truth of 
certain sentences, Priority claims that the truth of certain sentences 
grounds the existence of certain objects and the fact that certain 
singular terms really refer. Now, it is widely assumed among the 
supporters of NeoFregeanism (and not only among them) that each 
domain of discourse has its own acceptability criteria for sentences.7 
For example the community of professional mathematicians is 
inclined to accept a statement only if there is a proof of it that meets 
certain standards. Mathematical conditions of acceptability are 
certainly different from the acceptability conditions that rule our 
discourses about so-called middle size dry goods. In this domain of 
discourse we are inclined to accept statements that exhibit some kind 
of correspondence with a fact. A statement is true when it satisfies the 
ordinary acceptability conditions that hold within the domain of 
discourse it belongs to. If we couple this widely accepted claim with  
Priority, we get a thesis according to which, for example, if an 
existential statement like ∃xφ(x) meets the acceptability standards 
ruling the domain of discourse it belongs to, then there really are 
objects satisfying condition φ.  
Suppose that a certain abstraction principle, say Direction 
Abstraction, is effective in the sense specified above and one of its 
possible instances is such that its right hand side is a true statement. 
The effectiveness of such a principle assures us that the left hand side 
(that involved with the existence of directions) is a true statement too. 
                                                          
7 Wright (1992) and Lynch (2009) offer sustained arguments in favour of a moderate 
pluralism about the nature of truth. 
19 
 
Indeed, how can they differ in their truth value if they share the same 
content? Now, if we endorse Priority we are compelled to admit that 
there really are directions, since the left hand side of the principle at 
issue is an atomic sentence in which direction-terms occur. Directions 
are abstract entities, or, at least, they are abstract with respect to lines. 
The upshot is that we have just vindicated Platonism, since we have 
given an example of abstract self-subsistent entities. This line of 
argument, if correct, provides us with a cheap way to be Platonist 
about abstract entities.  
We can say that Priority, as various authors have noticed,8 sets 
the bar of existence very low. In the example above, the existence of 
abstract entities, like directions, is justified on the basis of two facts: i) 
a statement about certain unproblematic entities (lines) is acceptable 
according to the acceptability standards of the domain of discourse it 
belongs to; ii) Direction Abstraction is effective. We could say that 
Priority entails a form of Metaontological Minimalism, according to 
which, there are object whose existence doesn’t impose very 
demanding requirements to reality. Philosophers committed with 
Metaontological Minimalism cannot but allow for luxurious 
ontologies, since, presumably, the argument that we have just outlined 
can be adapted to many other cases. 
In the example that we have just given an essential role is 
played by an abstraction principle. The couple Priority + Abstraction 
Effectiveness seems to open an interesting road to Platonism. A 
further thesis that can be proposed is about the essentiality of 
abstraction principles for the theoretical framework that we have 
outlined in these pages. The example given above is such that 
Direction Abstraction plays an important role in the argument for the 
                                                          
8 See, for example, Linnebo (2012b) or Eklund (2006). 
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existence of directions. Since many abstract entities are susceptible to 
be defined by means of abstraction principles, one might suppose that 
our justification for the introduction of abstract object into our 
ontology necessarily relies on the availability of effective abstraction 
principles. Nevertheless there seems to be no sufficient reason to be 
sure of this. Priority seems to be strong enough to support the 
existence of abstract entities even in absence of sentences presenting 
all the peculiar feature of abstraction principles. Certainly the atomic 
sentence ‘the direction of r is F’, if true according to certain 
acknowledged standards, entails, in virtue of Priority, the existence of 
a referent for the singular term ‘the direction of r’. One may object 
that, in absence of an abstraction principle, we lack an important norm 
of correctness for the use of an expression like ‘the direction of r’. 
But, is this shortage so dangerous? After all, abstraction principles are 
not the only way to rule the use of a term referring to an abstract 
entity. Philosophers who believe that abstraction principles play an 
essential role in the best arguments aiming at justifying Platonism 
about abstract entities are committed to this principle. 
ABSTRACTION ESSENTIALITY: the best arguments in favour of 
Platonism about a certain kind of abstract entities require effective 
abstraction principles. 
Many supporters of NeoFregeanism endorse Abstraction Essentiality. 
Moreover this thesis seems to be a barrier against a possible 
trivialization of NeoFregeanism. Indeed Abstraction Essentiality 
seems to restrict the potentially unmanageable power of Priority; only 
if we provide precise norm of application for abstract terms we are 
entitled to consider them as really referring. 
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1.2 What NeoFregeanism is 
I take NeoFregeanism to be characterized by the four general theses I 
already presented and that I restate here to ease the reader: 
 1) PRIORITY: the following two facts: 
a) the singular term ‘a’ in the atomic sentence ‘Fa’ refers to an 
existing object 
b) there are objects satisfying the condition φ that features in the 
sentence ‘∃xφ(x)’ 
are grounded respectively in the following two facts: 
a’) ‘Fa’ is a true sentence 
b’) ‘∃xφ(x)’ is a true sentence 
2) PLATONISM : there are self-subsistent abstract objects 
3) ABSTRACTION EFFECTIVENESS: some abstraction 
principles are effective stipulations, i.e. they are such that their two 
sides share the same content. 
4) ABSTRACTION ESSENTIALITY: an argument in behalf of 
Platonism about a certain kind of abstract entities require effective 
abstraction principles. 
This is not supposed to amount to a definition. It’s very likely that a 
supporter of NeoFregeanism is committed at least with some of these 
theses, and almost surely with Priority and Platonism. Nevertheless, 
the purpose of this characterization is not to give an image of 
NeoFregeanism such that every NeoFregean philosopher would 
acknowledge it as the core of her theory. I have simply isolated four 
theses that are widely maintained among NeoFregean theorist and, 
more importantly, that are related in such a way that they can 
constitute the frame for an argument whose conclusion is Platonism. 
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In the preceding section I have outlined an argument for the existence 
of directions that, using Priority and Abstraction Effectiveness, proves 
Platonism about directions. That argument was such that the principle 
that we have called Abstraction Direction plays an essential role. 
Therefore such an argument verifies Abstraction Essentiality. Are 
there different (and shorter) paths to Platonism? Is there a way to 
prove it such that one is not compelled to commit with Priority? Or 
with Abstraction Effectiveness? 
As we have previously stated, the first aim of this dissertation is 
to examine Priority and see how it can be justified. Its second aim is to 
understand how it is related with abstraction principles and, in 
particular, to try to answer questions like these: is Priority sufficient to 
prove Platonism or something like Abstraction Effectiveness is 
necessarily required? Can Abstraction Effectiveness alone prove 
Platonism? Is there a sound and convincing argument in favour of 
Platonism relying on all the other three theses ? 
I’ll try to carry out this complex task by means of a detailed 
analysis of three alternative theoretical approaches to NeoFregeanism. 
Each one will be be examined in a dedicated chapter. I’ll show that 
each of these approaches performs a successful defence of Platonism, 
but with significant differences. These differences will be explained in 
virtue of which of the four theses each approach is able to maintain 
and adequately justify. The final achievement is going to be, 
hopefully, a deeper understanding of NeoFregean view.  
 
1.3 Three different approaches 
In this section I’m going to show how the three approaches to 
NeoFregeanism, which are the subject matter of this dissertation, have 
originated. Contrary to reasonable expectations, this is not going to be 
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an accurate historical excursus on the progressive development of that 
variegated collection of ideas that constitute contemporary 
NeoFregeanism. It is going to be rather a systematic analysis of the 
problems that these three approaches are aimed at solving. I’m going 
to present two theories that have failed to be a satisfactory defence of 
a Frege-inspired Platonism and I’ll show that one of them can 
overcome its difficulties in two ways, while the other can do the same 
only with a radical change of perspective. In this section these three 
new ways of interpreting NeoFregeanism will be placed into the 
theoretical context that has made them necessary. 
 
1.3.1 Priority, syntax and ontology 
The first philosopher to attribute to Frege a view very close to what 
we have called “Priority” was Michael Dummett. In his Dummett 
(1956) he states that the root of the idea of a priority of truth over 
reference lies in a famous Fregean statement, known as Context 
Principle. This statement says “Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes 
bedeutet ein Wort etwas,”, i.e. ‘only in the context of a sentence does 
a world have meaning’. This claim occurs in Frege's Grundlagen der 
Arithmetik (§§ 60, 62 and Introduction, p. x) and in no other of his 
writings. Its true meaning is still matter of a complex discussion that 
we are not going to touch now. What can be said with absolute 
certainty is that, from Context Principle, Frege deduces that one must 
“never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation” (Grundlagen, 
Introduction). In Dummett’s view, asking for the meaning of a word 
in isolation is the mistake made by those who take a statement, split it 
into its components and, focusing on the singular terms that have been 
extracted, ask themselves whether these terms really refer to 
something or not. Dummett casts doubt on the legitimacy of this 
24 
 
operation: why do they ask whether a term ‘really’ refer? Is there a 
meaningful distinction between ‘real’ reference and ‘apparent’ or even 
‘spurious’ reference? If a term acts as a singular term in the context of 
a sentence, then it must be regarded as a referring term. The 
distinction between ‘really referring’ and ‘apparently referring’ calls 
for a philosophical sense of existence that plays no role in our 
common linguistic practice. 
One of the consequences of A [= the Context Principle] is the repudiation of 
this philosophical existence. If a word functions as a proper name, then it is 
a proper name. If we have fixed the sense of sentences in which it occurs, 
then we have done all that there is to be done toward fixing the sense of the 
word. If its syntactical function is that of a proper name, then we have fixed 
the sense, and with it the reference, of a proper name. If we can find a true 
statement of identity in which the identity sign stands between the name and 
a phrase of the form "the x such that Fx," then we can determine whether the 
name has a reference by finding out, in the ordinary way, the truth value of 
the corresponding sentence of the form "There is one and only one x such 
that Fx." There is no further philosophical question whether the name - i.e., 
every name of that kind - really stands for something or not. (Dummett 
1956, p. 494)  
This point is elegantly restated by Wright (1983): 
To suppose that such a question [= does a certain term really refer?] does 
arise is exactly to suppose that it is legitimate to inquire whether such an 
expression genuinely denote anything in isolation from considerations from 
the part that it standardly plays in whole propositions. If we think that 
question arises, then we are asking, in effect, to have it answered by some 
sort of further independent investigation into the nature of the facts which 
makes the relevant proposition true: we are asking to show the Bedeutung of 
the expression in isolation. A major point of the Context Principle is to rule 
out the idea that there is any such further intelligible inquiry to be made. 
(Wright 1983, pp.14-15) 
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In Wright’s view, Context Principle offers solid grounds for a thesis 
on the priority of truth over reference, that, following MacBride 
(2003), we split into three different theses, for clarity reasons: 
Syntactic Decisiveness: if an expression exhibits the 
characteristic syntactic features of a singular term, then such an 
expression has the semantic function of a singular term (it’s a 
term that “aims at referring”) 
Referential Minimalism: the mere fact that a referring expression 
figures in a true atomic sentence determines that there is an item 
in the world to respond to the referential probing of that 
expression. 
Linguistic Priority: an item belongs to the ontological category of 
objects if it is possible that a singular term refer to it. 
The first of these three theses is the less controversial one. Being a 
singular term is nothing but acting as singular term and ‘acting as a 
singular terms’ is something susceptible of a precise characterization. 
Indeed Dummett (1973) and, afterwards, Hale (2001a) have presented 
some effective criteria for the individuation of which sub-sentential 
expressions act like singular terms. These are merely syntactic criteria; 
one of them, to give an example, states that, in a sentence of the form 
Fa, ‘a’ is a singular term only if Fa supports its existential 
generalization ∃xFx. In other words a necessary condition that ‘a’ 
must respect in order to be a referential expression is that, from the 
truth of Fa, the truth of ∃xFx must follow. This simple requirement 
excludes that an expression like ‘nobody’ can play the role of singular 
term (indeed from ‘nobody is playing tennis’ doesn’t follow the 
existential generalization ‘for some x, x is playing tennis’). The sole 
fact that an expression is the argument of a functional expression, like 
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a predicate, doesn’t make it a singular term. The criteria presented by 
Dummett and Hale are able to discriminate between real referring 
expression and expression that simply occupy the same place of a 
referring expression. 
The difficult job is the justification of Referential Minimalism 
and Linguistic Priority. As we have already seen, Wright argues in 
behalf of these thesis on the basis of his interpretation of Fregean 
Context Principle. His defence, if successful would support a kind of 
metaontological minimalism, particularly apt to justify a form of 
Platonism about abstract entities. Nevertheless a problem arises: even 
if we suppose that Wright’s justification of the three theses above is 
satisfactory, the  resulting view is still dubious, because of its wild 
ontological liberality. The first philosopher who raised this concern 
was Hartry Field. In his Field (1984) he argues that Context Principle 
can certainly support what we have called Syntactic Decisiveness, but 
cannot support Referential Minimalism. 
For instance, I cannot see (to paraphrase part of the third paragraph of the 
passage quoted) how it can be 'a preconception inbuilt into the syntax of our 
arithmetical language' that '4' is not only a singular term but one which in 
fact denotes. Is it a syntactic presupposition of our historical language that 
'Homer' denotes, or of our religious language that 'God' denotes? Are doubts 
about the existence of Homer and of God vacuous for that reason? (Field 
1984, p. 646) 
A justification of Referential Minimalism can come only by means of 
a stronger thesis. 
Strong Priority: if an expression exhibit the characteristic syntactic 
features of a singular term, then such an expression has the 
semantic function of a singular term and what is true according to 
ordinary criteria is really true (any doubt that this is so is vacuous). 
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Strong Priority is simply the conjunction of Syntactic Decisiveness 
with the claim that the acceptability conditions that holds good within 
a certain domain of discourse count as plain truth conditions for every 
sentence belonging to it. But, again, “did the 'ordinary criteria' for 
truth in Ancient Greece make 'Zeus is throwing thunderbolts' true 
whenever there was lightning?” (Field 1984, p. 646). The enormous 
ontological inflation involved with Priority, as interpreted by Wright, 
seems to be inescapable. Indeed, some authors9 have pointed out that 
there are true sentences about fictional characters that satisfy the 
acceptability conditions constraining fictional discourse. For example 
‘Sherlock Holmes lives in London’ is acceptable in the domain of 
discourse constituted by Conan Doyle’s fiction. Does Priority compel 
us to introduce Sherlock Holmes into our ontology? Wright (1994) has 
argued that fictional sentences are not properly content bearing, but 
this answer cannot be completely satisfactory, since a sentence like 
‘Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character’ doesn’t belong to the 
domain of discourse of Conan Doyle’s fiction. It belongs to a domain 
of discourse about fiction and, within this domain, it is certainly 
acceptable. 
There are two possible ways to face this predicament. One is 
simply to accept the wild ontological inflation imposed by whatever 
meaningful formulation of Priority and try to show that this doesn’t 
produce any bad consequence; the other is to weaken Priority with the 
imposition of further constraints, in order to avoid unpleasant 
ontological consequences. The former is the solution proposed (not 
without a hint of scepticism) by Matti Eklund and it will be analyzed 
in Chapter 3. The latter is proposed by  Øystein Linnebo and Chapter 
4 is dedicated to it. 
                                                          
9 See Williamson (1994b) and Divers & Miller (1995). 
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1.3.2 Recarving of content 
In his works Frege doesn’t propose a unique argument in favour of 
Platonism about abstract entities (and numbers in particular), but a 
rather variegated set of suggestions, each of them susceptible to broad 
developments. One of these suggestions has to do with abstraction 
principles and seems to be, at least at first sight, different and 
independent from the way of Priority. In Grundlagen §64 Frege 
famously claims that the judgement that line a is parallel to line b can 
be taken as an identity. This stipulation is made possible by the 
concept of direction: the parallelism between the two lines “amounts 
to” an identity of directions. We are in presence of a unique content 
“carved up” in two different ways. What is essential, in order to give 
good reasons to accept this claim, is to clarify the meaning of the 
generic expression ‘amounts to’. Hale, in his Hale (1987) and 
especially (2001b), tried to address two different, but intimately 
related, challenges: i) on the one hand, we need to understand in what 
terms need to be translated the metaphorical Fregean expression 
‘recarving of content’; ii) on the other hand we need to assess whether 
Frege’s theoretical proposal really achieves what it is aimed at.  
The crucial question is, obviously, how ‘content’ should be 
understood. As is well know, at the time of Grundlagen’s composition 
(i.e. 1884), the distinction between sense and reference was yet to 
come. From a certain moment on, Frege decided to split what he 
previously has called, perhaps naively, ‘content’ in these two 
components. It is therefore natural to ask which of these components 
can be conceived as the matter of the operation of “recarving”. 
Consider a statement like ‘line a is parallel to line b’: is the statement 
‘the direction of a is identical with the direction of b’ a recarving of its 
sense or of its reference? 
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Consider first the reference-option. Frege notoriously takes 
truth values as the reference of sentences. Nevertheless truth values 
doesn’t appear to be things that can be recarved in any meaningful 
sense. Moreover, in Frege’s approach, there are only two truth values 
(true and false); they really appear to be far too few to cover the 
intuitively enormous variety of contents that sentences of a given 
language can express. If we consider the object true as the reference 
of every true sentence then, as Hale points out, ‘the direction of line a 
is identical with the direction of line b’ would bear no closer relation 
to ‘lines a and b are parallel’ than it bears to, say, ‘Tuesday precedes 
Wednesday’. An alternative reading of the notion of content, in light 
of the reference-option, is to consider states of affairs as the referents 
of meaningful sentences. Although such a reading finds no textual 
support in Frege’s work, it appear more attractive than the previous 
one, at least because states of affairs posses enough internal structure 
to allow sentences, whose meaning are intuitively different, to refer to 
different things. Moreover the idea that two sentences can constitute 
different conceptualization of one and the same state of affairs seems 
to be a seductive way to recast Frege’s claim on recarving of content.  
Nevertheless, in Hale’s opinion, also this solution is 
unsatisfactory, since it is under the threat of a powerful argument, the 
so-called “Slingshot Argument”. The first statement of such an 
argument can be found in Davidson (1969). It proceeds as follows: let 
A and B be two true sentences, then consider these two identities: 
i) the x such that x is Socrates and A = the x such that x is Socrates 
ii) the x such that x is Socrates and B = the x such that x is Socrates 
Now, if  we assume that the interchange of co-referential singular 
terms in a sentence cannot change the state of affairs it depicts, it 
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follows that sentences i) and ii) depict the same state of affairs. 
Moreover if we assume a classical notion of logical equivalence it 
turns out that i) is logically equivalent to A and ii) is logically 
equivalent to B. Indeed, since the identity between the x such that x is 
Socrates and the x such that x is Socrates is satisfied in every model, it 
follows that the set of models in which i) is satisfied is the same set in 
which A is satisfied and the set of models in which ii) is satisfied is 
the same set in which B is satisfied. But now we are compelled to 
conclude that A and B depict the same state of affair. Since we have 
put very little restriction on the choice of sentences A and B (the only 
request is that they are both true) it turns out that a true sentence refers 
to the same state of affairs every other true sentence refers to. This is 
an obviously unacceptable conclusion, therefore the thesis that 
sentences refers to states of affairs is flawed.  
Hale doesn’t regard this argument as a tombstone for the 
reference option, since some of the assumptions it is based on are 
contentious. In particular one can object that interchange of co-
referential singular terms in a sentence do change the state of affairs it 
depicts, at least in some cases. Indeed, if we adopt a broadly 
Russellian conception of definite descriptions as devices of 
quantification, i) can be thought as saying that there is one and only 
one individual identical with Socrates and such that A and that 
individual is identical with Socrates. On the contrary ii) says that there 
is one and only one individual identical with Socrates and such that B 
and that individual is identical with Socrates. There is little temptation 
to see the two sentences as describing the same state of affairs. 
Despite the limited power of the Slingshot Argument, Hale believes 
that the reference option is a non-starter in virtue of a more 
fundamental reason. States of affairs are normally taken to be 
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constituted at least in part by objects; if two states of affairs are such 
that the objects featuring in them are not the same, then the two states 
of affairs cannot be identical. Unfortunately, all the interesting cases 
of content recarving mentioned by Frege require an identity of content 
between sentences whose singular terms refer to different objects. 
This consideration compels Hale to endorse the sense-option, 
namely to identify Fregean contents with senses. The notion of sense 
that is in play cannot be too strong. Indeed if one assumes that senses 
are strongly compositional, then she faces again the problem of the 
identity between things composed by different parts. There are weak 
notions of sense that could be apt to justify a claim of identity of 
content between the two sides of Direction Abstraction. One of them 
could be the following: two sentences share the same sense if and only 
if they coincide in truth values at all possible worlds. The two sides of 
Direction Abstraction clearly coincide in truth value at all possible 
world. But this is too weak a notion, since two necessary truths 
whatsoever coincide in truth values at all possible worlds. Hale’s need 
is to find a notion of sense of intermediate force between a strongly 
compositional one and a purely modal one.  
He believed to find it in the notion of compact entailment 
introduced in Hale & Wright (2001) for different purposes. We say 
that an entailment is compact if and only if it is liable to disruption by 
uniform replacement of any non-logical constituent in its premises. A 
more precise statement: 
COMPACT ENTAILMENT: A1, A2, ..., An compactly entails B if 
and only if i) A1, A2, ..., An entails
10 B and ii) for any non logical 
                                                          
10 Here the notion of entailment appear without further specification. In cases like this, we 
generically mean that between two sentences A and B there’s a relation such that if A is 
true B cannot but be true. The notion is hence taken in its full generality, not in its 
common model-theoretic sense. 
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constituent η of A1, A2, ..., An there is some substitution η’/η which 
applied uniformly through A1, A2, ..., An yields A1’, A2’, ..., An’ 
which do not entail B. 
Hale’s initial idea was to identify sameness of content with reciprocal 
compact entailment: A and B can be said to share the same sense, and 
therefore to be different carvings of the same content, if and only if A 
compactly entails B and B compactly entails A. It can be easily seen 
that this kind of entailment rules out all the cases in which some of the 
premises are irrelevant for the conclusion, therefore also all the cases 
of couples of necessary truths don’t constitute a threat for Hale’s 
theory.  
Now let’s have a closer look at the properties of compact 
entailment. One may wonder whether it is reflexive or not. If A is not 
a necessary truth then clearly A compactly entails A, since there is 
surely a uniform substitution of some non logical component of A 
such that the resulting sentence, A’, doesn’t entail A. What if A is 
necessary? In this case compact entailment clearly fails to be 
reflexive, since A is entailed by every sentence whatsoever. This is an 
undesirable feature, since it’s a platitude that every sentence (whether 
necessary or not) has the same content of itself. An easy remedy is to 
refine the definition of compact entailment in this way: an entailment 
is compact if and only if it’s a substitution-instance of an entailment 
that is compact according to the definition above. To avoid confusion 
let’s rename this new definition of compact entailment  ‘improved 
compact entailment’. 
IMPROVED COMPACT ENTAILMENT: A1, A2, ..., An stands in 
a relation of improved compact entailment with B if and only if, for 
some A1’, A2’, ..., An’ and some B’, A1’, A2’, ..., An’ compactly 
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entails B’ and A1’, A2’, ..., An’ and B’ are uniform substitution 
instances of respectively A1, A2, ..., An and B. 
Improved compact entailment is reflexive since in the expression ‘A 
compactly entails A’, in which A is a necessary truth, I can uniformly 
replace A with a non-necessary sentence and obtain an expression that 
compactly entail itself.  
Unfortunately, as Michael Potter has remarked, improved 
compact entailment is not transitive.11 This is bad news for Hale’s 
proposal since sameness of content is supposed to be an equivalence 
relation, therefore the transitivity of improved compact entailment is a 
necessary pre-requisite. Hale made another attempt to improve on the 
situation, by further refinements of the notion of compact entailment, 
but the cost is a further complication of the notion of entailment 
involved. His theoretical effort shows that also the sense-option is not 
easy to pursue.  
In such a situation one could be tempted by a radical move: 
giving up with both reference option and sense option and consider 
the possibility that sameness of content depends on the theoretical 
framework we are working with. In a certain theoretical framework 
two sentences can share the same content even if they do not stand in 
some complex relation of reciprocal entailment or they do not 
correspond, at least intuitively, to the same fact. For example, in the 
theoretical framework of general relativity the sentence ‘object a has 
mass λ’ has the same content of ‘object a produces a spatio-temporal 
camber of size µ’ (with λ and µ suitably chosen). There’s no analysis 
of the sense of the two sentences or of the states of affairs that we 
intuitively associate with them that can straightforward justify their 
                                                          
11 For a comprehensive explanation see Hale (2001b). 
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equivalence. Such an equivalence is assumed for general theoretical 
purposes: the assimilation of the two situations described allows us to 
explain elegantly many physical phenomena. Agustin Rayo has tried 
to defend the legitimacy of a view of this kind. Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation is dedicated to an analysis of his view. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
COMPOSITIONALISM AND 
ABSTRACT ENTITIES 
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In this chapter I’m going to examine Agustin Rayo’s proposal. His 
fundamental idea is that abstraction principles should be included into 
a wider class of propositions called ‘just is’-statements. I’ll try to 
explain what these statements are, why we should believe that at least 
some of them are true and why they are so relevant for the 
metaontology of abstract objects. After a presentation of Rayo’s 
notion of ‘just is’-statement (sections 1-5), I’ll outline my proposal 
(sections 6-8). My claim is essentially that the introduction, via some 
suitable ‘just is’-statement, of abstract entities-talk into a language L 
is fully compatible with the application of a correspondentist notion of 
truth on L’s statements. In order to prove this, I’ll explain how a 
“corrispondentist semantic” for a language that includes ‘just is’-
statement should be conceived. In the Appendix that closes the 
chapter, I’ll show that the notion of logical consequence that results 
from this semantics is coherent, complete and compact. 
 
2.1 ‘Just is’-statements 
A very recent view about principles of abstraction and their 
ontological consequences is Agustín Rayo’s Compositionalism. Such 
a view allows its supporters to embrace what Rayo calls Subtle 
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Platonism, in opposition to Traditional Platonism. The difference 
between these two positions is sketched with the similitude of a 
creation myth:  
On the first day God created light; by the sixth day, she had created a large 
and complex world, including black holes, planets and sea-slugs. But there 
was something left to be done. So on the seventh day she created 
mathematical objects. Only then did she rest. On this view, it is easy to 
make sense of a world with no mathematical objects: it is just like the world 
we are considering, except that God rested on the seventh day. 
The crucial feature of this creation myth is that God needed to do 
something extra in order to bring about the existence of mathematical 
objects: something that wasn’t already in place when she created black 
holes, planets and sea-slugs. According to subtle Platonists, this is a 
mistake. A subtle Platonist believes that for the number of  planets to be 
eight just is for there to be eight planets. So when God created eight planets 
she thereby made it the case that the number of the planets was eight. (Rayo, 
manuscript) 
While the traditional Platonist believe that a world without numbers is 
possible, a subtle Platonist believe that such a world is an impossible 
one, since for there to be no numbers just is for there to be zero 
numbers, but zero is a number so numbers exist after all. 
Clearly the acceptance of statements of the form ‘α just is β’ 
(where α and β are sentences) is essential to Subtle Platonism. This 
kind of statement can be tentatively defined as no difference-
statements, since what they tell is substantially that there is no 
difference for the world to be such that α is true and to be such that β 
is true. Some of them are absolutely unproblematic. Consider for 
example: 
WATER: for this glass to be full of water just is for this glass to be 
full of H2O. 
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Here the lack of any difference in meaning between the two atomic 
statements that flanks the ‘just is’-operator is warranted by the facts 
that: 1) ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are synonyms; 2) ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are the 
only symbols that could have made a difference in meaning, since the 
remaining parts of the two sentences are identical (we obviously 
suppose that ‘this’ has the same reference in its two occurrences).  
Other ‘just is’-statements are a little more problematic but still 
acceptable for the majority of people: 
PHYSICALISM: for such-and-such a mental state to be instantiated 
just is for thus-and-such brain states and environmental conditions 
to obtain. 
Here the lack of any difference in meaning is assured by widely 
accepted scientific theories and (more or less) universally accepted 
metaphysical assumptions. 
There are finally some ‘just is’-statements that are surely 
controversial: 
PROPERTIES: for Susan to instantiate the property of running just 
is for Susan to run. 
Here we are in presence of a highly controversial metaphysical claim, 
since many philosophers believe that the left hand side member of this 
statement commits us to the existence of properties, while the right 
hand side statement doesn’t. So, how can the two sides say the same? 
The relevance of the problem of the acceptability of ‘just is’-
statements for the purposes of our inquiry is absolutely clear: 
abstraction principles could also be conceived as ‘just is’-statements. 
Every reason to legitimate at least some ‘just is’-statement is a reason 
to legitimate abstraction principles (at least some of them). Consider, 
for example, the ‘just is’-version of Hume Principle: 
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HP: for the numbers of Fs to be identical with the number of Gs just 
is for the Fs and the Gs to stand in one-one correspondence. 
Here what is said is that what the two sides of this principle require of 
the world is exactly the same thing. There’s no need to justify the 
additional ontological commitment that the left hand side of HP seems 
to bring with it, since there is no real additional ontological 
commitment. Indeed the right hand side of HP is already committed to 
the existence of numbers; the two sides doesn’t differ with regard to 
meaning but only with regard to “appearance”. Rayo thinks that this is 
probably the more faithful interpretation of Frege’s considerations 
about “recarving of content” (See Frege 1884, § 64). 
In Rayo’s opinion this, and other metaphysically contentious 
statements, should be accepted. The reason why they should be 
accepted is rooted in a general view about meaning and reference that 
he calls Compositionalism and that we are going to examine below. 
Before exploring this issue let’s make the notion of ‘just is’-statement 
a bit clearer.  
 
2. 2 Elucidation of the notion 
The best way to elucidate the notion of ‘just is’-statement is to explore 
its relation with other semantic, metaphysical and epistemic notions. 
According to Rayo, a downright definition is impossible because it 
would require that the concepts employed to define the definiendum 
were definable independently from the definiendum itself. But, when 
it comes to the fundamental concepts that we need, in order to define 
‘just is’-statements, circularity is unavoidable to a certain extent. 
Hence the best we can do is to proceed to the elucidation of the mutual 
relations between the concepts at issue. 
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2.2.1 Inconsistency 
If α just is β then we cannot consistently claim α and not-β. Here 
‘inconsistency’ is not to be understood syntactically. Two sentences 
can be inconsistent in virtue of their sole logical forms, like in the case 
of “there’s water in my glass” and “there’s no water in my glass”. But 
they can be inconsistent also in another sense, namely as a 
representation of the world as being inconsistent. Consider, for 
example, “there’s water in my glass” and “there’s no H2O in my 
glass”. Here there’s no syntactical inconsistency, but only a 
representation of an impossible state of affairs. Therefore if α just is β 
then claiming that α and not-β amounts to a description of an 
impossible states of affair. The main difference between a ‘just is’-
statement and what we generally call a “factual statement” (a 
statement like ‘Snow is white’) is that the latter rules out a consistent 
way for the world to be, while the former rules out only an 
inconsistent way for the world to be. The set of all ‘just is’-statements 
that we are inclined to consider true draws the limits of consistency. 
Since some ‘just is’-statements are clearly a posteriori, like in the case 
of ‘for this glass to be full of water just is for it to be full of H2O’, to 
succeed in delineating the limits of consistency is far from being a 
trivial cognitive accomplishment.   
 
2.2.2 Truth Conditions 
If α just is β then the truth conditions of α are identical with the truth 
conditions of β. A ‘just is’-statement asserts that the two sub-
statements that compose it make the same request of the world. What 
is required of the world, in order for the left hand side statement to be 
true, is exactly the same that is required for the right hand side to be 
true.  
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2.2.3 Metaphysical Possibility  
A given scenario is metaphysically possible if and only if it is 
logically consistent with the set of the true ‘just is’-statements. When 
we talk about possibility, the adjective ‘metaphysical’ is intended in 
various ways: it can be an indicator of a particular level of strictness 
(metaphysical possibility is stricter than conceptual possibility) or, 
alternatively, it can be an indicator of a kind of possibility. In this 
latter sense ‘metaphysical’ is meant to indicate a possibility de mundo, 
namely a way the world can be, not a possibility de representatione, a 
way the world can be represented. ‘Just is’-statements draw the limits 
of de mundo possibilities, namely the ways that world can be, 
regardless of how it happens to be represented. 
 
2.2.4 Why Closure  
If α just is β then a question like “we know that α, but what reasons 
do we have to believe that β?” becomes meaningless. A true ‘just is’-
statement fills a explanatory gap between the two scenarios 
represented by its left hand side and its right hand side; what explains 
one of them explains the other too. We say that a sentence σ is why-
closed if and only if one is unable to make sense of the question “Why 
is it the case that σ?”. If someone says something like ‘I can see that 
things composed of water are composed of H2O, but I wish to 
understand why the world is such as to satisfy this condition’, either 
we find a charitable interpretation of her request (capable of making 
the answer not trivial), or we completely reject it and just say ‘this 
question makes no sense, since to be composed of water is nothing but 
to be composed of H2O’. In order to highlight the connection between 
the notion of why-closure and that of ‘just is’-statement, we can say 
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that a sentence σ is why-closed if and only if σ is either a true ‘just is’-
statement or a logical consequence of some ‘just is’-statement. 
 
These are the main features of ‘just is’-statements. These features 
somehow define the role that ‘just is’-statements play in a domain of 
discourse: they add no information, they simply establish the limit of 
what can coherently be said. In Rayo’s view ‘just is’-statements play a 
role analogous to that played by meaning postulates in Carnap’s 
philosophy of language. Meaning postulates draw the line separating 
propositions that are true in virtue of their meaning from factual ones; 
‘just is’-statements separate metaphysically necessary truths from 
contingent ones. In both cases the problem is to distinguish two 
fundamentally different class of statements: the considerable 
advantage of Rayo’s approach is that it doesn’t rely upon the 
problematic distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. 
Indeed, as we are going to see in the next section, the choice of the set 
of true ‘just is’-statements is based on considerations that are not 
undermined by any Quine-style objection.  
 
2.3 Which ‘just is’-statements are true? 
Until now we have made reference to true ‘just is’-statements or to the 
set of true ‘just is’-statements without explaining which conditions 
such statements must respect in order to count as true. Rayo claims 
that there are essentially two reasons to accept statements of this kind. 
If the statement in question is ‘α just is β’, where α and β differ only 
for an individual constant, then it’s true if and only if the two 
individual constants that make the difference have the same reference. 
Consider the sentence ‘for a spaceship to reach Hesperus just is for it 
to reach Phosphorus’; clearly the truth of this ‘just is’-statement is 
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grounded in the sameness of reference of the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’, which both refers to the planet Venus. Since, in some 
cases, sameness of reference is discovered by means of empirical 
investigations, ‘just is’-statements like that of our example are a 
posteriori necessary truths.12  However, if the ‘just is’-statement in 
question cannot be regarded as true in virtue of coincidence of 
reference of two constants, things are a bit harder.  
Consider the statement that we have previously called 
PROPERTIES, namely ‘for Susan to instantiate the property of 
running just is for Susan to run’. Here no empirical investigation can 
be of help; the task of determining its truth value must be carried out 
relying on entirely different considerations. The criterion that Rayo 
suggest to adopt is based on considerations of framework 
organisation. As we have just seen, ‘just is’-statements close a 
theoretical gap and, consequently, they make certain questions 
meaningless. This singular “power” can be extremely helpful in some 
cases; indeed there are metaphysical problems whose solution requires 
worthless theoretical effort. For example, if we believe in the 
existence of properties or simply we need, for our theoretical 
purposes, the introduction of entities like properties into our ontology, 
a typical objection that, fatally, we are supposed to answer is 
something along these lines: ‘I can see that there are good reasons to 
think that Susan is running, but I cannot see why we have to think that 
Susan is instantiating the property of running’. Naturally, there are 
arguments that can be employed to convince our opponent, but none 
of them is conclusive. This sole fact could be a good reason to think 
that there’s no point in trying to present a serious answer to the 
objection.  
                                                          
12 At least if we endorse a classical Kripkean view on reference and necessary truths. 
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A different (and radical) move should be preferred: claiming 
that the request of the opponent cannot be satisfied, since there is no 
difference between the fact that Susan is running and the fact that she 
is instantiating the property of running. This move should not be seen 
as ontologically inflationary. We are not adding anything to the 
“furniture” of the world: the existence of the property of running 
amounts to the same request that we make of the world when we 
assert that someone is running. To summarize up: ‘just is’-statement 
can be introduced on the basis of a cost-benefits evaluation. If the 
introduction of a ‘just is’-statement σ in a theory involves a significant 
benefit in terms of elegance of the theory itself and a significant 
reduction of the effort required in order to justify what is claimed, 
then the truth of σ is vindicated. 
 
2.4 The resulting picture 
Now we can easily see what’s the advantage of Rayo’s approach in 
the case of Hume Principle. The introduction of a ‘just is’-version of 
HP relieves us of the burden of explaining why, if (and only if) there 
are pluralities of things, there are also numbers corresponding to those 
pluralities. Usually, Platonism about numbers (or about other abstract 
entities) requires justifications that very often turns out to be 
complicated metaphysical tour de force. If we are not equipped with a 
good theory of, for example, ontological dependence of numbers on 
pluralities of things, we might consider the possibility of endorsing 
Rayo’s picture of metaontology and a ‘just is’-version of HP (call it 
HP≡). Thus we obtain a “cheap” Platonism about numbers: their 
existence is nothing but the same fact that there are pluralities of 
things, so, when we talk about them, we are not committing ourselves 
45 
 
to the existence of something extra. Therefore number-talk would 
stand with no need of further justification. 
The resulting picture is very close to the conclusions that 
Rudolf Carnap, in his Carnap (1950), comes to. There is no sense in 
which things absolutely exist; each theoretical framework requires the 
existence of different sets of things. Hence, questions on what there 
really is are to be answered saying something like “according to 
theoretical framework Γ there are Xs into the world”. Translated into 
Rayo’s words: there is no sense in which things absolutely exist; it 
depends on the set of ‘just is’-statements that we adopt. This set of 
statements (plus the set of statement that constitute a theory) 
establishes which things a theory is committed to. We are going to see 
below how exactly the ontological commitment is determined.  
In this view ‘just is’-statements can play at least two other roles. 
First: they can be seen as “bridge principles” that translate certain 
statements of a certain language into statements of a different 
language. For example HP≡ can be seen as a bridge between a second 
order language with no numerical vocabulary and a second order 
language provided with numerical vocabulary. HP≡ translates certain 
statements of the former into statements of the latter and vice-versa. 
Second: ‘just is’-statements can help in extending a basic theory into 
an extended theory which employs a richer vocabulary. As is well 
known, the introduction of (impredicative) HP, plus some very natural 
definitions, into a second order theory amounts to the creation of a 
theory that is equivalent to full second order Peano Arithmentics. 
Nothing prevents HP≡ from playing the same role, since its inferential 
power is certainly not lower than that of HP. 
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2.5 Metaphysicalism and Compositionalism 
Some philosophers are definitely hostile towards the kind of broadly 
Carnapian metaontology that we have outlined in the previous section. 
Their perplexity is related with a problem of legitimacy of ‘just is’-
statements as such. As we have said at the beginning of this chapter, 
some of them are unproblematic, because the sameness of meaning of 
their two sides is guaranteed by the sameness of reference of two 
singular terms and by the fact that nothing else differs. Nevertheless 
some other, like, for example, PROPERTIES, are not accepted by 
many philosophers, because it seems that their two sides make very 
different demands of the world. When it comes to a statement like 
PROPERTIES, how can the truth conditions of ‘Susan runs’ and ‘the 
property of running is instantiated by Susan’ be the same? While the 
first statement is about Susan and what Susan does, the second one 
seems to be about the relation between Susan and a certain property.  
The simplest answer seems to be this: at least one of the two 
statements is deceptively formulated. More specifically: while the 
surface grammar of the sentences suggests a certain content, their real 
content is different and it is somehow disguised by the grammatical 
appearance. If we translate one (or both) of them into an 
“ontologically appropriate” language, their real content will clearly 
appear to be the same. Now, this kind of solution is exactly what Rayo 
rejects in advance. Indeed, he assumes that the logical form of a 
sentence can be read more or less straightforwardly from the sentence 
surface grammar structure. This assumption is justified by the 
consensus of most linguists, who think that mismatches between 
“surface” structure and “deep” operative semantic structure are a very 
limited phenomenon (see, for example, Heim and Kratzer 1998); 
certainly not the kind of phenomenon that would allow us to us to 
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claim that sentences like ‘Susan runs’ and ‘the property of running is 
instantiated by Susan’ have the same logical form. Therefore the 
perplexity of many philosophers towards statements like 
PROPERTIES has to be dispelled in a different way. 
The first and most important question is: what’s the 
fundamental reason of this perplexity? The answer to this question is 
individuated by Rayo in a bunch of philosophical claims that he calls 
Metaphysicalism. Although it’s not explicitly presupposed, 
Metaphysicalism has a wide influence on the debate about ontological 
issues. It’s constituted by two thesis: one about metaphysics and one 
about reference. 
 Metaphysics: there is a fundamental way of carving up reality into 
its constituent parts. An analogy might help: each composite 
natural number can be decomposed into prime numbers and, for 
each composite number there is one and only one factorization. 
Something like that holds for facts: complex facts have a structure, 
they are composed of simpler parts, which stands in a certain 
mutual relation, and there is one and only one list of these parts and 
their mutual relations. 
 Reference: for an atomic sentence α to be true there must be a 
certain kind of correspondence between the logical form of α and 
the metaphysical structure of the portion of reality that α aims at 
describing.  
Supporters of Metaphysicalism are immediately barred from accepting 
statements like PROPERTIES. Indeed, its two sides have a different 
logical form, hence they represent facts having a different structure, 
therefore it’s impossible for them to have the same truth conditions. 
What is remarkable is that Metaphysicalism rejects statements like 
PROPERTIES merely on the basis of syntactic considerations, namely 
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without taking into account their content. To summarize up, we can 
say that Metaphysicalism is the source of the perplexity of some 
philosophers towards ‘just is’-statement. To be precise, not 
Metaphysicalism as a whole. Indeed the principled opposition to ‘just 
is’-statements comes from the thesis about reference. It should be 
noticed that such a claim is not entailed by the metaphysical thesis; 
one can certainly suppose that there is one and only one correct way 
of carving up a fact A into its constituent parts, without claiming that a 
sentence that aims at being a correct description of A must have a 
logical structure that mirrors the structure of A. The metaphysical 
thesis is clearly independent of the thesis about reference and can be 
accepted also by those who claim that ‘just is’-statements are not 
acceptable for merely syntactic reasons. Thus, only the endorsement 
of the thesis about reference results in a principled rejection of ‘just 
is’-statements. But according to Rayo there is no reason to endorse 
such a thesis, therefore there is no room for a principled rejection of 
‘just is’-statements. 
Rayo claims that the Metaphysicalist thesis about reference 
should be rejected essentially because it’s an example of bad 
philosophy of language. His line of argument is essentially as follows: 
for the purposes of stating a fact, object-talk is optional. Indeed,  we 
can describe one and the same state of affair using a language 
provided with singular terms and quantification over object-variables, 
as well as a language containing only predicates. For example, the 
content of “there is a table” can be as well expressed by the sentence 
“it tableize” of an hypothetic languages containing only predicates. 
The only reason why we generally prefer a language provided with 
singular terms and quantification over objects is that it enables us to 
recursively specify the truth conditions of a class of sentences, while a 
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language containing only predicates doesn’t. Therefore languages 
provided with singular terms and quantification over objects are not 
preferred because of their purported metaphysical adequacy. No 
serious argument can show that such a language can describe reality 
more precisely than any other kind of language. Therefore true 
sentences are not true in virtue of their mirroring the metaphysical 
structure of the facts they talk about. Nothing excludes that the 
property of being true is to be identified with a sort of correspondence 
with reality. Rayo’s point is only that an isomorphism between the 
logical form of a sentence and the metaphysical structure of the fact 
described is not a necessary condition.  
The view about reference, that Rayo proposes, is what he calls 
Compositionalism. Compositionalism is constituted by two thesis, the 
former about what counts as a genuine singular term, the second about 
reference of genuine singular terms: 
1. The following three conditions are jointly sufficient for an 
expression t to count as a genuine singular term: a) t behaves 
syntactically as a singular term; b) every sentence that one wishes 
to use and that contains t is provided with truth conditions; c) the 
assignment of truth conditions is coherent with the logical relations 
among sentences. 
2. If t is a genuine singular terms and the world is such as to satisfy 
the truth conditions that have been associated with the sentence 
∃x(t=x), or with any sentence inferentially equivalent with it, then t 
refers to something. 
Compositionalism is far more “generous” a view than 
Metaphysicalism, when it comes to their ontological consequences. To 
see this, we just have to apply its principles to the controversial case 
of PROPERTIES. Suppose that the statement ‘for Susan to instantiate 
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the property of running just is for Susan to run’ is formulated in a 
language in which ‘the property of running’ behaves syntactically as a 
singular term and such that truth conditions are assigned to every 
sentence in which this expression occurs (so that conditions 1.a and 
1.b are met). Moreover the truth conditions associated with the 
sentences in which the term occurs are such that if sentence α entails 
sentence β then what is demanded of the world for α to be true strictly 
includes what is demanded for β to be true (condition 1.c is met). 
Now, suppose that we have strong reasons to endorse PROPERTIES 
(obviously, reasons of framework organization, as illustrated in 
section 3); it turns out that the truth conditions associated with ‘Susan 
runs’ are the same that are associated with ‘the property of running is 
instantiated by Susan’. Hence, if ‘Susan runs’ happens to be true, then 
also ‘the property of running is instantiated by Susan’ is true. There’s 
no need for its logical form to mirror the structure of the same portion 
of reality which ‘Susan runs’ aims at describing. Metaphysicalism 
would require this kind of correspondence while, in Rayo’s view, the 
fulfilling of such a burdening requirement is not necessary. The 
sentence ‘the property of running is instantiated by Susan’ is 
inferentially equivalent to ‘for some x, x is instantiated by Susan and x 
is the property of running’ that entails ‘for some x, x is the property of 
running’. Thus also condition 2 is met. According to 
Compositionalism, we are entitled to claim that the singular term ‘the 
property of running’ really refers to something. We can conclude that 
there are such things like the ‘property of running’, although we don’t 
have any “robust” metaphysical justification for their existence. 
Certainly, in Rayo’s view, what is required for a singular term 
to refer to something is not so much. But the fact that the requirements 
for referentiality are not particularly demanding doesn’t mean that the 
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object to which some singular terms refer are to be considered “thin” 
in some sense. Dummett’s considerations on this issue are widely 
known and there’s no need to recap them here; it’s enough to recall 
that he thinks that we can introduce into our language some abstract 
terms and the assignation of suitable truth conditions to sentences 
containing them is sufficient to guarantee that these terms really refer. 
Nevertheless such a reference is not to be interpreted in a “realist 
fashion” (see Dummett 1991). Abstract objects, in this sense, are a 
special kind of things that have been called ‘thin objects’. Although 
Rayo’s requirement for referentiality are light, I don’t think that, in his 
view, there are such things as “thin” or “lightweight” objects. 
Consider again PROPERTIES: the left hand side statement and the 
right hand side statement are treated as fully symmetric. None of them 
contains singular terms that refer in weaker sense than the singular 
terms of the other. Both are a fully accurate description of a state of 
affairs and the truth of ‘Susan runs’ entails not only the existence of 
Susan, but also the existence of the property of running since this 
latter thing is what a singular term of the left hand side of 
PROPERTIES refers to. A number of passages from Rayo (2013) 
seem to confirm this.13 I think that, in Rayo’s view, nothing prevents 
                                                          
13 Consider, for example, what he says at page 5: “One could suggest, for example, that a 
‘just is’-statement should only be counted as true if the right hand side “explains the left 
hand side, or if it is in some sense “more fundamental”. This is not the reading that will 
be relevant for present purposes”. And again at page 24: “The anty-metaphysicalist is 
certainly committed to the view that a single feature of reality can be fully and accurately 
described in different ways. But this doesn’t entail that there is no fact of the matter about 
how the world is. On the contrary: it is strictly and literally true that the number of 
dinosaurs is Zero, and therefore that there are numbers. And this is so independently of 
which sentences are used to describe the world – or, indeed, of whether there is anyone 
around to describe it. The point is simply that the relevant features of the world could be 
also fully and accurately described in another way: by asserting ‘there are no dinosaurs’”. 
This latter quote is directed against a possible misunderstanding of his view (namely the 
misunderstanding of those who think that the truth of ‘just is’-statements involve a 
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abstract singular terms, that figure in a true ‘just is’-statement, from 
referring in a “realist fashion”.  
For this reason, one could be tempted to think that he 
presupposes a correspondentist conception of truth and that such a 
conception is what grounds the Compositionalist thesis about 
reference. If an atomic sentence is true, then it’s an accurate 
description of a portion of reality and therefore every singular term 
that occurs in it has a reference (even if the logical form of the 
sentence doesn’t mirror the structure of the portion of reality it aims at 
describing). If an atomic sentence is such that one of its singular terms 
doesn’t refer, then it cannot count as a fully accurate description of a 
fact. I’m not completely sure that Rayo would support this latter 
claim, but it doesn’t matter. The point that I would like to make is not 
exegetic, but a rather substantial one: Rayo’s anti-metaphysicalist 
view is fully compatible with a correspondentist conception of truth. 
Such a way of conceiving truth is exactly what he needs in order to 
claim that the two sides of a ‘just is’-statement are descriptions of the 
same fact. As we already said, a supporter of anti-metaphysicalism 
doesn’t think that ‘α just is β’ is such that only one of its two sides, 
say β,  has to be taken literally, while the other (α)  is, at best, 
assertable on the basis of the fact that β is true. Instead she would 
claim that both α and β are a fully accurate description of a fact (the 
same). In other words she thinks their truth is to be intended as 
correspondence. I think that there’s a way of assigning truth 
conditions to sentences such that two sentences with a different logical 
form can have the same truth conditions and such that the truth of a 
sentence consist in its correspondence to a fact.  As we are going to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
conception of the world as a structureless blob), but is pretty clear that the point that it 
makes is extremely relevant also for my purposes.   
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see in the next section, this thesis requires a revision of the classical 
rules that we follow when we assign truth conditions to sentences, 
since these rules are a formalization of the principle according to 
which the truth of a sentence requires a sort of mirroring between 
logical form and structure of a fact. Such an alternative way of 
assigning truth conditions is the topic of the rest of this chapter; I will 
try to show that ‘just is’-statements can be true in a correspondentist 
sense of ‘true’ even if we drop the assumption that the 
‘correspondence’ involves ‘mirroring’. 
 
2.6 Truth conditions 
What I would like to prove is that the following five claims are fully 
compatible: 
 UNIVOCITY: the translation of a sentence of a natural language 
into a sentence of a formal language is (at least in the vast majority 
of cases) straightforward and univocal. 
 CORRESPONDENCE: a sentence is true if and only if it 
corresponds to a fact. 
 ANTI-MIRROR: for a sentence to be true there’s no need for its 
logical structure to mirror the structure of a fact. 
 MONOTONICY: if ϕ can be derived, in virtue of its sole logical 
form, from ψ, then the truth conditions associated with ψ are at 
least as strong a requirement as those associated with ϕ. 
 ACCEPTABILITY: two sentences with a different logical form 
can have the same truth conditions. 
In other words, we need a view of meaning such that some ‘just is’-
statements are acceptable (ACCEPTABILITY), because their left 
hand side and their right hand side correspond to the same fact 
(CORRESPONDENCE). Obviously this correspondence cannot be 
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conceived as mirroring (ANTI-MIRROR) since these two sides really, 
and not only apparently, have different logical forms (UNIVOCITY). 
Such a view of meaning must respect the same logical requisites that 
model-theoretic semantics respect (MONOTONICY). 
The main problem is with the compatibility of 
ACCEPTABILITY and CORRESPONDENCE. Indeed the fact that 
two different atomic sentences can have the same truth conditions is 
certainly puzzling: if we follow the classical rules for the 
determination of truth conditions (those which are usually considered 
as the paradigm of a realist interpretation of sentences) we cannot but 
assign them different truth conditions. Take, for example, the two 
atomic statements that flanks the ‘just is’-operator in PROPERTIES: 
‘Susan runs’ and ‘the property of running is instantiated by Susan’. 
Their formal translations are, respectively, ‘Rs’ and ‘I(Rs)’. The 
classical rule that we adopt, when it comes to assign truth conditions 
to atomic sentences, can be stated as follows: 
RULE: given a model M constituted by a domain  and a function 
, a sentence of the form Rc1c2c3...cn, where R is a n-ary predicate 
symbol and c1, c2, c3... cn are individual constants, is true if and only 
if the individuals denoted by c1, c2, c3... cn stands in the relation 
denoted by R, namely if and only if (c1), (c2), (c3), ..., (cn) are 
members of (R).           . 
Therefore the truth conditions of our two sentences according to 
RULE are: 1) for ‘Rs’: ‘Rs’ is true if and only if the individual 
designated by ‘s’ belongs to the set of things that are R; 2) for ‘I(Rs)’: 
‘I(Rs)’ is true if and only if the individuals designated by ‘R’ and ‘s’14 
                                                          
14 I employ to different sorts of symbols for individuals and properties: capital letters for 
properties and lowercase letters for individuals. As we are going to see a basic first order 
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stand in the relation I. Now, whatever model we adopt, there is no 
possibility for these two atomic statement of having the same truth 
conditions. The mismatch between their logical form is sufficient to 
exclude this eventuality. This sole example is enough to show us that 
the classical rules for the assignment of truth conditions are 
incompatible with the truth of ‘just is’-statements like PROPERTIES. 
No way out based on a distinction between the apparent logical form 
of a statement and its authentic or “deep” logical form is available. 
One of the desiderata of our theory is that the translation of a sentence 
into a first order formal language can be simply derived from the 
surface syntax of the sentence at issue (UNIVOCITY). Since many 
‘just is’-statements are such that the logical forms of their left and side 
and right hand side are different, we face a dilemma: either 
renouncing most ‘just is’-statements or renouncing to the classical 
clauses for truth conditions (at least for atomic sentences). If we want 
to assume that a statement like PROPERTIES can be true, we need to 
drop out of the classical clauses for the assignment of truth conditions 
and replace them with something more suitable. 
I think, and I would like to show, that the best way to do so is 
the adoption of a semantics where the truth of a sentence depends on 
its relation to a fact. This could seem hardly a progress, since also 
classical semantics assumes that a certain sentence is true if and only 
if there is a fact that is shaped in such and such a way. But this latter 
determination is the source of our problem: classical semantics 
doesn’t limit itself to assigning truth to a sentence α if and only if 
there is a fact A that (somehow) corresponds to α. It descend to a 
deeper level, “unpacking” the fact in question and establishing how it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
language satisfying our theoretical purposes can be easily enriched with a new sort of 
variables, becoming able to express contents like ‘the property X is instantiated by x’. 
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must be shaped in order to be what corresponds to α. One of the 
desiderata that our theory should satisfy is what we have called 
ANTI-MIRROR, a principle that states that the logical form of a true 
sentence doesn’t need to mirror the metaphysical structure of the fact 
it correspond to. The classical rule that we follow when we assign 
truth conditions to an atomic sentence is not consistent with the 
conjunction of ANTI-MIRROR, UNIVOCITY and 
ACCEPTABILITY. What we need is to replace RULE with 
something less “invasive”. If we succeed in assigning a fact to a 
sentence without decomposing the fact itself into finer grained 
components and conserving the respect of the requisite that we have 
called MONOTONICY, then the problem is solved.  
In the semantics that I’m going to present, and that I will call 
anti-matephysicalist semantics, the role of assigning truth conditions 
to sentences is played by two distinct functions: a function assigning 
to a sentence α a fact that weakly satisfies α and a function assigning 
to a sentence β a fact that strongly satisfies β. We are going to employ 
the symbol Φ to designate the former and the symbol Ψ to designate 
the latter. Both Φ and Ψ have sentences as arguments and facts as 
values. These two kind of semantic relations are to be conceived as 
fundamental and not analyzable. For the purpose of clarification, we 
can say that a fact A weakly satisfies a sentence α if and only if the 
existence of A is sufficient to make α true, and a fact B strongly 
satisfies β if and only if B is described by β. Two examples can be of 
help: 1) the fact that whales breastfeed their babies weakly satisfies 
the sentence ‘whales are not fishes’, because it is sufficient to make 
the sentence true; 2) the fact that 23 has no positive divisor other that 
1 and 23 strongly satisfies the sentence ‘23 is prime’, because that 
sentence is a full and accurate description of the fact in question. 
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Anyway, it’s very important to bear in mind that the notions of weak 
satisfaction and strong satisfaction are elementary and not apt to be 
analyzed. The previous clarifications are not to be taken as definitions. 
A sentence α is true if and only if either Φ or Ψ are defined for 
the argument α, otherwise is false. Intuitively, if there is no fact that 
makes α true or that α represents, then α doesn’t correspond to any 
fragment of reality, therefore α is false. One could object: what about 
logical truths? Do your functions assigns some fact to them? If so, 
then you are assuming the existence of strange entities like logical 
facts or (even worse) you are assuming that some contingent facts 
make valid sentences true. If not, then you are assuming that valid 
sentences are false. I think that no solution can be completely 
satisfactory. Since, as we will see, the semantics I’m going to propose 
is formulated in terms of collections of facts, I assume that Φ assigns 
valid sentences to a sort of empty collection, a collection containing 
no facts. This is not to be interpreted as the introduction of a suspect 
entity like the null fact. I simply mean that Φ is defined for valid 
sentences (thus valid sentences are true), but there is no particular fact 
whose existence is needed for them to be true.  
The introduction of two distinct functions which aims at 
assigning semantic values to sentences needs some explanation. Every 
first order theory includes or, at least, entails some negative statement. 
In our semantics, a sentence, also a negative one, cannot be true 
without corresponding to a fact. If the only possible semantic relation 
between sentences and facts were that of strong satisfaction, encoded 
by function Ψ, then it would be necessary the postulation of special 
facts which are fully and accurately described by negative sentences. 
There’s no need to say that negative facts are metaphysically 
unappealing; the sole fact that a semantic theory requires their 
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existence can constitute a good reason for its rejection. To avoid this 
dead-end we introduce another kind of semantic relation, that of weak 
satisfaction, which allows us to assign semantic values to negative 
sentences, avoiding any undesirable ontological commitment. This 
different kind of semantic relation is encoded by function Φ. How can 
this function make true a negative sentence like, for example, ¬α? 
The answer is very simple: by assigning it to a certain “positive” fact 
A. If Φ(¬α) = A, then A is the fact whose sole existence is 
incompatible with what is expressed by sentence α. Nothing rules out 
the possibility, for a positive sentence β, of being such that Φ(β) = A. 
In this case we say that the fact A makes true both ¬α and β by being 
incompatible with what is expressed by α and by being what makes 
true what is expressed by β. This situation can be illustrated by many 
examples taken from our everyday linguistic practice. Consider the 
sentences ‘Bacteria are not eukaryotes’ and ‘Bacteria are prokaryotes’; 
it’s quite intuitive that they are made true by the same fact, namely 
that Bacteria are single-celled organisms that lack a membrane-bound 
nucleus. This single fact is incompatible with their being eukaryote 
(hence it makes the first sentence true) and is what makes the second 
sentence true.  
Now, what about ‘just is’-statements? We know that the two 
sides that compose them are in a relation of identity of truth 
conditions, but now the question becomes more precise: what kind of 
truth conditions are at issue here? Those assigned by function Φ or 
those assigned by Ψ? If we think that the identity of truth conditions 
between the two sides of a ‘just is’-statement consist in an identity of 
facts that weakly satisfy those two sides, we leave open the possibility 
of ‘just is’-statements that are not necessarily true. Consider the 
previous example: ‘Bacteria are not eukaryote’ and ‘Bacteria are 
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prokaryote’. They are made true by the same fact, but we are not 
allowed to put them in a ‘just is’-statement, since the result would be a 
statement that is only contingently true. Indeed it’s only contingently 
true that a living being can be only prokaryote or eukaryote; a third 
realm, although not actually instantiated by any living being, is 
possible, at least logically possible. Thus, for something to be 
eukaryote is not just being not-prokaryote. We are allowed to 
formulate a ‘just is’-statement only when, given two statements α and 
β, Ψ(α) = Ψ(β), namely when α and β are strongly satisfied by the 
same fact. The relation of strong satisfaction is to be conceived as 
strictly more demanding than that of weak satisfaction; if a fact A 
strongly satisfies α then A weakly satisfies α, but the converse does 
not hold. 
The two notions that we have just introduced allow us to replace 
RULE with something far less demanding, something that doesn’t 
exclude that two different atomic sentences with a different logical 
form can correspond to the same fact. 
RULE*: an atomic sentence α is true if and only if function Φ is 
defined for the argument α, namely if and only if there is a fact that, 
even if it doesn’t strongly satisfy α, at least weakly satisfies α. 
What we need finally is a set of constraint on functions Φ and Ψ 
capable of saving MONOTONICY. This is going to be the main 
purpose of the next section.  
 
2.7 A General Anti-Metaphysicalist Semantics  
Suppose we have a uninterpreted first order countable language with 
identity ℒ, enriched with the just is operator ‘≡’. The logical operators 
of ℒ are ¬, ∧, ∨, ∃, ∀, = and ≡. A deductive system is fixed by the 
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classical introduction and elimination rules for the for the symbols ¬, 
∧, ∨, ∃, ∀, =. An introduction and an elimination rule for ≡ will be 
presented soon. Since ℒ is countable, the set L whose members are all 
the sentences of ℒ is countable too. For simplicity reasons we assume 
that L contains only closed sentences, no open formula is allowed.15 
Let the set C={a, b, c, ...} contain all the constants of ℒ.16 Let F={A, 
B, C, ...} be a set of atomic facts. Here the world ‘atomic’ should be 
understood as ‘undecomposable’. It must not be intended as 
‘something that is portrayed by an atomic sentence’, since we have no 
reason to rule out the possibility of an atomic sentence strongly 
satisfied by a complex fact or weakly satisfied by a complex fact. The 
introduction of a set of atomic facts doesn’t necessarily amount to an 
ontological commitment to facts as fundamental constituent of reality; 
nothing prevent us from decomposing them in more fundamental 
entities (like, for example, individuals and properties). The 
introduction of a set of atomic facts is ontologically neutral; the only 
metaphysical assumption is that facts, whatever they are, can be 
decomposed until we reach a basic level, at which a further 
decomposition would not result in a plurality of simpler facts. 
Pluralities of facts can be taken as a whole. For this purpose we 
introduce the operation  ⊔ of union among facts. We are going to 
write A⊔B to indicate the fact constituted by A and B taken as a 
whole; in some occasions we are going to write ⊔(A, B, C, ...) if we 
are considering the union of many facts. Analogously we can also 
define an operation of overlap (in symbols, ⊓). Two unions of atomic 
                                                          
15 Rayo (2013) p. 67 declares that there can be ‘just is’-statements with free variables, so 
the constraint that we impose is needed only to simplify our formalization.  
16 If someone wishes to make this language capable of expressing second order sentences, 
she can add a further set of constants, turning ℒ into a two-sorted language. For simplicity 
reasons I restrict myself to the presentation of a first order language. 
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facts overlap if and only if there is at least one atomic fact that is a 
proper part of both unions. Unions of atomic facts are complex facts. 
We introduce now a sort of analogous of the power set: if F, as we 
have said previously, is the set of all facts, ℘(F) is the set of all the 
possible unions among the members of F. Let Φ be a partial function 
L→℘(F) assigning to each sentence that is included into its domain a 
minimal fact that weakly satisfy it. ‘Minimal’ because it’s the 
minimum union of atomic facts that weakly satisfy α. Suppose that α 
is weakly satisfied by the fact A⊔B; then it is of course made true by 
⊔(A, B, C) and also by ⊔(A, B, C, D). Moreover we can simply say 
that, for each sentence α such that Φ is defined for α, Φ(α) = F. To 
avoid this trivialization we establish that, for every α, such that Φ is 
defined for α, Φ(α) is the overlap of all the members of ℘(F) that 
weakly satisfy α. The assumption that we make is obviously that this 
overlap exists and is sufficient to weakly satisfy α; in other words we 
assume that a sentence α cannot be made true by two (complex) facts 
⊔(A, B, C, ...) and ⊔(A’, B’, C’, ...) such that their overlap doesn’t 
exost or is unable to weakly satisfy α.  
The function Φ doesn’t need to be injective, since it can be the 
case that two different sentences are weakly satisfied by the same fact. 
Moreover it doesn’t need to be surjective, since there’s no reason to 
assume that the domain of Φ is a set of sentences that correspond to 
every fact of the world (we don’t rule out the possibility of facts that 
doesn’t satisfy any sentence of ℒ).  
Function Φ must respect these constraints in order to fulfil 
MONOTONICY: 
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1. If a sentence α is a=b and Φ is defined for the argument α then, for 
every sentence σ(a) ∈ L such that Φ is defined for σ(a), Φ is 
defined for σ(b) and vice versa. 
2. If a sentence α is identical with ¬β and Φ is defined for the 
argument α, then Φ is not defined for the argument β and vice 
versa. 
3. If α is identical with β∧γ and Φ is defined for the argument α, then 
Φ is defined for both the arguments β and γ and Φ(α) = ⊔(Φ(β), 
Φ(γ)). 
4. If Φ is defined for the arguments α and β then it’s defined also for 
the argument α∧β and Φ(α∧β) = ⊔(Φ(α), Φ(β)). 
5. If α is identical with β∨γ and Φ is defined for the argument α , 
then if Φ is not defined for γ then Φ is defined for β. 
6. If Φ is defined for α then it is defined also for α∨β. 
7. If α is identical with ∃xβ and Φ is defined for the argument α, 
then: 1) if β contains no variable, then Φ is defined for β and Φ(α) 
= Φ(β); 2) if β ↔ σ(x), then, for some c∈C, Φ is defined for the 
argument [σ(x)](x/c). 
8. If, for some c∈C, Φ is defined for [σ(x)](x/c), then: 1) Φ is 
defined for ∃x[σ(x)](x/c); 2) Φ is defined for ∃xσ(x). 
9. If α is identical with ∀xβ and Φ is defined for the argument α, 
then: 1) if β contains no variable, then Φ is defined for the 
argument β and Φ(α) = Φ(β); 2) if β ↔ σ(x), then, for every c∈C, 
Φ is defined for the argument [σ(x)](x/c) and Φ(α) is identical 
with the union of the facts that weakly satisfy these sentences. 
10. If, for every c∈C, Φ is defined for [σ(x)](x/c) then: 1) Φ is defined 
for ∀x[σ(x)](x/c) for every c∈C and Φ(∀x[σ(x)](x/c)) = 
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Φ([σ(x)](x/c)); 2) Φ is defined for ∀xσ(x) and Φ(∀xσ(x)) is the 
union of the facts that weakly satisfy all the sentences [σ(x)](x/c) 
11. If α is identical with β≡γ and Φ is defined for the argument α, then 
if Φ is defined for the argument β so is for γ and vice versa, and 
Φ(β) = Φ(γ). 
Clauses 5, 6 about disjunction and clauses 7, 8 about existential 
quantification deserve some comments. I take a disjunction like α∨β 
to be made true by a fact that can be identified neither with what 
makes true α, nor with what makes true β (and not even with the 
union of these two verifiers). Indeed if it were the case that Φ(α∨β) = 
⊔(Φ(α),Φ(β)) then the truth of α would not entail the truth of α∨β, 
since α∨β asks Φ to be defined also for  β, not only for α. Clauses 5 
and 6 constraint function Φ in such a way that if Φ is defined for α, 
then it’s defined also for α∨β and if Φ is defined for α∨β, but not for 
α, then it’s surely defined for β. This says nothing on the nature of 
facts making true α,  β and α∨β. Analogous considerations apply to 
clauses 7 and 8. This move avoids problems with the notion of logical 
consequence that we are going to introduce later. 
Let Ψ be a partial function L→℘(F) that associates each 
sentence that belongs to its domain to the fact that strongly satisfies it.  
Also in this case the function at issue is not injective nor surjective. 
Here we have the requirements that the function Ψ must satisfy 
in order to fulfil MONOTONICY: 
12. If sentence α is identical with a=b and Ψ is defined for the 
argument α then, for every sentence σ(a) ∈ L such that Ψ is 
defined for σ(a), Ψ is defined for σ(b) and vice versa. 
13. If α is identical with ¬β and Ψ is defined for the argument α, 
then: 1) Ψ is not defined for the argument β; 2) if α is not logically 
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equivalent with a positive sentence (= a sentence that doesn’t start 
with a negation operator), then there is a γ∈L such that γ is positive 
and Ψ(α) = Ψ(γ). 
14. If α is identical with β∧γ and Ψ is defined for the argument α, 
then Ψ is defined for both the arguments β and γ and Ψ(α) = 
⊔(Ψ(β), Ψ(γ)). 
15. If Ψ is defined for both the arguments α and β, then it’s defined 
also for the argument α∧β. 
16. If α ↔ ∀xβ and Ψ is defined for the argument α, then: 1) if β 
contains no variable, then Ψ is defined for the argument β and 
Ψ(α) = Ψ(β); 2) if β ↔ σ(x), then, for every c∈C, Ψ is defined for 
the argument [σ(x)](x/c) and Ψ(α) is identical with the union of 
facts that strongly satisfy these sentences. 
17. If, for every c∈C, Ψ is defined for [σ(x)](x/c) then: 1) Ψ is defined 
for ∀x[σ(x)](x/c) for every c∈C and Ψ(∀x[σ(x)](x/c)) = 
Ψ([σ(x)](x/c)); 2) Ψ is defined for ∀xσ(x) and Ψ(∀xσ(x)) is the 
union of facts that strongly satisfy all the sentences [σ(x)](x/c). 
18. If α ↔ β≡γ and Ψ is defined for the argument α, then if Ψ is 
defined for the argument β so is for γ and vice versa, and Ψ(β) = 
Ψ(γ). 
19. If α and β are such that Ψ(α) = Ψ(β), then Ψ is defined for α≡β. 
Moreover there is a further constraint that Φ and Ψ have to respect: 
20. If Ψ is defined for the argument α then also Φ is defined for α and 
Ψ (α) = Φ(α). 
If a couple (Φ, Ψ) satisfies all these 20 constraints then it constitute an 
acceptable interpretation of ℒ. If an acceptable couple (Φ, Ψ) is such 
that, for every sentence α∈L, Φ is either defined for α or for ¬α we 
say that (Φ, Ψ) is a complete interpretation of ℒ.  
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Finally we can define the notion of logical consequence: 
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE: Let ℐ be the set of all couple of 
functions that constitute a complete interpretation of a language ℒ. 
We say that α is a logical consequence of a set of sentences Γ (in 
symbols Γ⊨α) if and only if there is no (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ such that Φ is 
defined for every sentence β∈Γ and not defined for α. 
In the Appendix below I’ll prove the theorems of consistency, 
completeness and compactness for this notion of logical consequence.  
 
2.8 Some conclusive remarks 
The anti-metaphysicalist semantics that we have just introduced has 
the remarkable virtue of satisfying all the five desiderata that we set at 
the beginning of section 6. It allows us to regard as true all and only 
the sentence that correspond to a fact (CORRESPONDENCE), since 
the functions Φ and Ψ represent the two different ways in which a 
sentence can correspond to a fact. It’s possible, for two statements 
with a different logical form, to correspond to the same fact 
(ACCEPTABILITY). The requisite of MONOTONICY is respected 
by every couple (Φ,Ψ) that satisfies the 20 constraints indicated in 
section 2.7. Finally, truth conditions are assigned independently of any 
kind of isomorphism between logical form of sentences and structure 
of corresponding facts (NO-MIRROR); thus the reading of the logical 
form of a sentence from its surface semantics is allowed and totally 
harmless (UNIVOCITY). 
Three final remarks deserve to be made:  
Remark 1: Anti-metaphysicalist semantics adopt substitutional 
quantification. This cannot be avoided, since we don’t employ any 
domain of object over which one can quantify. 
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Remark 2: The two semantic notions that we employ are left 
without a definition. I assume that they are primitive concepts. In most 
cases, when we grasp what a sentence α says, we are able to identify 
the fact it correspond to and to establish whether it weakly satisfies α 
true or strongly satisfies α. The criteria that we adopt in doing such a 
cognitive task are complex and maybe not easily definable. For our 
purposes this is not a problem, since here we deal only with semantic 
notions. Indeed our question is ‘how can α mean something?’ and not 
‘how do we know what α means?’ 
Remark 3: The classical assignment of truth conditions to 
atomic sentences somehow contributes to explain how we manage to 
understand (and employ appropriately) sentences that we have never 
heard before. The well known Generality Constraint claims that “if a 
subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have 
the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for 
every property of being G of which he has a conception” (Evans 1982, 
p. 104). The classical (model theoretic) assignment of truth conditions 
fits perfectly with the Generality Constraints, since it clearly shows 
how the semantic value of an atomic sentence depends on the 
semantic values of its components. Thus it contributes to explain how 
a subject that can understand ‘a is F’ is able to understand also ‘a is 
G’: the meaning of the first sentence depends on its components and 
once someone gets the meaning of these components is also able to 
understand a statements where one of these components is replaced by 
another one. A supporter of anti-metaphysicalist semantics must be 
inclined to accept that his semantic apparatus cannot do that. Since, in 
this view, the smaller meaningful part of the discourse is individuated 
in a complete sentence, there’s no way in which the meaning 
attributed to a sentence like ‘a is F’ can be of help in explaining why 
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people who understand ‘a is F’ are also able to understand ‘a is G’. A 
supporter of anti-metaphysicalism can say that the task of semantics is 
not to ease the explanation of the mental processes of language 
understanding. Semantics is exclusively about meaning, not about 
“what we get when we understand a sentence”. We could even say 
that there are two different notion of meaning of a sentence α: 1) how 
the world must be in order for α to be true and   2) what we get when 
we understand α. The supporter of anti-metaphysicalism deals only 
with the first interpretation of the notion of meaning and is not 
concerned with the second. This might be considered a remarkable 
cost, depending on how we are inclined to define meaning. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Consistency 
We adopt the usual inference rules for the logical connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, 
∃, ∀, =. The proof of their consistency is completely straightforward 
and largely overlapping with the classical proof of consistency. The 
only rule that doesn’t appear in classical consistency proofs and that 
we need to justify explicitly is that associated with the operator  ≡. 
Such a rule establishes that α, α≡β ⊢ β.  
Proof: whatever function Ψ, that is member of an acceptable 
pair (Φ, Ψ)∈ℐ, and that is defined for α and for α≡β cannot but be 
defined for β, because whatever acceptable pair (Φ, Ψ) has to respect 
constraint 18, which says that if Ψ is defined for α and for α≡β, thenΨ 
is defined for β. 
 
2. Completeness 
We want to prove that, for every theory Γ ⊆ L, and every α ∈ L, if 
Γ⊨α then Γ⊢α. 
Theorem 1 
These two statements are equivalent: 
a) if Γ⊨α then Γ⊢α. 
b) if Γ is consistent then there is a pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies17 Γ. 
Proof 
 Proof of a)→b): suppose (for reductio) that if Γ⊨α then Γ⊢α, that 
Γ is consistent and that there is no pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ. 
                                                          
17 Here the notion of satisfaction is not that of weak satisfaction, nor strong satisfaction 
that hold only for single sentences, but a different notion: a theory Γ is satisfied by a 
couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈  if and only if (Φ, Ψ) is such that Φ is defined for every sentence 
belonging to Γ. 
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If there is no pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ capable of satisfying Γ, then there 
must be a sentence β such that Γ⊨β and Γ⊨¬β. Therefore, since 
we are assuming that if Γ⊨α then Γ⊢α, we have Γ⊢β and Γ⊢¬β. 
But this contradicts our previous assumption that Γ is consistent. 
Hence, if we assume that  if Γ⊨α then Γ⊢α and that Γ is 
consistent, it turns out that there is a pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies 
Γ. From this follows that a)→b). 
 Proof of b)→a): suppose (for reductio) that if Γ is consistent then 
there is a pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ, that Γ⊨α and that Γ⊬α. 
If Γ⊬α then Γ∪{¬α} is consistent. Therefore, since we assume 
that if Γ is consistent then there is a pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ, 
there must be a pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ∪{¬α}. But this 
contradicts our previous assumption that Γ⊨α. Thus, if we assume 
that if Γ is consistent then there is a pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ 
and that Γ⊨α, it turns out that Γ⊢α. From this follows that b)→a).  
Thus we can prove that, for every theory Γ ⊆ L, and every α ∈ L, if 
Γ⊨α then Γ⊢α, simply by proving that if Γ is consistent, then there is 
a pair (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ. 
Definition 1 
A theory Γ is complete relative to L if and only if, for every α ∈ L, 
either α ∈ Γ or ¬α ∈ Γ.  
Theorem 2 
Every consistent theory Γ ∈ L can be extended to a theory Γ’ 
consistent and complete. 
Proof: consider a consistent theory Γ; we can extend it by 
adding a sentence α∈L which doesn’t belong to Γ and such that ¬α 
doesn’t belong to Γ. The result of the implementation of this 
procedure is a set of sentences Γ that is consistent (since, in each step 
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of our procedure the raising of a contradiction is blocked) and 
complete (since the process doesn’t stop until every sentence that 
doesn’t make Γ inconsistent is included). 
Definition 2  
We define Γ as saturated relative to L if and only if Γ satisfies these 
conditions: 
1. ¬¬α ∈ Γ entails α ∈ Γ, 
2. α∧β ∈ Γ entails α ∈ Γ and β ∈ Γ, 
3. ¬(α∧β) ∈ Γ entails ¬α ∈ Γ or ¬β ∈ Γ, 
4. α∨β ∈ Γ entails α ∈ Γ or β ∈ Γ, 
5. ¬(α∨β) ∈ Γ entails ¬α ∈ Γ and ¬β ∈ Γ, 
6. ∀xα ∈ Γ entails α(x/c) ∈ Γ for every c ∈ C, 
7. ¬∀xα ∈ Γ entails ¬α(x/c) ∈ Γ for some c ∈ C, 
8. ∃xα ∈ Γ entails α(x/c) ∈ Γ for some c ∈ C, 
9. ¬∃xα∈Γ entails ¬α(x/c) ∈ Γ for every c ∈ C, 
10. for every sentence α, Γ doesn’t contain both α and ¬α, 
11. for every formula α(a, b, c, ...) ∈ Γ, if a=a’, b=b’, c=c’, ..., then 
α(a’, b’, c’, ...) ∈ Γ, 
12. α≡β ∈ Γ and α ∈ Γ entail β ∈ Γ. 
Theorem 3 
If Γ is consistent and complete then Γ is saturated. 
Proof:  
1. If Γ is complete, then either α or ¬α belongs Γ. But ¬¬α∈Γ and, 
since Γ is coherent α belongs to Γ. Indeed if ¬α belonged to Γ 
(instead of α) then Γ would include both ¬α and ¬¬α losing, thus, 
its coherence. 
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2. If α∧β ∈ Γ and Γ is complete, then one between α and ¬α and one 
between β and ¬β belong to Γ. But neither ¬α nor ¬β belongs to 
Γ, since Γ is coherent. Therefore Γ includes α and β.  
3. If ¬(α∧β) ∈ Γ and Γ is complete, then one between α and ¬α and 
one between β and ¬β belong to Γ. But if both α and β belonged to 
Γ, then Γ would not be coherent. Therefore at least one between 
¬α and ¬β belongs to Γ. 
4. If α∨β ∈ Γ and Γ is complete, then one between α and ¬α and one 
between β and ¬β belong to Γ. But if both ¬α and ¬β belonged to 
Γ, then Γ would not be coherent. Therefore at least one between α 
and β belongs to Γ. 
5. If ¬(α∨β) ∈ Γ and Γ is complete, then one between α and ¬α and 
one between β and ¬β belong to Γ. But if at least one between α 
and β belonged to Γ, then Γ would not be coherent. Therefore both 
α and β belong Γ. 
6. If ∀xα ∈ Γ and Γ is complete then, for every c ∈ C, either α(x/c) 
or ¬α(x/c) belongs to Γ. But if there were a constant k ∈ C such 
that ¬α(x/k) belongs to Γ, then Γ would not be coherent. Therefore 
α(x/c) ∈ Γ for every c ∈ C. 
7. If ¬∀xα ∈ Γ and Γ is complete then, for every c ∈ C, either α(x/c) 
or ¬α(x/c)  belongs to Γ. But if, for every c ∈ C, α(x/c)  belonged 
to Γ, then Γ would be incoherent. Therefore, at least for one 
constant k ∈ C, ¬α(x/k) belongs to Γ.  
8. If ∃xα ∈ Γ and Γ is complete then, for every c ∈ C, either α(x/c) 
or ¬α(x/c) belongs to Γ. But if there were no constant k ∈ C such 
that α(x/k) belonged to Γ, then Γ would not be coherent. Therefore 
α(x/c) ∈ Γ for some c ∈ C. 
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9. If ¬∃xα∈Γ and Γ is complete then, for every c ∈ C, either α(x/c) 
or ¬α(x/c) belongs to Γ. But if, for some c ∈ C, α(x/c) belonged to 
Γ, then Γ would be incoherent. Therefore, for all constant k ∈ C, 
¬α(x/k) belongs to Γ.  
10. If α∈Γ and Γ is coherent and complete, then Γ cannot include ¬α. 
11. If α(a, b, c, ...) ∈ Γ and Γ is complete, then, if a=a’, b=b’, c=c’ 
either α(a’, b’, c’, ...) ∈Γ or ¬α(a’, b’, c’, ...) ∈Γ. But if ¬α(a’, b’, 
c’, ...) belonged to Γ, then Γ would be inconsistent. Therefore α(a’, 
b’, c’, ...)∈Γ. 
12. If α≡β ∈ Γ and α ∈ Γ and Γ is complete, then either β or ¬β 
belongs to Γ. But if ¬β belonged to Γ then Γ would be 
inconsistent. Therefore β∈Γ. 
Theorem 4 
If a theory Γ is saturated then there is a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that 
satisfies Γ. 
Proof: suppose Γ is saturated, but there is no couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ 
that satisfies Γ. Then there must be at least one sentence γ such that no 
member of ℐ can assign a fact to γ. But if no member of ℐ can do so, 
then the assignation of a fact to γ would violate at least one of the 20 
constraints that functions Φ and Ψ must respect. But the violation of 
one of these constraints would necessarily lead a complete theory (like 
Γ) to inconsistency.  But if  Γ were inconsistent, then Γ would not be 
saturated. This would contradict our hypothesis. Therefore if Γ is 
saturated then there is a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ. 
Theorem 5 
If there is a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies a theory Γ then such a 
couple satisfies every Λ such that Λ⊆Γ. 
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Proof: if there were a set of sentences Λ⊆Γ such that a couple 
(Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ doesn’t satisfy Λ, then there would be at 
least a sentence γ belonging to Λ such that γ doesn’t fall into the 
domain of one between Φ or Ψ. But, if Λ⊆Γ, then γ∈Γ. Since (Φ, Ψ) 
satisfies Γ, then it cannot but satisfy γ. Therefore if (Φ, Ψ) satisfies Γ 
then (Φ, Ψ) satisfies every Λ such that Λ⊆Γ. 
Theorem 6 (Completeness) 
If Γ is consistent then there is a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ that satisfies Γ. 
Proof: if Γ is coherent, then it can be extended until it becomes 
complete (Theorem 2); if such extension is complete, then it’s 
saturated (Theorem 3); if it’s saturated then there is a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ 
ℐ that satisfies it (Theorem 4) and such a couple satisfies also the 
original theory Γ (Theorem 5). 
 
3. Compactness  
A couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ satisfies Γ if and only if it satisfies every finite 
subset of Γ’s sentences. 
The theorem’s enunciate is a biconditional, so we are going to give a 
proof for both the conditional and the converse. 
If a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ satisfies Γ then it satisfies every finite subset of 
Γ’s sentences. 
Proof: same of Theorem 5 of Completeness. 
If a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ satisfies every finite subset of Γ’s sentences 
then it satisfies Γ. 
Proof: suppose that a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ satisfies every finite 
subset of Γ’s sentences, but doesn’t satisfy Γ. Then there must be at 
least one sentence γ belonging to Γ such that γ doesn’t fall into the 
domain of one of the functions Φ, Ψ. But, since γ∈Γ there must be at 
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least one finite subset Λ⊆Γ such that γ∈Λ. Therefore (Φ, Ψ) doesn’t 
satisfy Λ. But this contradicts our assumption that every finite subset 
of Γ is satisfied by (Φ, Ψ). Therefore if a couple (Φ, Ψ) ∈ ℐ satisfies 
every finite subset of Γ’s sentences, then it satisfies Γ.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
MAXIMALISM AND VAGUE 
EXISTENCE 
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In this chapter I’m going to present an important view on the Priority 
Thesis and its metaontological consequences. This view is known as 
Maximalism. In section 1 I will illustrate the ontological inflation 
caused by the endorsement of Priority Thesis. Section 2 is devoted to 
Maximalism and its main problem: the existence of incompatible 
objects. A possible solution, consisting in the adoption of a notion of 
vague existence, is outlined. In section 3 I will present the two main 
difficulties that Maximalism, enriched with a theory of vague 
existence, has to overcome. Section 4 is devoted to a detailed 
presentation of a framework for vague quantification. In section 5 I 
will show how this framework overcomes the difficulties that threaten 
the notion of vague existence. In section 6 I will draw some 
provisional conclusions. 
 
3.1 Priority and Metaontology  
A widely held opinion about the Priority Thesis is that it commits us 
to a rather promiscuous ontology. Indeed, if truth is constitutively 
prior to reference, whenever an atomic sentence satisfies the criteria of 
truth that ordinarily rule the domain of discourse which it belongs to, 
its singular terms really refer. For example, if a numerical statement 
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like ‘7+5=12’ is true according the criteria of arithmetic, then its 
singular terms really refer. We are compelled to maintain that terms 
like ‘5’, ‘7’ and ‘12’ stand for really existent things. Mathematical 
Platonism is a natural consequence of the endorsement of Priority 
Thesis. Those who hold a theory like this generally think that 
nominalists deal with the problem of ontology of mathematics in a 
completely wrong way. Nominalists generally think that reference is 
prior to truth; the latter depends on the former. For example, Field 
(1980) claims that arithmetical statements are simply false, because 
the singular terms featuring into them are empty. The reason why 
arithmetic (and mathematics in general) is useful has nothing to do 
with truth or falsity, but with a different and more complex 
characteristic that all the demonstrated mathematical statements share: 
conservativity. Wright (1992) argues against nominalism claiming, 
among many other things, that within mathematical discourse the 
ordinary criterion of truth is in fact conservativity. For a mathematical 
statement, to be true is nothing but to be conservative. Hence 
mathematical statements are true, after all. The fact that they are true 
and the endorsement of the Fregean context principle (“never ask for 
the meaning of a word in isolation; only in the context of a sentence 
does a word have meaning”; see Frege (1884)) compel us to regard the 
singular terms featuring in true atomic mathematical sentences as 
really referring ones. In general, a supporter of Priority Thesis thinks 
that the right order of explanation is from truth to reference, while the 
nominalist proceed erroneously in the reverse order. 
A natural question is: “why is mathematics so special? Why 
don’t we employ the same approach with other domains of 
discourse?” The final landing place of a this train of thoughts is that, 
for every domain of discourse, if a sentence satisfies the relevant norm 
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of acceptability, then its singular terms really refer. This positions 
leads to a form of ontological maximalism. It’s not surprising that 
Divers & Miller (1995) and Williamson (1994b) claim that the 
adoption of Priority leads to the ontological commitment to fictional 
characters. Even fictional discourse has a relevant norm of 
correctness, a norm in virtue of which, for example, it’s true that 
Sherlock Holmes lived in London and false that he lived in Paris. A 
supporter of Priority seems to have no robust reason to refuse the 
commitment to Sherlock Holmes and similar entities. Most 
philosophers believe that this is a really unpleasant consequence. Hale 
& Wright (2009) and Wright (1994) deny that fictional contexts are 
properly content bearing; there cannot be true sentences in fictional 
discourses. They argue that the presence (even if implicit) of 
quotational, modal or fictional operators somehow disturbs the 
referential mechanism, preventing singular terms from working 
properly. Here we do not want to discuss this issue. We simply 
concede, for the sake of the argument, that Wright and Hale are right 
in thinking that fictional discourse cannot be properly true, even if it 
apparently displays its own norm of correctness. The ontology a 
supporter of Priority Thesis is committed with is still a luxurious one, 
since it includes, at least, every kind of abstract object that we can 
coherently define. The sensation is that this can be a source of not 
negligible philosophical problems. 
 
3.2 Maximalism and Incompatible Objects 
Eklund (2006) has the merit of showing that this is not just a 
sensation. He defines metaontological maximalism in a quite intuitive 
way: 
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MAXIMALISM: for a given sortal F, Fs exist just in case (a) the 
hypothesis that Fs exist is consistent and (b) Fs do not fail to exist 
simply as a matter of contingent empirical fact. 
 
Condition (b) shows the endorsement of Hale and Wright’s argument 
against the commitment to fictional entities. A supporter of Priority 
may be committed to intuitively strange objects, but she is not 
committed to believing in objects that we have empirical reasons not 
to believe in. Condition (a) is an alternative way of expressing the idea 
that every sentence that respect the norm of correctness that rule the 
domain of discourse it belongs to is such that its singular terms really 
refer. Indeed, a discourse about abstract entities has consistency as its 
unique norm of correctness. Every theory about a kind of abstract 
objects, no matter how weird they could appear, needs only to be 
consistent in order to be acceptable. Therefore, according to 
Maximalism, every coherently definable sortal whatsoever is 
instantiated by some individual. Maximalism can be considered a 
consequence, at metaontological level, of Priority. 
Eklund shows that such a metaontological theory is flawed, 
since there is an entire class of convincing counterexamples to the 
thesis that everything is coherently definable must exist. This class is 
constituted by incompatible objects.  
INCOMPATIBLE OBJECTS: sortals F and G are incompatible if 
and only if (a) if there are Fs then there are no Gs and (b) if there 
are Gs there are no Fs. 
A couple of incompatible sortals is such that the fact that one of them 
is instantiated is sufficient to exclude that the other has instantiations. 
Now, suppose that both the mutually incompatible sortals are 
coherently defined. It’s easy to see that this would turn out to be a 
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serious problem for Maximalism. According to this metaontological 
view, if two sortals are coherently defined they must be both 
instantiated. But incompatible sortals cannot be both instatiated. 
Therefore either there are no convincing examples of coherently 
defined incompatible objects, or Maximalism is unacceptable. If 
Maximalism is unacceptable, then Priority has to be rejected, since the 
former is a consequence of the latter.  Unfortunately for the supporter 
of Maximalism there seems to be plenty of convincing examples of 
mutually incompatible (and individually consistently definable) 
sortals. 
A well known example can be found in Boolos (1990). 
Consider the following statement: 
HUME PRINCIPLE: N(F) = N(G) ↔ EqFG 
It says that the number of Fs is identical with the number of Gs if and 
only if the Fs and the Gs are in one-one correspondence. This 
principle has no finite model. If we interpret it in a model whose 
domain includes only a finite number of objects it becomes 
inconsistent. To see this, consider a domain containing three objects: 
a, b, c. The extensions of the concepts over which our second order 
quantifiers quantify over are the following ones: ∅, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, 
b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}. The relation of equinumerosity groups 
them into four classes: 1) concepts with empty extension; 2) concepts 
one-instantiated; 3) concepts two-instantiated; 4) concepts three-
instantiated. To each class Hume’s Principle makes it correspond a 
number. Therefore the domain should include at least four objects, but 
it has only a, b and c. A generalization of this argument on a domain 
constituted by n objects (where n is finite) is completely 
straightforward. We will obtain a grouping of concepts into n+1 
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classes: the class of concepts zero-instantiated, that of concepts one-
instantiated, ..., that of concepts n-instantiated. Therefore there is no 
finite domain in which Hume’s Principle holds. 
Now consider another abstraction principle: 
PARITY PRINCIPLE: P(F) = P(G) ↔ DiffFG .  
It says that the parity of the concept F is identical with the parity of 
the concept G if and only if the Fs and the Gs differ evenly. The 
relation of evenly differing is defined as follows: two concepts F and 
G differ evenly if and only if the number of objects falling under F, 
but not under G, or falling under G, but not under F, is finite and even. 
The relation of evenly differing is an equivalence relation since it is: i) 
Reflexive: F and F differ evenly because they differ of 0 objects and 0 
is a finite and even number; ii) Symmetric: if F and G differ of a even 
number of objects then obviously G and F differ of an even number of 
objects too; iii) Transitive: if F and G differ evenly and G and H differ 
evenly, then F and H differ evenly too. Since it’s not immediately 
evident that the relation of evenly differing is transitive look at the 
picture below. 
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The picture represents the three concepts with their mutual 
intersections. The letters into the various areas of the picture represent 
the number of objects included in that area. If the concepts F and G 
differ evenly then A+F+B+G is an even number. Moreover if the 
concepts G and H differ evenly then B+D+F+C  is an even number. 
The sum of two even numbers is an even number too, so 
A+F+B+G+B+D+F+C is an even number. If we subtract from it the 
factor 2(F+B), we are subtracting an even number from an even 
number, obtaining an even number again. We obtain A+G+D+C 
which is the number of things falling under F but not under H or 
falling under H but not under F. Therefore F and H differ evenly. The 
relation of evenly differing is transitive. 
Now, suppose we interpret this principle with a model whose 
domain is an infinite set, for example, the set of natural numbers. In 
every case in which two concepts differ of an infinite numbers of 
elements they don’t have the same parity, since the numbers of 
elements that they don’t share is infinite, hence neither even nor odd. 
Consider a subset ∑ of the set of natural numbers constituted by the 
powers of each prime number: 
2  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ... 
3  32  33  34  35  36  37  ... 
5  52  53  54  55  56  ... 
7  72  73  74  75  ... 
11 112  113   ... 
13 132  ... 
... 
Consider the concept of being into the series of p, where p is a prime 
number. A member of ∑ is into the series of p if and only if it’s a 
power of p. In the representation above, each line is the extension of a 
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concept of this kind: the first line represent the extension of the 
concept of being into the series of 2, the fourth line represent the 
extension of the concept of being into the series of 7, and so on. It’s 
easy to see that the parity of each of these concepts is different from 
the parity of every other, since two different series cannot but differ 
by infinite elements, hence they cannot differ evenly. So there are at 
least as many parities as prime numbers. But there’s more. Nothing 
prevents us from setting concepts like ‘being into the series of 7 or 
into the series of 53 or into the series of  217’. Such a concept has a 
different parity from the concept of ‘being into the series of 19 or the 
series of 29 or the series of 73. The same hold for every analogous 
disjunctive concept whatsoever. Since the cardinality of prime 
numbers is ℵ0, there are 2
ℵ0 disjunctive concepts like those of the 
example.18 This claim is an obvious consequence of Cantor Theorem 
on the cardinality of power sets. Each disjunctive concept of the 
envisaged kind is associated by the Principle of Parity with a different 
parity, since there are no couples of such concepts that differ evenly. 
So there are 2ℵ0 parities. But the members of ∑ are ℵ0, hence there 
are more parities than members of ∑ and this is impossible. We can 
conclude that the Principle of Parity has no model of infinite 
cardinality. It can hold only into the context of a finite domain.19 
Therefore Hume’s Principle and Principle of Parity are 
incompatible. There cannot be a domain (or, if you prefer, a possible 
world) where both the concept of number and the concept of parity are 
instantiated. The problem for the supporter of Maximalism is that both 
Hume’s Principle and Parity Principle are consistent. Indeed they both 
                                                          
18 At least if the Continuum Hypothesis is true. 
19 This sketch of proof of the unsatisfiability of Parity Principle within an infinite domain 
differs from that of Boolos (1990), which is more compact but far less intuitive. 
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have a model. Therefore there should exist both parities and numbers 
but, as we have just shown, these sortals are incompatible. 
This example shows that Maximalism has problem with 
incompatible objects. A way of saving this metaontological view from 
collapse it to show that, properly speaking, there are no incompatible 
objects. Consider again the example of Hume Principle vs Parity 
Principle. One could say that thinking of the universe as constituted by 
a finite number of things is incompatible with the exigencies of 
Maximalism. Since Parity Principle requires a finite number of objects 
in the universe, it cannot be considered true, although it’s consistent. 
Thus there are numbers, but there are no parities. This response is far 
from being convincing. Maximalism clearly establishes that, for an 
object to exist, very little is required. The only thing required is 
consistency, not compatibility with the exigencies of a certain 
metaontological view (Maximalism itself in this case). A more refined 
response could be that Hume Principle, unlike Parity Principle, 
satisfies some good requisite. A good requisite could be 
Conservativity. 
CONSERVATIVITY: A statement α is conservative, with respect 
to a theory T, if and only if T ∪ {α} doesn’t prove any theorem, 
expressible in T, that T alone was not able to prove.20  
The introduction of Conservativity as a standard that good definitions 
of abstract objects must respect is not an ad hoc move aimed at saving 
Maximalism from collapse. Conservativity can be independently 
motivated; for example Field (1980) shows that all the classical 
mathematical definitions are conservative. As demonstrated by Wright 
                                                          
20 A precise definition of Conservativity is a bit different from this one, since it requires 
the mention of the language in which T and T T ∪ {α} are formulated. Consider the 
definition above as an intuitive approximation, sufficient for our purposes. 
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(2001) Hume Principle is conservative, while Parity Principle is not. 
This could appear a very good point in favour of the claim that there 
are numbers but not parities, but unfortunately it’s not. Shapiro and 
Weir (1999) provide an example of a couple of mutually incompatible 
abstraction principles, each of which is consistent and conservative.21 
It seems that appeal to Conservativity cannot be a solution. 
A drastic strategy could be employed: since the problem of 
incompatible objects seems to involve essentially objects defined by 
abstraction principles, we could declare abstraction principles 
illegitimate. A Neo-Logicist philosopher would not be happy about 
that, but this is not a problem in the context of our discourse. We are 
not dealing with foundation of Arithmetic, but only with 
metaontological problems. Unfortunately also this drastic move is 
insufficient. There are various incompatible objects that can be 
defined with no appeal to abstraction principles. Eklund (2006) 
proposes some examples. Consider the concept of anti-number, an 
entity whose existence both supervenes on anything one likes and 
rules out the existence of numbers. Numbers and anti-numbers are 
clearly incompatible objects and their definition doesn’t require the 
employment of abstraction principles. Another example: let xhearts to 
be almost like hearts, except that they exist only if xlivers do not and 
xlivers to be almost like livers, except that they exist only if xhearts do 
not. This latter example could be dubious because the xhearts and 
xlivers are defined circularly. Nevertheless Eklund notices that there 
are examples of successful circular definitions (see Yablo (1993)) and, 
moreover, that, since Maximalism is a radically promiscuous 
ontology, it offers no basis for a rejection of circular definitions. 
                                                          
21 I omit the details because it’s a very complex example and it would require a long 
explanation. 
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Definitions like those of xhearts and xlivers suffer from an absence of 
ground, 22  but they are not properly inconsistent. Hence, from a 
Maximalist point of view, they are perfectly acceptable. 
It should be clear that there’s no way to reject incompatible 
objects, once Maximalism is endorsed. The only possible escape 
seems to be the theorization of a special kind of indeterminacy. One 
could claim that some objects are borderline cases of existent things. 
Incompatible objects could be an example of things whose existence 
suffers from a sort of vagueness; it’s indeterminate whether, for 
example, xhearts exist and xlivers do not or xlivers exist and xhearts 
do not. 
Here is a suggestion: what we have here is a special kind of indeterminacy. 
Suppose we have a purported case of incompatible objects to which the 
maximalist has no other satisfactory answer. For concreteness suppose the 
xhearts/xlivers case to be such. Then the maximalist can say that it is simply 
indeterminate whether it is xhearts or xlivers that exist. She can even insist 
that she has independent reason to say this. Can xhearts consistently exist, 
given the empirical facts? That is, do xhearts satisfy the minimal conditions 
that some purported objects must satisfy to exist, given maximalism? It can 
be said: they do only if xlivers do not exist. Mutatis mutandis for xlivers. 
There is nothing that determines whether it is xhearts or xlivers that exist. 
So it is indeterminate which exist. But indeterminacy the maximalist can 
live with. [Eklund (2006), p. 113] 
Eklund thinks that this solution doesn’t look promising, since it 
encounters at list two obstacles: on the one hand, it seems to be very 
hard to find a precise and coherent notion of existential indeterminacy; 
on the other hand, even if such a notion is available, there is a further 
example of incompatible objects that poses a serious difficulty for a 
                                                          
22 I use the term ‘ground’ in analogy with Kripke (1975)’s use. Here we are in a situation 
of absence of ground, because the existence of xhearts relies on the inexistence of xlivers, 
that, in turn, relies on the existence of xhearts. 
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version of Maximalism equipped with existential indeterminacy. In 
the next section we are going to explain what these two difficulties 
consist in.   
 
3.3 Two challenges for vague existence 
3.3.1 Sider’s Objection  
The notion of vague existence is still controversial, not because it’s 
difficult to give intuitively convincing examples of borderline cases of 
existent things, but because the coherence of the notion itself is 
disputed. The most known and discussed objection against vague 
existence is due to Sider (2003). It’s a very refined argument and it 
deserves to be thoroughly examined. To my knowledge, the best semi-
formal reconstruction of Sider’s argument is provided by Torza 
(forthcoming), so my exposition will follow closely his presentation. 
The first part of the argument says that quantifier vagueness 
would be completely different from the already known cases of 
vagueness. It would be a completely sui generis case of vagueness; it 
would require an entirely different model from the usual one. The 
usual model is characterized by precisifications. Those who have 
thought hard on vagueness converge on the claim that its 
formalization requires precisifications, no matter whether they are 
supervalutationist or epistemicist or nihilist. There are alternative 
accounts of vagueness that doesn’t involve claims about 
precisifications (e.g. degree- theoretic construal with fuzzy logic), but 
they can be refuted on the basis of independent considerations.23 
When I meet a vague predicate and I’m in the necessity of 
saying something like ‘Sam is bald’ I can always retreat to a relatively 
precise background language that allows me to precisify my assertion. 
                                                          
23 See Williamson (1994a). 
88 
 
The background language is more precise that the ordinary one at least 
in the relevant aspect. But Sider claims this mechanism breaks downs 
in the case of quantifiers. Suppose it’s definitely the case that there is 
exactly one F and exactly one G but it’s indeterminate whether the 
following it’s true: 
(E) ∃x(x is composed of F and G) 
Now suppose that the vagueness at issue is to be ascribed to the 
existential quantifier, not to the predicates F and G, nor to ‘is 
composed’. Therefore there are at least two precisifications of the 
existential quantifier to the effect that (E) is true if the quantifier at 
issue is ∃1 and false if the quantifier is ∃2. So there is an object that 
belongs to the domain of the first quantifier but not to the domain of 
the second one. Our use of ‘there is’ cannot but be absolutely 
unrestricted. 
ABSOLUTENESS: if on some precisification there are Fs, then 
∃xFx is true. 
As we are going to see in the presentation below, this premise plays a 
crucial role in Sider’s argument against vague existence. 
Let ℒ be an ordinary first order language and let ℒ∆ be the same 
language enriched with a determinacy operator ‘∆’ and an 
indeterminacy operator ‘I’. In the course of the argument we are going 
to present, we will employ also a metalanguage to talk about some 
sentences of ℒ∆. The argument is a reductio ad absurdum and it begins 
with the premise (E) to the effect that it’s indeterminate that there is 
an object composed by two other objects. 
1) I∃z(x≠z ∧ y≠z) 
Now we deduce an elementary consequence in our metalanguage: 
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2) ‘∃z(x≠z ∧ y≠z)’ is true on some precisification of ℒ∆ and false in 
some other. 
To say this is nothing but to say that: 
3) on some precisification of ℒ∆ there’s an object other than x and y 
and in other precisification there’s no further object. 
With a conjunction elimination performed on the previous passage we 
deduce: 
4) on some precisification of ℒ∆ there’s an object other than x and y. 
Now, in virtue of the principle of absoluteness of existential 
quantifier, we deduce: 
5) if, on some precisification of ℒ∆ there’s an object other than x 
and y then ‘∃z(x≠z ∧ y≠z)’ is true. 
Then, by Modus Ponens on 4) and 5) we get: 
6) ‘∃z(x≠z ∧ y≠z)’ is true. 
A widely accepted principle in vagueness frameworks is the rule of ∆-
introduction. It says that when, in the object language, a sentence is 
true, such a sentence is determinately true. Therefore, from 6) we get: 
7) ‘∆∃z(x≠z ∧ y≠z)’ is true. 
By a universally accepted principle of disquotation we deduce: 
8) ∆∃z(x≠z ∧ y≠z) 
From 1) and 8) we finally get: 
9) I∃z(x≠z ∧ y≠z) ∧ ∆∃z(x≠z ∧ y≠z) 
Since one and the same sentence cannot be indeterminate and 
determinate 9) is a contradiction. Therefore 1) must be false. In 
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Sider’s opinion, we cannot but conclude that the notion of vague 
existence is irremediably flawed. 
 
3.3.2 A Contradiction 
There’s another problem with existential indeterminacy taken as a 
solution for the problem of incompatible objects. Suppose that a 
coherent notion of vague existence is available. In Eklund’s opinion, 
there is still room for an objection against the coherence of the 
solution of enriching our language with vague quantification.24  
Let dhearts be almost like hearts except for the fact that they 
exist only if dlivers determinately do not exist and let dlivers be 
almost like livers except for the fact that they exist only if dhearts 
determinately do not exist. The definitions of dhearts and dlivers 
allow us to say that if it’s not determinate that dlivers do not exist, 
then dhearts do not exist. The same holds for dlivers. 
1) ¬∆¬∃xLdx → ¬∃xHdx 
2) ¬∆¬∃xHdx → ¬∃xLdx 
The solution that a supporter of Maximalism should adopt in case of 
incompatible objects is to claim that the existence of each of them is 
indeterminate. 
3) ¬∆∃xLdx ∧ ¬∆¬∃xLdx 
4) ¬∆∃xHdx ∧ ¬∆¬∃xHdx 
Applying Modus Ponens on 1) and on the second conjunct of 3) we 
get: 
5) ¬∃xHdx 
                                                          
24 The argument that follows is a personal reworked version of a suggestion that can be 
found at page 114 of Eklund (2006). I believe that my version of the argument is an 
accurate development of Eklund’s idea. 
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Applying Modus Ponens on 2) and the second conjunct of 4) we get: 
6) ¬∃xLdx 
By the rule of ∆-introduction, from 5) and 6) we get: 
7) ∆¬∃xHdx 
8) ∆¬∃xLdx  
By ∧-introduction applied on 8) and on the second conjunct of 3) we 
finally get: 
9) ¬∆¬∃xLdx∆ ∧ ∆¬∃xLdx 
By ∧-introduction applied on 7) and on the second conjunct of 4) we 
finally get: 
10) ¬∆¬∃xHdx ∧ ∆¬∃xHdx  
Since 9) and 10) are contradictions we have just proved that the 
assumptions 1) and 2) are incompatible with the assumptions 3) and 
4). In Eklund’s opinion, this should be a knock-out argument against 
Maximalism. Even if it is equipped with devices for vague 
quantification, Maximalism is still inconsistent. In the next section we 
will elaborate a framework for vague quantification that should be 
able to dispose of the contradiction pointed out by Eklund and to 
answer the challenge constituted by Sider’s objection.  
 
3.4 A framework for vague existence 
3.4.1 A mixed approach 
The discussion on predicate-vagueness has been historically 
dominated by two different approaches: a semantic one and an 
epistemic one. Other approaches are possible, but they have attracted 
less attention. The difference between these two fundamental 
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approaches depends on which thing is identified as the source of the 
phenomenon of vagueness: according to semantic approach, the 
source is language itself, because it includes many predicates whose 
extension is not perfectly defined; according to epistemic approach the 
source of vagueness is our ignorance of some facts of the world. For 
the first approach, for example, there are borderline cases of baldness 
because the threshold between the extension and the antiextension of 
the predicate <is bald> is fuzzy; it’s not a neat line, but rather a wide 
grey area. For the second approach, there’s no grey area between what 
is a clear case of baldness and what falls certainly into the 
antiextension of <is bald>.  No part of our language has a vague 
meaning, there’s always a sharp boundary between the extension and 
the antiextension of a predicate. The origin of all the known vagueness 
phenomena is our ignorance about where such a boundary lies. With 
respect to our example, there’s a precise number n of hairs, such that 
whoever has more than n hairs is not bald and whoever has n hairs or 
less is bald. Since now, these two approaches has always proceeded 
separately, as two different and incompatible ways of addressing the 
problem of vagueness. 
Nevertheless a fruitful union of these two approaches, although 
not yet carefully explored, is not unconceivable. The idea that, in 
some cases, predicate-vagueness comes from an intrinsic 
indeterminateness of the meaning of the predicate at issue and in some 
other cases it comes from our ignorance of the precise meaning of 
such a predicate is not a non-starter. One could easily find some 
convincing examples. The often cited predicate <is bald> seems to 
constitute a good example of predicate whose extension is vague 
because of the intrinsic vagueness of its meaning. A clear evidence of 
the indeterminateness of its meaning is the fact that any answer 
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whatsoever to the question ‘what’s the exact number of hair below 
which a human being can be considered bald?’ cannot but sound 
totally arbitrary. There are also examples of predicates whose 
vagueness is clearly due to our ignorance of their precise meaning. 
Consider the predicate, taken from cosmological domain of discourse,  
<indefinitely expands>. The extension of this predicate is 
indeterminate; indeed it’s not clear whether our universe will expand 
forever or, once it will have reached a critical volume, it will 
progressively narrow. The vagueness of this predicate doesn’t come 
from its meaning. Indeed it has a perfectly determined meaning: a 
(possible) universe indefinitely expands if and only if its energy 
density is below λ. The value of λ is perfectly determinate and it 
constitute a precise threshold. We simply ignore the exact amount of 
λ. Here the meaning of the predicate at issue is precise and so is its 
extension; vagueness comes from our ignorance. 
A detailed development of such a view is outside the scope of 
my dissertation; my only point is that an account along these lines has 
some intuitive underpinning and it probably deserves further 
investigation. When it comes to vague quantification, I believe that the 
best approach is, again, a mixed one. Indeed, also in the case of 
existential vagueness we can distinguish between two distinct kinds of 
existential indeterminateness. These two kinds don’t constitute two 
alternative and mutually exclusive ways of conceiving existential 
vagueness, but they can be integrated in a unique theory. The best way 
to outline the distinction is by means of two examples. 
First, consider the much discussed notion of mereological 
fusion. If A and B are two objects, their mereological fusion is a 
further object C such that A is part of C,  B is part of C and if I 
subtract from C both A and B then C completely vanishes (no other 
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parts of it remain). Now, consider this example taken from Putnam 
(1987). In a certain portion of universe there are the following 
absolutely simple objects: a, b, c. If we ask ourselves how many 
objects there are in that portion of universe, the answer could 
significantly vary, depending on the answer we give to the Special 
Composition Question: 25  under what circumstances two (or more) 
things constitute a unique thing, namely a mereological fusion? A 
supporter of mereological nihilism would say that, in that portion of 
universe, there are three things since her answer to Special 
Composition Question is “never”. On the contrary, a mereological 
universalist would say that there are seven things, namely, a, b, c, ab, 
ac, bc, abc, since her answer to the Special Composition Question is 
“always”. Other, more complex answers are possible. Indeed one 
would argue that many things constitute one thing if and only if they 
are tightly connected, i.e. they constitute an uninterrupted stretch of 
solid stuff. Someone else would argue that they constitute a unique 
thing if and only if they constitute a functional organism. The 
important thing to notice is that the question ‘are there mereological 
fusions?’ admits a wide range of answers, not limited to the extreme 
two (‘yes’ or ‘not’). An answer according to which some mereological 
fusion exist and some other not is perfectly meaningful (even though 
not necessarily true). 
Now, consider the familiar case of natural numbers as defined 
by Hume Principle. One could meaningfully ask whether there really 
are entities like these; in other words one could be unsure of the 
effectiveness of a stipulation like Hume Principle: if we have a 
domain composed by infinitely many individuals, are there necessarily 
natural numbers among them? But suppose that someone is pretty 
                                                          
25 See Van Inwagen (1990) 
95 
 
persuaded of the effectiveness of Hume Principle; then her answer to 
the question ‘are there numbers?’ would be undoubtedly ‘yes’. More 
complex answers, maintaining, for example, that some natural number 
exist and some other do not exist are simply meaningless. Once I 
endorse Hume Principle I accept the existence of all natural numbers; 
a question like ‘which natural numbers really exist?’ would be 
rejected as unintelligible. 
These two examples show that there are two different ways of 
being existentially indeterminate: some sortals are such that it’s 
indeterminate which instantiation exist and which don’t exist and 
some other are such that if they are instantiated, then all their 
conceivable instantiations really exist (and if not, none of them really 
exist). The model of vague quantification that I would like to present 
here is mixed, because it allows for these two different kind of 
vagueness. As we are going to see, this is the feature allowing the 
model to be safe from Eklund’s indeterminacy paradox. 
 
3.4.2 Supervaluationism reconceived  
The model of vague quantification that I would like to present is 
inspired by the classical account of Fine [1975]. My aim is to modify 
the classical supervaluationist machinery in order to make it suitable 
to interpret a language whose sole vague constituent are quantifiers. 
Nothing rules out the possibility of a completely generalized model 
for vague languages, capable of accounting for both predicate 
vagueness and quantifier vagueness. I think the endeavour is feasible, 
even though it would result in a notational nightmare. Thus I prefer to 
present a model capable of interpreting a language that is perfectly 
precise, except for its quantifiers. Once the model is settled, a 
generalization would be tedious, but completely straightforward. 
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Fine’s account of predicate-vagueness is well known; we only need to 
recall its essential features. A specification space for a language ℒ is a 
set or specification points that constitutes a partial order under an 
accessibility relation. Each specification point is a partial model for ℒ; 
for every predicate it determines which objects (belonging to a unique 
domain) are included in its extension and which of them are part of its 
anti-extension; the union of extension and anti-extension doesn’t 
always coincide with the entire domain. Indeed , at least for some 
predicate, there are objects that do not belong neither to its extension 
nor to its anti-extension. Each specification point precisifies a point 
from which it is accessible; it is able to assign to the extension or to 
the anti-extension of a predicate some objects that were in the grey 
area at a precisification point from which it is accessible. The base 
point is not accessible from any other specification point and 
constitute the root of the three of specification points. It’s the less 
determined model of ℒ. On the opposite side, the complete 
specification points are the peaks of the tree; they are classical models 
in which, for every predicate and every object, it is always determined 
whether the object belongs to the extension or to the anti-extension of 
the predicate in question. 
The fundamental insight of my model of vagueness is to treat 
specification points as models, each one equipped with a domain that 
doesn’t include all the objects that language ℒ is able to refer to or 
quantify over. An atomic sentence can be such that it cannot be 
interpreted at a certain specification point, since at that point there’s 
no reference for the individual constant featuring in it. In this case the 
sentence cannot be true; it can be indeterminate or false (we are going 
to see how to determine the truth value in these cases soon). Similarly, 
an existentially quantified sentence can be such that, at a certain 
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specification point, there’s no object satisfying the predicate into the 
scope of the quantifier. In this case the truth value of the sentence can 
be only false or indeterminate. If a specification point p is accessible 
form a specification point s then the domain of p strictly includes the 
domain of s. The process or progressive specification, i.e. the process 
of progressive extension of the domain, goes on until it reaches the 
complete specification points. These points are models of ℒ such that 
no sentence of ℒ has an indeterminate truth value. It’s important to 
stress that, in the framework I would like to introduce, complete 
specification points are not classical models, i.e. models in which, for 
example, every constant of ℒ has necessarily a reference. It’s simply a 
model at which every sentence has a determined truth value, even the 
atomic sentences in which there are empty names. Indeed, in my 
framework, there are rules that allows the determination of truth value 
for this kind of sentences. Complete specification points can still be 
defined classical in a different sense: they are ruled by classical 
bivalent logic. They are models whose domain could be potentially 
further extended. These domains are not all-inclusive, they are simply 
able to assign to each sentence of ℒ a determinate truth value. In the 
technical exposition, that will follow shortly, these features will 
appear clearer. 
The most heretical characteristic of my account is the plurality 
of base points that it contemplates. While in classical 
supervaluationism there is one and only one base point liable to 
various precisifications, in my framework there are various base 
points, each of them liable to various precisifications. This feature 
allows us to distinguish the two kind of existential indeterminacy that 
we have previously outlined: existential vagueness of sortals whose 
instantiation happens in a “all or nothing” fashion and existential 
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vagueness of sortals which admit a partial instantiation. The first kind 
of indeterminacy is expressed by the plurality of base points and the 
second kind by the plurality of specification points that each base 
point bears. Indeed the first kind of indeterminacy is related with the 
problem of incompatible objects. Consider again the incompatibility 
between natural numbers (as defined by Hume Principle) and parities 
(as defined by Parity Principle). A specification point cannot contain 
parities and be such that some of the specification points accessible 
from it contain numbers (and vice versa). Moreover there cannot be a 
specification point without numbers and without parities and such that 
numbers and parities appear in separate branches of the tree generated 
by its accessible specification points. Each specification point is such 
that either it contains numbers or it contains parities in its domain, 
because each domain is either infinite or finite. If it is finite it must 
contain parities, if it is infinite it contains numbers.26 If a base point 
contains numbers, its various specification points enrich its domain in 
various different ways, but they never add parities. The general idea is 
that different base points constitute alternative (and in some cases 
incompatible) pictures of the world. No precisification can remove the 
incompatibilities between them. On the contrary, from a certain base 
point with no mereological fusions we can access specification points 
with some mereological fusions.  
Therefore the two kinds of existential vagueness are mirrored 
by a plurality of base points, each of which is precisified by a plurality 
of specification points. 
 
 
                                                          
26 Recall: we suppose that Maximalism is true. The framework we are going to outline is 
designed to save the coherence of  Maximalism. 
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3.4.3 The framework 
Let’s start with the technical details. A specification space S is a 
structure composed by: 
i. a set of specification points P; 
ii. a function D assigning to each member of S a domain of objects; 
iii. an accessibility relation R over the members of S. Such a 
relation is reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric. Given a 
specification point p, the set of all points accessible from p is 
called shade of p. 
iv. A set of base points B, such that B is a subset of P. Each 
member b of B is such that, for no p belonging to P, Rpb and, for 
every p belonging to P, there is one and only one b, belonging to 
B, such that Rbp. 
v. An interpretation function I assigning to each predicate of ℒ a set 
of objects and to each singular term of ℒ an object. But from 
which domain are  taken these objects? An appropriate 
definition of an interpretation I requires the definition of a set 
that we call total domain of I and we represent by the symbol ⅅI. 
The total domain ⅅI is the union of all the domains that function 
D associates to the members of P. An interpretation I maps every 
individual constant of ℒ with a member of ⅅI and every n-ary 
predicate of ℒ to a member of ⅅI
n.   
A specification space S = <P, D, R, I, B> is acceptable if and only if 
function D and relation R are such that, for every couple of 
specification points p and q, Rpq if and only if D(p) ⊂ D(q). This 
condition assures that no specification point q can be a precisification 
of a specification point p unless q expands the domain of p. From this 
moment on, when we speak of specification spaces, we always mean 
acceptable specification spaces. 
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From this moment on, we will focus exclusively on how a 
certain portion of our system works, for simplicity reasons. We will 
consider one and only one base point b and the specification points 
accessible from it, ignoring the fact that there are various base points. 
At the end of this explanation we will see how this momentarily 
neglected fact enriches our framework. Thus, let’s pretend we are 
examining a specification space provided with a unique base point.   
A precise definition of the notion of specification point requires 
the notion of range restriction. As is well known, every binary 
function is liable to restriction; given a function f: A→B, a restriction 
f↾A* is a function identical to f, except for the fact that its domain is 
not A but a set A* such that A* ⊆ A. In other words the graph of f↾A*, 
in symbols G(f↾A* ), is {(x,y) ∊ G(f)| x ∊ A*}. This kind of restriction 
(that is the most common) is sometimes called left-restriction or 
domain restriction. A range restriction, or right-restriction, of a binary 
function f: A→B, in symbols f↾B* is a function identical to f except for 
the fact that its range is not B but a set B* such that B* ⊆ B. 
Therefore G(f↾B*) = {(x,y) ∊ G(f)| y ∊ B*}. A specification point p is a 
partial model of ℒ constituted by a domain D(p) and a range 
restriction of the interpretation function I to the domain D(p), in 
symbols Ip. In a rather simplistic fashion: Ip is the interpretation of the 
portion of ℒ that speaks of the objects included in D(p). In a more 
sophisticated way: i) Ip assigns to a constant c of ℒ a referent r if and 
only if I(c) = r and r ∊ D(p). If r is not a member of D(p) then Ip is not 
defined for the argument c; ii) Ip assigns to a n-ary predicate F of ℒ the 
intersection between I(F) and D(p). Such an intersection can be 
empty: in this case Ip is indefinite for the argument F. It can be 
identical with I(F): in this case Ip is completely defined for the 
argument F. In all the other cases Ip is partially defined for the 
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argument F. In the rest of our discourse we will call I a global 
interpretation of ℒ and its restrictions (like Ip, Iq, Is, ...) local 
interpretations of ℒ. The notion of local interpretation allow us the 
introduce another helpful distinction, that between global anti-
extension and local anti-extension of a predicate. If I(F) is the set of n-
ples of objects of ⅅ satisfying F, AI(F) is the set of all the n-ples of 
objects of ⅅ that don’t satisfy F. Similarly, if Ip(F) is the set of n-ples 
of objects of D(p) satisfying F, AIp(F) is the set of all the n-ples of 
objects of D(p) that don’t satisfy F. It’s easy to see that every local 
extension of a predicate is a subset of its global extension and the 
same holds for anti-extensions. 
The determination of truth value of sentences is designed to be 
such that, ascending from the base point toward the complete 
specification points, every sentence of ℒ will receive a determinate 
truth value (true or false) sooner or later. Once this truth value is 
assigned, it cannot change ascending toward the complete 
specification points. Indeed each specification point precisifies the 
specification points from which it’s accessible, but it can never be 
inconsistent with them (we will call this property “Stability”). A 
precisification is not a correction. I will soon give the precise truth 
condition for each kind of sentence, but before doing that, I think that 
an example could be of help. Look at the picture below: 
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Suppose that sentence ‘Fa’ is true at specification point q. This means 
that i) the function of local interpretation for specification point q, 
namely Iq, is defined for the argument ‘a’; ii) the function of local 
interpretation for q is defined (at least partially defined) for the 
argument ‘F’; iii) Iq(a) ∊ Iq(F). Now let’s step back at specification 
point p, from which q is accessible. Suppose that Ip is not defined for 
the argument ‘a’, i.e. there’s no member of D(p) that local 
interpretation Ip assigns to ‘a’. In this case the sentence ‘Fa’ cannot be 
true at p. Moreover it cannot be false, because there is a specification 
of p, namely q, at which ‘Fa’ is true. If ‘Fa’ were false at p, then q 
would correct p and not simply precisify it. Hence ‘Fa’ is 
indeterminate at p. 
Now suppose that Iq is not defined for the argument ‘a’ and the 
same holds for every specification point accessible from p. In other 
words, for every specification point z, such that z is into the shade of 
p, D(z) doesn’t include I(a). Now, into the shade of p there are also 
many complete specification points (c1 is one of them). At these 
points sentence ‘Fa’ cannot be indeterminate, since complete 
specification points are ruled by classical bivalent logic (this requisite 
will be called “Classicality” below). Since it cannot be true, nor 
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indeterminate, the sentence is false at all the complete specification 
points into the shade of p. In a case like this, we establish that ‘Fa’ 
was already false at point p. If a sentence is not true at any of the 
points that precisify p, then it’s false at p. Sentence ‘Fa’ can be true at 
some specification point outside the shade of p, but this is irrelevant 
for the determination of its truth value at p. Look at the picture again. 
On a different branch of our tree of specification points there’s a point 
s such that Is is defined for the argument ‘a’ and for the argument ‘F’ 
too. But s is not accessible from p and p is not accessible from s; they 
are part of two branches whose last common node, namely b1, is far 
behind p and s. If s is not a precisification of p, whatever happens at s 
is irrelevant for the determination of the truth value at p of whatever 
sentence. 
Now we are ready to examine the truth conditions of our 
framework. The following conditions establish in which cases a 
sentence α of ℒ is true simpliciter at a specification point p: 
1. If α is an identity like a = b: i) α is true simpliciter at p if and only 
if Ip(a) = Ip(b); ii) false if and only if Ip(a) ≠ Ip(b) or at least one 
between a and b belongs exclusively to the domains of 
specification points s such that ¬Rps; iii) indeterminate otherwise. 
2. If α is an atomic sentence constituted by a n-ary predicate and n 
individual constants, like Fa1a2a3...an: i) α is true simpliciter at p if 
and only if Ip(<a1, a2, a3,..., an>) ∈ Ip(F); ii) false if and only if 
Ip(<a1, a2, a3,..., an>) ∈ 
AIp(F), or if some member of I(<a1, a2, a3,..., 
an>) belongs exclusively to domains of specification points s such 
that ¬Rps; iii) indeterminate otherwise.  
3. If α is a negative sentence like ¬β: i) α is true simpliciter at p if 
and only if β is false at p; ii) false if and only if β is true simpliciter 
at p; iii) indeterminate otherwise. 
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4. If α is a conjunction like  β∧γ: i) α is true simpliciter at p if and 
only if both β and γ are true simpliciter at p; ii) false if and only if 
at least one between β and γ is false at p; iii) indeterminate if and 
only if both β and γ are indeterminate at p. 
5. if α is a disjunction like β∨γ: i) α is true simpliciter at p if and only 
if at least one between β∨γ is true simpliciter at p; ii) false if both β 
and γ are false at p; iii) indeterminate otherwise. 
6. if α is an existentially quantified sentence like ∃xβ: i) α is true 
simpliciter at p if and only if there’s at least one member of D(p) 
such that β is true simpliciter at p; ii) false if and only if there’s no 
point s such that Rps and such that at least one member of D(s) 
makes β true simpliciter at s; iii) indeterminate otherwise. 
7. If α is a universally quantified sentence like ∀xβ: i) α is true 
simpliciter at p if and only if, for every s such that Rps, s is such 
that every member of D(s) makes β true simpliciter at s; ii) false if 
at least one member of D(p) is such that β is false at p; iii) 
indeterminate otherwise. 
A specification point pc is complete if and only if it assigns a definite 
truth value (true or false) to each sentence of ℒ . Unlike classical 
supervaluationism, in my semantics, complete specification points are 
not classical models of ℒ, since no complete specification point 
contains the referents of every individual constant of ℒ and none is 
such that every predicate of ℒ is completely interpreted by the local 
restriction of I. Nevertheless there is a perfectly legitimate sense in 
which these specification points are classical. As we have just said, 
they are such that no sentence of ℒ is left without a truth value, while 
all the specification points that are not complete are characterized by 
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truth value gaps. Complete specification points are classical because 
they are ruled by classical bivalent logic. 
A sentence is supertrue at p if and only if it’s true at all 
complete specification points that are accessible from p. If truth is 
supertruth then all the classically valid formulas are true at all 
specification points. Our model respect the same constraints that Fine 
[1975]’s model respects: 
 Fidelity: complete specification points are classical. As we have 
already said they are ruled by classical bivalent logic. 
 Completability: for every p belonging to P there’s an s belonging to 
P such that Rps and such that s is a complete specification point. 
The progressive expansion of a domain ends at some point. There 
are maximal domains. This maximality is not to be intended as 
universal inclusivity; indeed no complete specification point has a 
domain identical with ⅅI. Maximality is relative to the capacity of 
assigning a definite truth value (true or false) to each sentence of ℒ. 
 Stability: for every p belonging to P and for every sentence α of ℒ, 
if α is true at p then, for every s belonging to P, such that Rps, α is 
true at s. The conditions 1) - 7) are such that if a sentence is true at 
p, it is also true at every point into the shade of p; if it’s false at p, 
it’s also false at every point into the shade of p; if it’s 
indeterminate then at some point accessible from p it is true, at 
some other it is false. 
We can see now in what sense a plurality of base points enriches our 
model. In Fine (1975) a sentence that is true at the base point is 
determinately true. In his framework, since there is one and only one 
base point, the determinacy of sentence is an absolute quality. In my 
framework a sentence α is determinately true relatively to base point b 
(in symbols ∆bα) if and only if it’s true at the base point b, i.e. if and 
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only if it’s true at every specification point into the shade of b. This 
relativization allows us to introduce two further operators: ‘∏’ and 
‘∑’. They mean, respectively, ‘for every base point’ and ‘for some 
base point’. ∏α means that, whatever base point we choose, α is true, 
while ∑α means that for some base point α is true. More complex 
combination are possible and meaningful: ∏∆α means that whatever 
base point we choose α is determinately true, namely true at every 
base point; ∏¬∆α means that whatever base point we choose α is not 
determinate, i.e. there’s no base point at which α is true; ∑∆α means 
that for at least one base point α is determinately true; ∑¬∆α means 
that for at least one base point α is not determinately true. It’s easy to 
see that ¬Π∆α is equivalent to Σ¬∆α and ¬Σ∆α is equivalent to 
Π¬∆α.  
A sentence α is a supervaluationary consequence of a set of 
sentences Γ (in symbols, Γ ⊨ α) if and only if every specification point 
at which all the sentences that composes Γ are true is a point at which 
α is true. A sentence α is supervaluationary valid if and only if it’s 
true at every specification point. 
In the next section we are going to see how the presented 
apparatus can be of help in disposing of the contradiction pointed out 
by Eklund and in answering the challenge posed by Sider’s objection. 
 
3.5 Answering the challenges 
3.5.1 Dhearts-dlivers problem 
Now we can try to rephrase our paradox of dhearts and dlivers using 
our new conceptual apparatus. Let’s recall the argument leading to 
contradiction: 
1) ¬∆¬∃xLdx → ¬∃xHdx          Incompatibility dhearts-dlivers               
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2) ¬∆¬∃xHdx → ¬∃xLdx          Incompatibility dlivers-dhearts               
3) ¬∆∃xLdx ∧ ¬∆¬∃xLdx         Vague existence of dlivers               
4) ¬∆∃xHdx ∧ ¬∆¬∃xHdx        Vague existence of dhearts               
5) ¬∃xHdx                                   Modus Pones on 1,3                
6) ¬∃xLdx                                    Modus Ponens on 2,4                 
7) ∆¬∃xHdx                                ∆-introduction on 5 
8) ∆¬∃xLdx                                 ∆-introduction on 6  
9) ¬∆¬∃xLdx ∧ ∆¬∃xLdx          ∧-introduction on 3,8              
10) ¬∆¬∃xHdx ∧ ∆¬∃xHdx       ∧-introduction on 4,7             
Passages 9) and 10) are clearly contradictory. Now, our aim is to 
rephrase this argument using our conceptual apparatus and to show 
that, when the premises are suitably restated, the contradiction is 
disposed of. 
Let’s start from the premises that we have dubbed 
“incompatibility dhearts-dlivers”. In our conceptual framework they 
can be properly restated in the following way: 
1*) ∏(¬∆¬∃xLdx → ¬∃xHdx) 
2*) ∏(¬∆¬∃xHdx → ¬∃xLdx) 
The idea is that, whatever base point happens to be the right (partial) 
model for our language, there cannot be dhearts (dlivers) unless there 
are determinately no dlivers (dhearts). Therefore, for every base b 
point there is no specification point p, accessible from b, such that 
∃xHdx is true simpliciter at p and ∃xLdx is true or indeterminate at p. 
The paraphrase of the next two assumptions, namely “vague existence 
of dlivers (dhearts)”, is a bit more problematic. We cannot adopt the 
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same device that we used before, since the plain introduction of the 
operator ‘Π’ before the sentence doesn’t dispel the contradiction. To 
see this, look at the following lines: 
3+) ∏(¬∆∃xLdx ∧ ¬∆¬∃xLdx)                      
4+) ∏(¬∆∃xHdx ∧ ¬∆¬∃xHdx)       
These premises simply say that there’s no base point b such that 
∃xLdx is true at b or ¬∃xLdx is true at b. Whatever base point happen 
to be the right one, these two sentence are always indeterminate. From 
these premises, plus 1*) and 2*), it follows that 
5+) ∏(¬∃xHdx)                                 
6+) ∏(¬∃xLdx)                              
Then the path that leads to contradiction is open and even wider than 
before, since we have added the specification that, whatever base 
point happens to be the right one, dhearts (dlivers) must determinately 
exist and, at the same time, they must be determinately inexistent. If 
we want to avoid this contradiction we need to rephrase premises 3) 
and 4) in a less straightforward way. The solution I would like to 
propose is quite simple: since we cannot maintain that, for every base 
point b, the existence of dhearts (dlivers) is indeterminate, we have to 
claim that, for some base points dhearts determinately exist and 
dlivers are determinately inexistent and for some other base points 
dlivers determinately exist and dhearts are determinately inexistent. In 
other words, the existential indeterminacy in which dhearts and dlivers 
are involved is of the same kind of the indeterminacy involving 
numbers and parities. This solution is not at odd with our intuitions; 
on the contrary, it’s natural to think that, if Maximalism is the correct 
metaontological view, couples of sortals like dhearts-dlivers must be 
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such that one of them is determinately instantiated (and, therefore, the 
other determinately do not exist) but we don’t know which one. If 
dhearts exist only if dlivers determinately do not exist and vice versa, 
then only two cases are possible: either there are dhearts and 
determinately no dlivers or there are dlivers and determinately no 
dhearts. Our conceptual apparatus allows us to express this in a rather 
synthetic way:  
3*) ∑∆∃xLdx ∧ ∑∆¬∃xLdx 
4*) ∑∆∃xHdx ∧ ∑∆¬∃xHdx 
From the two premises above and from 1*) and 2*) follows that: 
5*) ∑∆¬∃xHdx 
6*) ∑∆¬∃xLdx 
From the two sentences above and from 3*) and 4*) we can conclude: 
7*) ∑∆¬∃xLdx ∧ ∑¬∆¬∃xLdx    
8*) ∑∆¬∃xHdx ∧ ∑¬∆¬∃xHdx 
As we can clearly see, here there’s no contradiction. We simply came 
to the conclusion that, at certain base points it’s true that there are 
dlivers (dhearts) and at other base points it’s true that there are no 
dlivers (dhearts). The application of our conceptual framework has 
shown that the contradiction pointed out by Eklund (2006) is 
essentially due to an imprecise way of expressing the ontological 
relation between determinately incompatible objects. As soon as we 
adopt a framework able to express some more subtle distinctions the 
contradiction disappears. 
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3.5.2 Response to Sider’s Objection 
In Sider’s argument a crucial role is played by the assumption of the 
absoluteness of quantifiers: if on some precisification of a language ℒ 
there are Fs, then ∃xFx is true. The most important feature of the 
framework I’ve just presented is the presence of a plurality of base 
points. We could ask ourselves what would be the result of the 
application of absoluteness principle to a framework with this peculiar 
feature. If the objects that exist at a whichever precisification exist in 
general, then there is a sort of super-domain identical with the union 
of the domains of all the specification points of the specification 
space. Certainly, in our framework there is a set ⅅI containing all the 
members of the domains of all specification points. Nevertheless such 
a set doesn’t constitute a domain over which we quantify. Indeed, how 
is it possible to quantify over a domain containing both dhearts and 
dlivers, both numbers and parities, both numbers and anti-numbers? 
The sole existence of incompatible objects is a valid reason to doubt 
that this is possible. Indeed, the domain over which we quantify 
should be, for example, finite and infinite at the same time. I think 
there is an axiom that is widely accepted, although tacitly: a domain is 
not only a set. It’s part of a model and a model must be consistent. If a 
set is such that no model can interpret a language that quantify over all 
the members of that set, then such a set is not a domain. Since Sider’s 
objection relies crucially on the absoluteness of quantifiers, the fact 
that such a principle cannot hold in the framework I’ve presented is a 
sufficient reason to think that his powerful objection cannot threaten 
the coherence of the presented notion of vague existence. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have presented a metaontological view known as 
Maximalism. It’s worth noticing that I’ve avoided to deeply analyze 
the connection between Priority Thesis and Maximalism. I’ve simply 
assumed that Maximalism is a natural consequence, on a 
metaontological level, of Priority Thesis. In the next chapter I’ll show 
that this is far from being obvious and that there are other ways to 
understand the relation between Priority Thesis and a certain 
indubitable abundance of existent entities. Maximalism is not the only 
option, but, I think, is an acceptable one. Its main problem is with 
incompatible object. I’ve shown how to solve it by means of a 
framework allowing vague quantification. Such a framework is able to 
save Maximalism from the threat posed by incompatible objects and 
moreover it’s able to resist to a well known objection against the idea 
of vague existence. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
THE POSSIBLITY OF THIN OBJECTS 
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4.1 Introduction 
The question that Linnebo (forthcoming) tries to answer is a 
fundamental one for the ontology of abstract entities: are there objects 
whose existence doesn’t impose very demanding requirement on 
reality? Such objects are called thin, in opposition to thick objects, 
whose existence requires, for example, that some physical conditions 
obtain. Objects can be thin in at least two different senses: i) 
absolutely thin, i.e. their existence puts no significant requirement of 
reality. An example could be that of pure sets, since pure sets are 
supposed to exist even if nothing else exist; ii) relatively thin, i.e. 
given a set of objects whose existence is undisputed, they do not 
require very much else to reality. For example a mereological sum is 
thin relatively to its constituent parts. The question of the existence of 
thin objects is tightly related with a certain metaontological theory that 
has already been mentioned in the course of this thesis: 
metaontological minimalism. 
Metaontological Minimalism is, fundamentally, the thesis that 
there are thin objects (no matter if they are relatively or absolutely 
thin). It’s a metaontological view that sets the bar of the existence 
very low; a minimalist claims that our concept of object allows for 
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thin objects. Minimalism tends to be connected with Ontological 
Maximalism, a thesis according to which everything we quantify over 
in every kind of discourse really exist. Indeed if very little is required 
for something to be a really existent object, then the commitment with 
a generous ontology is unavoidable.  
The idea of thin object is appealing for an obvious reason: it 
allows for a face-value reading of mathematical statements and 
therefore it lends support to Mathematical Platonism. Nevertheless the 
very idea of thin object has, since now, proven quite slippery, for at 
least two reasons: i) their introduction seems to justify extravagant 
ontologies (roughly: if we allow for the existence of thin objects why 
should we put constraints on the existence of whatever weird entity an 
ontologist can imagine?); ii) the epistemic access to thin objects seems 
to be problematic (here, obviously, the old problem pointed out by 
Benacerraf (1973) is in play).  
Linnebo claims that his approach is able to solve both these 
problems. His fundamental idea is to make clear what’s the link 
between a triad of concepts that Frege believed to be tightly related, 
those of object, reference and identity criteria. This triangle can show 
us how thin objects can exist and how they can be understandable. In 
Frege’s view, reference is a sufficient condition for objecthood. 27 
Moreover a sufficient condition for a singular term t to refer is that 
there are identity conditions available, namely, a formula saying in 
which cases, for some x, x = t. If we put together the two theses we 
should get what we seek: an easy way to introduce abstract objects in 
ontology, namely, a good defence of Metaontological Minimalism. 
This, apparently easy, Fregean road to thin objects requires a theorist 
                                                          
27 But not a necessary condition, since there are objects which we cannot refer to with 
singular terms, like, for example, complex numbers. See Linnebo (forthcoming) pp. 19-
20. 
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to pass through three different steps. The first consist in a justification 
of the legitimacy of abstraction principles as ways to introduce light 
additional commitment into our ontology. In particular, which 
conditions must respect the relation occurring between the two sides 
of an abstraction principle in order to assure its acceptability? Section 
2 is dedicated to the attempt to answer this question. The second step 
is a clarification of the notion of criterion of identity. How can a 
criterion of identity for t assure us that t really refer to something? 
Section 3 addresses this problem. The third step must be a clear 
explanation of the mechanism by which, in a given language, singular 
terms really referring to thin objects are introduced. Section 4 is 
dedicated to this task. Finally section 5 explains the notion of thin 
objects that results from this complex theory. 
 
4.2 The possibility of recarving of content 
In § 62 of Grundlagen der Arithmetik Frege famously suggests that 
the two sides of an abstraction principle are to be considered as 
different carvings of one and the same content. As already said in the 
first chapter, the notion of content recarving is quite elusive, since it 
seems to be very difficult to respect all the constraints which such a 
notion is subject to. For example, if propositional content is 
cognitively understood, then it seems that no philosophically 
interesting abstraction principle is an example of content recarving. 
Indeed, in the case of direction abstraction, we cannot seriously claim 
that the two sides have the same cognitive content, at least because 
they talk of different objects. Linnebo believes that it’s not easy to 
find a satisfactory notion of content recarving, but the endeaviour is 
not desperate.  
116 
 
In his view the notion must be analyzed in terms of mutual 
sufficiency. In other words, ϕ and ψ are different carvings of one and 
the same content if and only if ϕ is sufficient for ψ (in symbols ϕ⇒ψ) 
and ψ is sufficient for ϕ. Intuitively, the idea of sufficiency is that, if ϕ 
suffices for ψ, then when we assert ϕ we are also asserting ψ. With a 
theological metaphor: if God makes it the case that ϕ He is also 
making the case that ψ, without this requiring an extra 
creative/determinative effort. At this stage we don’t need a more 
refined notion, an intuitive grasp is enough.  
The notion of mutual sufficiency is clearly different from that of 
content recarving, because to say that ϕ and ψ are mutually sufficient 
is not to say that they share the same content (however intended). 
Nevertheless there’s still a sort of equivalence that preserves some 
interesting philosophical properties. Which ones? To answer this 
question we need to consider what mutual sufficiency is supposed to 
do into the theoretical framework we are working with. First of all, 
this notion is supposed to be of help in solving Benacerraf (1973) 
problem about the epistemic access to mathematical objects. Indeed, if 
we take numbers, functions, sets, and other things populating the 
mathematical universe to be self-subsistent non-material objects, we 
will have hard time to explain how we get acquainted with them. 
Since our cognitive apparatus is known to be able to deal exclusively 
with material beings, knowledge of mathematical objects looks 
impossible. The notion of mutual sufficiency is a promising way of 
answering the challenge only if its primitive (sufficiency) is able to 
transmit an epistemic status from the antecedent to consequent. 
Epistemic Constraint 
ϕ⇒ψ 
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Kϕ 
− 
◊Kψ 
The operator K represent an epistemic status whatsoever (being 
known, being plausible, and the like). This inference rule states that if 
ϕ suffices for ψ and ϕ has the epistemic property K then it’s possible 
for ψ to have the property K too. Here the possibility at stake is real 
possibility, not a highly idealized one; an ordinary knower who 
knows/believes/etc ϕ must be able to know/believe/etc also ψ. 
Moreover this possibility (◊Kψ) must be grounded in the fact that Kϕ 
happens to be true. The possibility of knowing/believing/etc ψ obtains 
in virtue of ϕ’s being known/believed/etc. 
A second task that sufficiency is supposed to carry out is to 
justify certain properties of mathematical universe, especially those 
regarding its ontological luxury. As already remarked, a principle like 
Direction Abstraction is supposed to justify the introduction of 
directions in a universe containing straight lines. In particular a//b it’s 
supposed to count as an explanation of the identity D(a) = D(b). 
Therefore we need a further constraint on the notion of sufficiency. 
Here it’s presented in Linnebo’s version. 
Explanatory Constraint 
ϕ⇒ψ 
Eϕ 
 
Eψ 
If ϕ is sufficient for ψ and ϕ admits an explanation, then ψ admits an 
explanation too. Linnebo idea is that what explains ϕ, explains (or, at 
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least, give rise to an explanation of) ψ too. Therefore, if we want a 
better formalization of this constraint we need a two-places 
explanation-predicate Σ, such that Σ(A,B) means that B is explained 
by A. Here is the version of Explanatory Constraint that I favour. 
Explanatory Constraint* 
ϕ⇒ψ 
Σ(γ,ϕ) 
 
Σ(γ,ψ) 
If we consider only Epistemic and Explanatory Constraints, we might 
be struck by the fact that there’s an obvious candidate for the role of 
sufficiency: the notion of logical consequence. Surely this notion 
satisfies both constraints; indeed if A ⊨ B then if A enjoys a certain 
epistemic status then, presumably, we are entitled to suppose that it’s 
possible for B to enjoy the same status; moreover if γ explains A and 
A ⊨ B, then γ explains B too. Nevertheless the identification of 
sufficiency with logical consequence would completely trivialize this 
notion and, what counts more, it would make it unfit for our purposes. 
Indeed if we aim at justifying some philosophically significant 
abstraction principles (like Direction Abstraction for example) logical 
consequence is of no help. The identity of D(a) with D(b) is clearly 
not a logical consequence of a//b. Therefore we need to impose a 
further constraint on the notion of sufficiency. 
Non-Triviality Constraint 
There must be systematic range of couples of sentences ϕ and ψ 
such that 
i) ϕ ⇒ ψ 
ii) ϕ and ψ are to be taken at face value 
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iii) the ontological commitment of ψ exceed that of ϕ 
The quest for a notion able to respect these three constraints doesn’t 
immediately appear hard. For example, a possible candidate is 
analytic entailment. 28  It could appear a good option, but when it 
comes to abstraction principles like, for example, direction 
abstraction, we find ourselves into troubles. Suppose that a//b 
analytically entails D(a) = D(b). From D(a) = D(b) we derive the 
existential claim ∃x(x = D(a)). If we suppose that logical consequence 
is subsumed under sufficiency (we are going to do so below), we get 
that a//b analytically entails ∃x(x = D(a)). We can write A[a//b → 
∃x(x = D(a))] and, since there’s no free occurrence of x into a//b we 
can write A∃x[a//b → x = D(a)]. So we are in presence of an 
analytical existence claim. No need to say that this cannot but be a 
very problematic consequence of this approach. 
Therefore we need something less demanding. This less 
demanding notion can be thought to be strict implication. In other 
words the idea is that ϕ⇒ψ is nothing but (ϕ→ψ). It’s easy to see 
that if ϕ and ψ are two necessary truths, say a=a and p→p, we can 
legitimately claim that the former suffices for the latter. Here the 
explanatory constraint is clearly not respected. Moreover the strict 
implication between a certain necessary truth and the existence of a 
necessary God would not conserve the epistemic status nor it would 
be explanatory. We need a notion less demanding than analytic 
entailment and more demanding than strict implication. Is there such a 
notion? Before trying to answer let’s examine some other 
requirements that the such a notion must respect. 
                                                          
28 Which is, by the way, Frege’s favourite candidate. 
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There must be also some logical constraints on the notion of 
sufficiency. Indeed if ϕ and ψ are mutually sufficient, they must 
entertain the same logical relationships with all the other sentences. 
For the exposition of logical constraints we’ll employ the symbol Γ 
for a set of sentences, so, when we write Γ ⇒ ϕ we mean that the 
sentences of Γ are collectively sufficient for ϕ or, if the language we 
adopt allows for infinite conjunction, that the infinite conjunction of 
all the γ belonging to Γ. 
First of all it’s convenient to subsume logical consequence 
under sufficiency.  
Subsumption 
Γ ⊨ ϕ 
 
Γ ⇒ ϕ 
In other words, if ϕ is a logical consequence of a set of sentences Γ, 
then Γ suffices for ϕ.29 The notion of logical consequence at issue 
must be first order or, if intended for a higher order language, it must 
be defined according to Henkin’s semantics. This restriction is 
                                                          
29 I believe that there could be some tension between this rule and the inference rule that 
we called Epistemic Constraint. Linnebo is well aware of the risk connected with so 
strong a requirement (see pp. 28-29 of Linnebo forthcoming) but it seems that he didn’t 
notice that Classical Logical Consequence allows us to assert ϕ ⊨ ψ∨¬ψ. For 
Subsumption we get ϕ ⇒ ψ∨¬ψ. Now suppose that ϕ enjoys the epistemic status of 
being known (let’s represent it by means of the operator K); from Epistemic Constraint 
we get ◊K(ψ∨¬ψ). In principle there’s nothing wrong with this, but, as Linnebo clearly 
states, Epistemic Constraint establishes that, if A⇒B then there’s a transmission of 
epistemic status from A to B. Therefore, if A is known it’s possible that B is known and 
this is true in virtue of A being known. But, in the present case, the possibility, for ψ∨¬ψ, 
of being known doesn’t depend on the fact that ϕ is known. Indeed ψ∨¬ψ is a logical 
truth; we are allowed to suppose that it’s known a priori and not in virtue of knowledge of 
any other statement whatsoever. I don’t believe that this is a serious problem for 
Linnebo’s view. A possible solution is to weaken Epistemic Constraint replacing 
Classical Logical Consequence with a suitable version of Relevant Logical Consequence. 
This move seems to be rather innocuous; indeed we can weaken the constraint in question 
avoiding any other substantial modification of Linnebo’s approach. 
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motivated by a well known concern: standard second order logical 
consequence is badly incomplete. Indeed not every logical 
consequence of a sentence ϕ can be deduced from ϕ.30 But if standard 
second order logical consequence is subsumed under sufficiency and 
Epistemic Constraint holds, then there are cases in which a 
consequence of ϕ that cannot be deduced from ϕ is (possibly) known 
in virtue of ϕ. This would be a serious problem for the coherence of 
this theoretical proposal. The adoption of Henkin’s semantics for 
second order logic disposes of this threat since Henkin’s style logical 
consequence is demonstrably complete. 
Another indispensable logical property of sufficiency is 
transitivity. 
Cut 
Γi ⇒ ϕi         for each i ∈I 
{ϕi∈I} ⇒ ψ 
 
 ⋃i∈IΓi ⇒ ψ 
If a set of sentences Γi suffices for ϕi (for every i belonging to I) and 
the set of all ϕi such that i belongs to I suffices for ψ, then the union of 
all the sets Γi (such that i belongs to I) suffices for ψ. 
Moreover, sufficiency must interact properly with the material 
conditional. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
30 To be more precise: there’s no sound deductive system for second order logical which 
is also complete under standard semantics and effective. This is a consequence of Gödel 
Incompleteness Theorem. 
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Conditionalization 
Γ,ϕ ⇒ ψ                    Γ ⇒ ϕ→ψ            
               
Γ ⇒ ϕ→ψ                 Γ,ϕ ⇒ ψ 
This is clearly an analogous of Deduction Theorem applied to 
sufficiency; if Γ and ϕ suffice for ψ then Γ suffices for ϕ→ψ, and vice 
versa. 
Finally we cannot allow sufficiency to ensure everything. 
Non-trivialization 
⇏ ⊥ 
No set of sentences suffices for a contradiction. 
These four logical constraints are sufficient to ensure that if ϕ 
and ψ are mutually sufficient, then they entertain the same logical 
relationships with all the other sentences. Indeed all the classical 
introduction and elimination rules for the logical connectives can be 
deduced from these four constraints. 
These four logical constraints are not so difficult to satisfy, they 
leave room for a multiplicity of solutions.31 The problem is only to 
reconcile the strictures posed on the one hand by epistemic and 
explanatory constraint and, on the other hand, by the non-triviality 
constraint. The difficulty is not easy to overcome but there are two 
reason not to despair: i) the notion of content we are looking for must 
not necessarily be an already known one; 2) two sentences can have 
the same content with respect to the features that are relevant for us, 
i.e. it’s not a problem if two sentences are not cognitively equivalent, 
it’s enough if they are explanatorily and epistemically equivalent. In 
                                                          
31 In Linnebo (forthcoming) p. 38 it is shown that every consistent theory T is such that if 
we identify sufficiency with  ⊨T, sufficiency respects the four logical constraints.  
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section 5 it will be shown what’s the notion of sufficiency must be 
identified to. 
 
4.3 A metasemantic conception of criteria of identity 
Criteria of identity are the key to get the desired theory of thin objects. 
Quine (1948) suggested that a necessary condition for an act of 
reference to take place is the availability of identity conditions for the 
things we aim at referring to. The importance of such identity 
conditions is not negligible. For example, in order to refer univocally 
to the river Cayster we need to distinguish it from what is not the river 
Cayster and what is merely a part (spatial or even spatio-temporal) of 
it. Moreover identity criteria allow us to answer the question ‘what’s 
so special about abstraction principles?’. The answer is simple: they 
are special because they provide identity conditions for abstract 
objects. They are nothing but identity criteria for directions, numbers 
and everything is liable to be defined this way. A nice feature of an 
account of reference based on identity conditions is its full generality. 
Unlike accounts based on causal relationships between an object x and 
a term standing for x, whose validity cannot cover cases of terms 
whose reference is not a typical middle-size dry good, this account 
would be fully general. 
Before examining Linnebo’s reflections on the relation between 
criteria of identity and reference, it’s worth remarking that what is 
needed is only a sufficient condition for reference. Nobody claims 
that, in every case, reference must take place as described below. The 
aim of the presented model is only to show that what is minimally 
required for a singular term to have reference is so easy to achieve that 
also an abstract entity term can successfully refer. 
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 Linnebo presents a toy model of how identity criteria and 
reference interact. His point is essentially that reference to objects can 
be implemented by a very rudimental system if such a system is able 
to apply criteria of identity. Imagine a robot that is provided with two 
of our senses: sight and touch. It is capable of some very fundamental 
cognitive processes, not highly complex ones such as consciousness. 
Suppose this robot is capable to see objects, i.e. to detect light 
reflected by their surface, and to touch them, i.e. to entertain a 
physical contact with a spatiotemporal part of them. The robot needs 
also the ability to understand when two nucleuses of information come 
from the same body and when they come from two different bodies; 
otherwise the robot would simply be a thing capturing light from other 
things and bumping into them. What it needs is to know that different 
parts constitute an object if and only if they are spatiotemporally 
connected, i.e. if and only if there’s an uninterrupted stretch of solid 
stuff connecting its various parts. If two parts are so connected we can 
say that they belongs to the same body. The relation in play is 
obviously symmetric and transitive (there’s no need to suppose that 
it’s also reflexive). The relation holding in a domain of parts is 
therefore partial equivalence relation. This relation is such that not 
every object belonging to the domain is included into an equivalence 
class. We can write 
B(u) = B(v) ↔ u∼v 
In words: the body which u belongs to is identical with the body 
which v belongs to if and only if u and v are connected by an 
uninterrupted stretch of solid stuff. Notice that this statement has the 
form of an abstraction principle. If the robot’s software is provided 
with such a principle it should be able to refer to a body. Indeed it’s 
not easy to imagine what else is needed for machine to do so. If a 
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cognitive system can do what this robot can do then it is able to refer 
to objects. The envisaged situation displays an interesting reductionist 
aspect that in the next section will receive more attention: the robot 
should be able to refer to a body without any computation involving 
the notion of body. 
A possible objection to this account of reference is that it is at 
odd with Kripke’s account of reference of proper names. He famously 
claimed, in Kripke (1972), that the reference of a proper name is 
direct, not mediated by any sort of description. It could seem that an 
account of reference for names based on criteria of identity calls for 
the existence of something mediating between a name and its 
reference. Despite the appearances it’s only a superficial concern. The 
account of reference at issue is explicitly metasemantic; in other 
words, it’s not an account of the meaning of proper names, but an 
account of what are the minimal conditions that a linguistic expression 
must respect in order to be able to refer. The problem is not what 
reference consists in, but how reference is possible. Kripke’s famous 
claims address only the semantic problem and are perfectly 
compatible with any metasemantics whatsoever. Nothing prevents us 
from maintaining that proper names directly refer to objects and that 
the reason why they can do so is that they satisfy certain  identity 
criteria. 
Now, the problem for Linnebo is to justify his metasemantic 
conception of criteria of identity. Since now, we have treated his 
conception as the only one, but, as usual, reality is more complex. 
There are two different conceptions of criteria of identity other than 
the metasemantic one that we have adopted: a metaphysical one and 
an epistemic one. According to the metaphysical conception of criteria 
of identity, such criteria provides information about the nature of the 
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things they are about. In this interpretation the principle known as 
Direction Abstraction gives answer, at least partially, to the question 
‘what are directions?’. According to the epistemic conception, criteria 
of identity are what allows us to decide whether items are the same or 
not. 
Linnebo believes that both conceptions are correct and that 
criteria of identity have both a metaphysical and an epistemic side, 
but, in his opinion, their fundamental trait is their metasemantic role. 
Let’s see how he shows this. Both epistemic and metaphysical 
conceptions suffer from some serious limitations. Epistemic 
conception treats criteria of identity simply as means that we need to 
recognise two presentations as belonging to one and the same object 
or as belonging to distinct objects. In order to do so they simply direct 
our attention to some distinctive marks, whose detection should lead 
us immediately to the right conclusion. These marks cannot tell us so 
much about the identified thing itself. Certainly the typical marks of a 
thing depends on its features but, in many cases they are not so 
informative about the thing itself. Consider, for example, the case of a 
certain disease and its symptoms. Strong chest pain is a typical mark 
of heart attack and it certainly allows a physician to detect it and to 
distinguish it from other diseases, but it doesn’t say so much about 
what the heart attack itself is or about what’s going on into the heart.  
The problem that Linnebo sees with the metaphysical 
conception of criteria of identity is that, if so conceived, criteria of 
identity cannot be distinguished from other metaphysical truths. 
Indeed a criterion of identity is presumably a metaphysically 
necessary sentence that has a certain typical logical form. Look at this 
example: we customarily claim that the identity of sets is given by the 
principle of Extensionality (namely, A and B are the same set if and 
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only if for every x, x is a member of A if and only if it’s a member of 
B). Nevertheless there’s another metaphysical truth about sets that, for 
its logical form, is apt to be a criterion of identity and it’s the 
following one: 
SET(a) ∧ SET(b) ↔ [a = b ↔ ∀x(a∈x ↔ b∈x)] 
In words: a and b are sets if and only if they are the same set if and 
only if they belongs to the same sets. This sentence is necessarily true, 
it displays a logical form compatible with that of an identity criteria 
and, finally, it certainly says something about the identity of sets. 
Nevertheless we still prefer the principle of extensionality as a 
criterion of identity. A supporter of metaphysical conception of 
criteria of identity cannot but find difficult to explain why we accord 
our preference to Extensionality. Linnebo can finally concludes: 
I believe that my metasemantic conception of criteria of identity provides a 
clearer and more satisfactory account of how criteria of identity are 
distinguished from more humdrum metaphysical truths. Criteria of identity 
explain how certain fundamental forms of reference are constituted. And 
through that, they also come to govern the referents in questions. (Linnebo 
forthcoming p. 126) 
 
4.4. Abstraction and reference 
4.4.1 A  community of speakers 
As already said, criteria of identity have an important role to play in 
Frege’s account of reference. Linnebo believes that this is a 
fundamental feature that a good account must preserve, since it 
favours the elaboration of a fully general explanation of reference, 
capable of justifying reference to both material and abstract objects. In 
order to illustrate his Fregean conception of reference, Linnebo 
proposes a sort of thought experiment in which he asks to imagine a 
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community of speakers who, at same point, starts talking about some 
abstract entities, somewhat extending its language. He then tries to 
show that we should interpret their use of abstract terms as really 
referring to abstract entities and not as an indirect or metaphorical way 
to refer to concrete entities. 
Let’s start with the thought experiment. A community of 
speakers communicates by means of a language ℒ0, that we will call 
base language, capable of referring to and quantifying over various 
concrete objects. For simplicity reasons Linnebo assumes that ℒ0 is a 
first order language with identity and that its interpretation I is shared 
by each member of the community. Therefore it’s a priori excluded 
the possibility of linguistic disagreement. The domain of I is D0 and it 
consist of concrete objects whose existence is not matter of any 
dispute. The base language is able to refer to (and quantify over) 
letter-tokens, namely concrete inscriptions (on physical supports) of 
alphabetic letters. Now suppose that, at a certain point, this 
community of speakers becomes able to talk about letter-types, 
namely those abstract entities we commonly call letters. They can do 
this employing an extended language ℒ1 which is identical with ℒ0, 
except for the fact that it allows for reference to and quantification 
over a new sort of objects, namely letters. The extended language ℒ1 is 
a two sorted language; it’s constituted by a base sort covering all the 
constants, variables and predicates of ℒ0 and by an extended sort, 
reserved for letters talk. The latter is constituted by: 1) a set of 
constants referring to letters; 2) a set of variables ranging over letters; 
3) a set of predicates suitable for letter talk; 4) a functional operator § 
assigning a letter to each inscription; 5) two identity signs, = and =1, 
that can be flanked respectively by singular terms referring to 
129 
 
inscriptions and by singular terms referring to letters.32 It should be 
noticed that this example can be easily generalized and hence cover 
other cases of abstract entities talk. Nevertheless, the fact itself that 
the presented model requires a many sorted language poses a 
restriction on the generality of Linnebo’s model: it can be applied only 
to cases of predicative abstraction. This restriction may affect the 
mathematical power of a theory of abstraction, but, since we are 
dealing exclusively with the ontological aspects of the problem, we 
are free from this concern. 
The members of this hypothetical community use the extended 
language to talk about letters; they act as if they are referring to and 
quantifying over letters. They can do so in virtue of abstraction on 
inscription. Indeed we suppose that they master some criteria for when 
two inscriptions count as different inscriptions of the same letter. It’s 
worth noticing that this ability doesn’t require any cognitive grasp of 
the notion of letter (indeed there are electronic devices with this 
capacity); the speakers of this community are able to assign (or to 
refuse to assign) two different inscription to the same letter even if 
they are not able to explain what letters are. We use the symbol ‘∼’ to 
design the relation, holding on D0, between inscriptions that count as 
inscriptions of the same letter. This relation is clearly symmetric and 
transitive, but not reflexive since not every member of D0 is an 
inscription of a letter. In other words ∼ is a partial equivalence relation 
that divides a subset of D0 into equivalence classes.  
The principle of abstraction on inscription is the following: 
Letter Abstraction: §(x1) =1 §(x2) ↔ x1 ∼ x2 
                                                          
32 Identities between terms belonging to different sorts are deemed as ill-formed. This is 
aimed at avoiding the so called Cesar Problem of mixed identities.  
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The free variables x1 and x2 belong to the base sort, while the singular 
terms §(x1) and §(x2) and, obviously, the identity sign =1 belong to the 
extended sort. This principle enables speakers to formulate assertible 
statements about letters. Before examining the assertibility conditions, 
it’s worth noticing that, in considering a principle like Letter 
Abstraction as a norm of assertibility, and not as a norm of truth, 
Linnebo is claiming that the hypothetical community simply regards 
sentences respecting it as correct, as valid moves in their everyday 
linguistic practice. Here no substantial semantic claim is in play: it 
simply makes no sense to say that §(x1) =1 §(x2) expresses the same 
content of x1 ∼ x2 or that the former can be reduced to the latter. The 
principle at issue is simply a linguistic practice accepted into the 
community and the same holds for every other assertible sentence 
formulated in ℒ1. Here is a semiformal presentation
33  of the 
assertibility conditions for sentences of ℒ1: 
1. Every sentence of ℒ1 that is also a sentence of ℒ0 is assertible if 
and only if it’s true under the interpretation I. 
2. §(x1) =1 §(x2) is assertible if and only if x1 ∼ x2. 
3. Each n-place predicate P is associated with an assertibility 
condition  φP such that P(§(x1), §(x2), ..., §(xn)) is assertible if and 
only if φP(x1, x2, ..., xn) 
4. The clauses for truth functional connectives are the obvious 
compositional ones. 
5. ∀xθ is assertible if and only if, for every value that x can assume, 
θ is assertible. 
                                                          
 
33  For a more precise presentation see Linnebo (forthcoming) pp. 154-155. For the 
purpose of the present exposition the semiformal characterization is sufficient. 
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The assertibility condition φP mentioned at condition 3 must be subject 
to two constraints. First we need to assume that ∼ is a congruence 
relatively to assertibility condition φP:  
(x1 ∼ y1 ∧ x2 ∼ y2 ∧ ... ∧ xn ∼ yn) → φP(x1,x2, ...,xn) ↔ φP(y1,y2, 
...,yn) 
In other words φP must be unable to distinguish items that are 
equivalent relatively to relation ∼. If two inscriptions x1 and y2 count 
as inscriptions of the same letter, then the assertibility conditions of 
two sentences, that differ exclusively because in the former x1 features 
in a certain position and in the latter there’s y2 in that same position, 
are the same. Second we have to assure that each object to which φP 
applies is an inscription (recall that the domain of the extended 
language doesn’t include only inscription but also whatever object is 
included into domain D0). 
φP(x1,x2, ...,xn) → (x1 ∼ x1 ∧ x2 ∼ x2 ∧ ... ∧ xn ∼ xn) 
In other words if φP holds for x1,x2, ...,xn then each xi (with i ranging 
from 1 to n) must be an inscription. This characterization of ℒ1 should 
suffice to show that the speakers belonging to our envisaged 
community speak as if they were referring to and quantifying over 
letters. In the next section we will explain why Linnebo claims that 
they are really referring to and quantifying over letters. 
 
4.4.2 Reductionism vs Non-Reductionism 
The question is what’s the best interpretation of the extended language 
ℒ1. As already said, the interpretation of ℒ0 poses no problem, since 
every member of the envisaged community agrees on I. But when it 
comes to ℒ1 at least two different stances are possible: on the one hand 
someone could argue that, since the assertibility conditions for the 
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sentences of ℒ1 don’t mention letters, the most appropriate (because 
the closest to the linguistic data) interpretation is a reductionist one, 
according to which a model for ℒ1 doesn’t require a domain more 
extended than D0; on the other hand someone else could argue that the 
behaviour of the speakers suggests that they are really referring to and 
quantifying over letters and therefore an acceptable model for ℒ1 
cannot but require a domain wider than D0. This latter position, that 
we’ll call non-reductionist takes at face value the assertible sentences 
of ℒ1 and, since there are functional operators that, when saturated 
with an inscription-term, generate a singular term that behaves like a 
letter-term, then ℒ1 really allows for reference to letters. On the 
contrary the reductionist reads off her interpretation from the 
assertibility conditions and instead of saying that a term like §(x1) is 
associated with x1, she claims that it refers to x1. From her point of 
view, assertibility conditions become truth conditions. 
The supporter of non-reductionism, as already said, needs to 
add letters to the set of existing things. This addition is obtained 
introducing a separate domain D1 for letters. Such a domain can be 
considered the range of function §. 
Letters Domain:   b∈D1 ↔ ∃x(x∈D0 ∧ x∼x ∧ §(x) = b) 
In words: an item b belongs to D1 if and only if there is an x belonging 
to D0 and being an inscription such that function § associates b to x. 
According to the non-reductionist view, identities between items 
belonging to D1 are true if and only if they respect the condition 
imposed by the already presented principle Letter Abstraction. The 
truth conditions for an atomic sentence, in which a predicate P is 
applied to letter-terms, requires that assertibility conditions for P are 
defined as follows: 
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A-Equivalence: ∀x1,x2,...,xn{φP
*[§(x1), §(x2),..., §(xn)] ↔ 
φP(x1,x2,...,xn)} 
This constraint simply says that the assertibility condition (that we 
represent with the symbol φP
*) for a predicate P applying to a certain 
sequence of letters is equivalent to the assertibility condition for the 
same predicate applying to the corresponding sequence of 
inscriptions. A-Equivalence enable us to say that an atomic sentence 
P(b1,b2,...,bn), with b1,b2,...,bn∈D1, is true, under the non-reductionist 
view, if and only if φP
*(b1,b2,...,bn). The truth conditions for sentences 
in which logical connectives or quantifiers feature are construed in the 
obvious way (just recall that the quantifiers of sentences of ℒ1 range 
over D1, not D0). 
These two interpretations, reductionist and anti-reductionist, 
differ for their truth conditions and obviously for the ontological 
commitment that they assign; nevertheless they are equivalent under 
an important respect: as it’s clear from the two principles above 
(Letters Domain and A-Equivalence) the “request of the world” that 
the two interpretations make are perfectly equivalent. For example: for 
an identity of letters to be true what is required is just the fact that 
makes true an identity of inscriptions. There’s a precise sense 
according to which also the non-reductionist interpretation is 
reductionist: the truth conditions it assigns to ℒ1 sentences never make 
an irreducible reference to entities belonging to D1. One may ask 
what’s the fundamental source of the disagreement between a 
reductionist and a non-reductionist. Also to this question there’s a 
precise answer: the disagreement lies in the different conception that 
the two disputer have of semantics and what semantics involves. The 
reductionist believes that his foe’s semantics requires a problematic 
and purposeless introduction of abstract semantics values; the non-
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reductionist believes that his foe’s semantics includes some 
metaphysical principles alien to genuine semantics, principles 
according to which, for example, identity of letters is nothing but 
identity of inscriptions. In a sense, the disagreement lies in what they 
believe is the boundary of semantics. 
Before looking at Linnebo’s arguments in favour of non-
reductionist interpretation, it’s worth observing that such an 
interpretation is really available and not simply an imaginary 
possibility. The truth conditions given by a non-reductionist 
interpretation doesn’t require to the world something that could be 
required only after a serious empirical inquiry. Consider the case of a 
term like ‘phlogiston’: its introduction as a constant of ℒ1 would 
require scientific knowledge at least of its chemical structure and its 
role in a combustions process. The assertibility conditions of an 
atomic sentence containing such a constant cannot avoid to mention 
what the term purport to refer to. Unlike the introduction of letter 
terms, the introduction of the term ‘phlogiston’ and its use in atomic 
sentences makes some substantial request to reality. The non-
reductionist interpretation, as is characterized in the present chapter, is 
really available. 
Let’s see what are the arguments that Linnebo proposes to show 
the superiority of non-reductionist interpretation. A first argument is 
related with a problem of compositionality and it is about the 
treatment of some generalized quantifiers. Consider a language ℒM 
identical with ℒ1 except for the fact that it’s enriched with the 
quantifier ‘most’; its standard semantic treatment the following: if we 
say that most x are P we mean that, given a collection of relevant x 
(our domain), more than half of them is P. Now suppose that five 
inscriptions are drown on a blackboard: A, B, A, A, C. Taking this 
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collection of inscriptions as our domain, one can truly say, in ℒM, that  
most inscriptions are vowels. There’s no reason to doubt that a 
reductionist and a non-reductionist would agree on the truth value of 
this sentence. But now consider the sentence ‘most letters are vowels’. 
Such a sentence is intuitively false in ℒM, since only one letter is a 
vowel, while the other two are consonant. A non-reductionist has no 
difficulty in recognising the falsity of such a sentence and therefore in 
upholding our intuitions. Indeed the sentence at issue is: 
(1) ∃Mx(Lx→Vx) 
The symbol ‘∃M’ stands for the quantifier ‘most’. The semantic 
analysis of a non-reductionist would take the quantifier to range over a 
subset of domain D1 (contextual restriction of D1) containing three 
letters, only one of which is a vowel. Hence, according to a non-
reductionist interpretation, the sentence is false (and our intuition are 
vindicated). What about a reductionist interpretation? According to 
reductionism, the quantifier doesn’t range over a subset of D1, but 
over a subset of D0, a set containing precisely the inscriptions on the 
blackboard. The reductionist semantic analysis can be represented 
semi-formally as follows: 
(2) For most x of the blackboard(x is an inscription → x is a vowel 
inscription) 
The analysis cannot but give as output the truth of sentence (2). 
Indeed most inscriptions on the blackboard are vowel-inscription. 
Therefore a reductionism semantics has an important limit: it’s not 
able to deal with the generalized quantifier ‘most’ in the desired way. 
It should be noticed (and Linnebo notices it) that the 
reductionist can rebut that her semantics can be easily enriched with 
the resources needed for the treatment of these cases in accordance 
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with our intuition and without being unfaithful to its reductionist 
vocation. For example, we can introduce, into the metalanguage that 
we use to express truth conditions for the sentences of ℒM, a 
function π associating each singular term (constant or free variable) t 
of the extended sort (hence a term standing for a letter) with one and 
only one member x of D0 such that x∼x, namely with an inscription. 
Function π respects the constraint imposed by Letter Abstraction; it 
never associates two distinct letter-terms with the same inscription, 
but each letter term with a different inscription. Such inscription is one 
of the many inscriptions that Letter Abstraction associates with a 
certain letter and it acts like a proxy of the equivalence class it belongs 
to. A reductionist can claim that letters talk is nothing but proxy-
inscriptions talk. Her analysis of (1) becomes: 
(3) For most x of the blackboard(x is a proxy-inscription → x is a 
vowel inscription) 
Since the proxy inscriptions are three and only one of them is a vowel 
inscription (3) is false. The accordance with our intuitions is regained. 
Linnebo remarks that this strategy works in the present case, but 
cannot be extended to all the conceivable cases. Indeed, in some cases 
the entities of the extended domain largely outstrip the entities of the 
base domain. Consider, for example, Predicative Basic Law V. Unlike 
its impredicative cousin, it’s perfectly consistent, since the domain of 
extensions is separate from the domain of basic entities (no extension 
can be included into an equivalence classes to which abstraction 
assigns an extension). In virtue of Cantor Theorem we know that the 
cardinality of the extended domain is bigger than the cardinality of the 
base domain. Therefore the reductionist gambit cannot work here: 
there cannot be enough proxies among the objects of the base domain. 
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Nevertheless there’s a last option: taking the pluralities generated by 
Predicative BLV themselves as proxies. Linnebo believes that also 
this strategy cannot but lead to a dead end. In his words: 
Since pluralities are not objects, however, this will results in type clashes. 
For instance, when ‘most’ is applied to talk about ordinary objects, then the 
truth conditions involve cardinality comparisons among objects, but when 
‘most’ is applied to talk about sets, then we need to make cardinality 
comparisons among pluralities. (Linnebo forthcoming p.145) 
I believe that the problem  that he sees cannot be avoided. One could 
well imagine a strategy allowing the reductionist to both treat 
extensions as objects and conserving fidelity to the essential ambition 
of a reductionist semantics, but this wouldn’t work for different 
reasons. Let’s examine what’s the extreme move that a reductionist 
could try. Extension b can be identified with the mereological fusion 
of all the objects x such that §(x) = b. The number of possible 
mereological fusions of objects belonging to the base domain equals 
the number of objects belonging to the extended domain, so we avoid 
cardinality problems. Moreover the acceptance of mereological 
fusions is presumably not a scandal for a reductionist. Under the 
standard account of mereology,34 the mereological fusion <bc> of two 
(unproblematic) entities b and c doesn’t count as an additional 
ontological commitment, since <bc> is nothing more than b and c 
taken as a whole. Even if someone might contend that the thesis of the 
ontological innocence of mereology is dubious, since it relies on a not 
universally accepted characterization of the notion of object,35 there 
seems to be room for a reductionist to accept mereological fusion 
without twisting her view. Finally the problem of type clashes is 
                                                          
34 See, for example, Lewis (1991), and more recently, Hawley (2014). 
 
35 See, for example, Carrara (manuscript). 
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avoided since mereological fusions count as objects. But there’s a 
serious problem: to which domain these mereological fusions belong 
to? If we take them as belonging to the extended sort, then a 
reductionist cannot make use of them when she formulates the truth 
conditions for sentences talking about them. Recall that reductionist 
truth conditions don’t mention entities belonging to the extended 
domain (that’s the point of reductionism). If, alternatively, she takes 
them as belonging to the base domain, she faces a cardinality problem 
again. Indeed Predicative BLV is such that the quantifiers featuring on 
its right hand side ranges over all the entities of the base domain. 
Therefore it generates a number of extensions that largely outstrips the 
number of mereological fusions, which constitutes a subset of the base 
domain. I claim that the reductionist faces a dilemma: either 
renouncing to an essential trait of a reductionist semantics or falling 
into inconsistency. I believe we should conclude that Linnebo is right 
in believing that non-reductionism fares better with respect to 
compositionality. 
A second argument Linnebo appeals to for the vindication of 
the superiority of non-reductionist approach to the interpretation of ℒ1, 
has to do with the cognitive constraints that interpretations must 
satisfy. In general we believe that there is a certain cognitive 
transparency of meaning, that can be loosely expressed like this: 
Cognitive Constraint: the truth conditions that an interpretation 
assign to a sentence must be the ones adequately grasped by a 
speaker who understand the sentence. 
As Linnebo puts it, a plausible semantic analysis of ‘snow is white’ 
must mirror the cognitive content that a competent speaker grasps 
when reading it, namely that a thing called ‘snow’ enjoys a property 
called ‘being white’. This constraint seems to be more 
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straightforwardly met by a non-reductionist interpretation. Indeed a 
speaker who understands an atomic sentence of ℒ1 talking about 
letters tends to grasp a content according to which a certain property is 
attributed to a certain letter. It’s very unlikely that what she grasps is 
that a corresponding property is attributed to a certain inscription that 
is related to the mentioned letter by a relation that is not completely 
transparent to her mind. Indeed the relation ∼ that allows us to count 
different inscriptions as inscriptions of the same letter is very difficult 
to analyze. The mental mechanisms involved acts largely at a sub-
personal level. We all are able to see that two different inscription of a 
letter correspond to the same letter, but, if asked to explain why, we 
will find ourselves in a predicament. The mental processes involved 
are surely important, but they leave no significant trace on our 
consciousness. Non-reductionist interpretation seems to fare better 
also with regard to cognitive aspects.  
I find this argument to be less convincing than the previous one, 
since, as Rayo (2013) has pointed out there is, at least in some cases, a 
significant gap between what a competent speaker grasp and what a 
sentence mean. Indeed some sentences can have the same meaning 
without them being associated with the same cognitive content. I 
believe that the critical considerations of Rayo about that 
philosophical prejudice that he dubs ‘Metaphysicalism’ undermine 
Cognitive Constraint or, at least, show that it’s far too demanding. In a 
number of cases (recall, for example, the couple of sentences ‘Susan 
runs’ and ‘the property of running is instantiated by Susan’) we can 
legitimately assign the same truth conditions to two sentences that the 
cognitive apparatus of a competent speaker might take as very 
different. Rayo’s arguments successfully explain why there’s no need 
to assume that the face-value reading of a sentence must be mirrored 
140 
 
by its semantic analysis. Therefore I believe that Linnebo’s cognitive 
argument in behalf of the superiority of non-reductionist interpretation 
is not conclusive. Nevertheless we can say that, in general, the 
availability of a non-reductionist interpretation and its adavantage 
over a reductionist one is well established in his theory. 
 
4.5 Thin Objects 
The consequences of the considerations exposed in the previous 
section are ontologically relevant. It is shown that an extension of a 
base language by means of abstraction principles is legitimate and a 
non-reductionist interpretation of the extended language is legitimate 
and preferable to a reductionist one. Moreover there are true 
existential sentences in the extended language ℒ1 that, according to 
both the reductionist and the non-reductionist interpretation, are true 
and such that, in virtue of the latter, we can consider as really 
committing to letters as abstract objects. Linnebo remarks that 
This way of introducing objects into one's rational discourse will no doubt 
strike some philosophers as too easy. Surely, such philosophers will think, 
the view that there are abstract objects is a substantive thesis whose truth 
requires the cooperation of reality and not just the adoption of some 
language. I disagree. I believe that letters and other abstract objects that can 
be introduced in an analogous way are thin objects. [...] the idea is that thin 
objects do not require much of reality for their existence. Their existence 
requires only the obtaining of some condition which does not mention the 
objects in question and which is thus comparatively unproblematic. For 
instance, the existence of a letter requires nothing more than that there be an 
appropriate inscription. (Linnebo forthcoming, p.151) 
Linnebo’s theory has clearly a reductionist aspect. Each sentence of ℒ1 
has assertibility conditions that doesn’t mention letters. This is needed 
in order to guarantee the legitimacy of the introduction of letter talk: 
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nothing radically new has been introduced. Nevertheless reductionism 
is confined to assertibility conditions. Truth conditions assigned by the 
non-reductionist interpretation are classical, hence, sentences which 
mention letters are interpreted as really referring to letters. 
We are now in a position to clarify the notion of sufficiency 
presented in section 2 of the present chapter. 
Sufficiency: ϕ⇒ψ if and only if there is a legitimate extension of 
our linguistic resources of the sort described in section 4 of the 
present chapter such that ϕ provides the assertibility  conditions for 
ψ. 
Linnebo shows that this definition satisfies all the constraints which 
the notion of sufficiency is subject to. Epistemic and explanatory 
constraints are satisfied or, at least, we are in good position to claim 
that they are satisfied. Consider the example given at section 4 of the 
present chapter: the assertibility conditions associated with sentences 
of language ℒ1 guarantee that a sentence talking about letters can be 
legitimately asserted if and only if there is a corresponding sentence 
about inscriptions that is classically true. Therefore there are good 
reasons to claim that if ϕ is explained by α and ϕ⇒ψ then ψ is 
explained by α too. The same holds for the transmission of epistemic 
status. For example, the knowability of ϕ and ϕ⇒ψ are enough to 
claim that ψ is (possibly) knowable, since its assertibility conditions 
are equivalent to those of ϕ. The non-triviality constraint is obviously 
respected in virtue of the essential characteristics of a non-reductionist 
interpretation. Indeed atomic sentences of ℒ1 talking about letters 
present an additional ontological commitment relatively to the 
sentences of ℒ0 they are equivalent to. As it has been already shown in 
section 2 of the present chapter the logical constraints are easily 
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satisfied by various notions of sufficiency and, among them, also by 
Sufficiency. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
At this point is should be clear the Linnebo’s theory is able to pass 
through the three explanatory steps that we outlined in section 1 of the 
present chapter. Thought some passages of his argument are tricky, 
the resulting picture is rather simple: the concepts of reference, object 
and identity criteria are tightly related. An object is whatever we are 
able to refer to in virtue of a criterion of identity. Moreover, if a given 
language is enriched with the means needed for reference to abstract 
objects (essentially abstraction principles) and if non-reductionist truth 
conditions for the sentences of the enriched language are available, 
then reference to abstract objects really succeeds. I have pointed out 
that not all the arguments that Linnebo presents in behalf of non-
reductionist semantics are fully convincing, nevertheless at least the 
availability of such a semantic is fully established.  
In the next chapter we are going to compare this theory with the 
other two (Eklund and Rayo’s) and to show its superiority over at least 
one of them. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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NeoFregeanism is a complex and original conception of the relation 
between language and reality. The analysis of the three theories of 
Rayo, Eklund and Linnebo has given us an idea of how different are 
the ways in which such a conception can be articulated. These 
different formulations face some difficulties; I’ve tried to show how 
they can be overcome. I hope my discourse has given some good 
reason to consider these theories as something worth of serious 
reflection. 
What I would like to do now is to reassess these theories in light 
of the four theses, characterizing NeoFregeanism, that I have 
enunciated in the introduction and that I restate here for the reader’s 
ease: 
1) PRIORITY: the following two facts: 
a) the singular term ‘a’ in the atomic sentence ‘Fa’ refers to an 
existing object 
b) the existence of objects satisfying the condition φ that features in 
the sentence ‘∃xφ(x)’ 
are grounded respectively in the following two facts: 
a’) ‘Fa’ is a true sentence 
b’) ‘∃xφ(x)’ is a true sentence 
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2) PLATONISM : there are self-subsistent abstract objects 
3) ABSTRACTION EFFECTIVENESS: some abstraction 
principles are effective stipulations, i.e. they are such that their two 
sides share the same content. 
4) ABSTRACTION ESSENTIALITY: an argument in behalf of 
Platonism about a certain kind of abstract entities requires the 
employ of effective abstraction principles. 
As we have said in the introduction, Platonism is the conclusion of an 
argument that can employ some (or all) of the three other theses. The 
question that I believe it’s worth answering is how each of the three 
examined theories performs with respect of these theses. Can each 
justify all of them? If not, which are justified and which are not? 
Why? The answers to these questions should significantly clarify our 
view of NeoFregeanism.  
 
5.1 Rayo’s Compositionalism 
Let’s start our analysis from Rayo’s theory. The main part of Rayo’s 
theoretical effort is devoted to the justification of the legitimacy of 
‘just is’-statements. He tries to show that there are perfectly 
acceptable ‘just is’-statements, and that those who believe that there is 
something wrong with them are deceived by a poorly motivated 
philosophical preconception. Abstraction principles are a subset of 
‘just is’-statements, so their acceptability is supported by the very 
same arguments. A ‘just is’-statement is acceptable if and only if its 
two sides are depictions of the same state of affairs, that is, if and only 
if they constitute two different reconceptualization of one and the 
same content. If one is able to argue in favour of the acceptability of 
‘just is’-statements then she can argue in favour of Abstraction 
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Effectiveness too. As I have shown in Chapter 2 Rayo’s defence of 
‘just is’-statements, as ways of describing one and the same state of 
affairs in two different ways, requires the appeal to a truthmaker 
semantics. In a language in which there are acceptable ‘just is’-
statements, sentences cannot receive their truth conditions from the 
classical tarskian clauses. Indeed these clauses are too fine grained; 
they are not able to assign the same truth conditions to different 
atomic sentences. But this is what some acceptable ‘just is’-statements 
require. Therefore the defence of Abstraction Effectiveness comes at a 
cost: a coarse grained semantics for the statements of the envisaged 
language. This fact, as we observed in Chapter 2 may appear at odds 
with Evans’ Generality Requirement. The only solution that I can see 
to this concern is to distinguish two different aspect of meaning: the 
state of affair that makes a sentence true and the cognitive content that 
a competent speaker associates to it. ‘Just is’-statements are true when 
their two sides depict the same state of affair, no matter how different 
is the cognitive content that a competent speaker would attribute them. 
If we are ready to accept this distinction, then we can consider 
Abstraction Effectiveness as adequately justified by Rayo’s 
Compositionalism. 
What about Priority? Compositionalism is  certainly a generous 
view when it comes to assigning a reference to expressions behaving 
as singular terms. If a ‘just is’-statement is true (and it can be so also 
in virtue of simple framework organization reasons) and one of its two 
sides is true for the ordinary criteria of truth, then also the other side is 
true, since the truth of one of the two sides of a ‘just is’-statement 
counts as an ordinary truth condition for the other. And, 
Compositionalism says, if an atomic statement is true according to the 
ordinary truth conditions, then its singular terms really refer. This 
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strong thesis, substantially equivalent with Priority, is justified, as we 
have seen in Chapter 2 in a negative way. Rayo’s argument is that 
there’s no metaphysical strong reason to favour a certain 
conceptualization and to employ exclusively that one to depict states 
of affair. The fact that two lines stand in certain reciprocal relation can 
be described equally well by means of parallelism between them and 
by means of identity of their direction. Believing that only one of 
these two presentations carves reality at the joints is a philosophical 
prejudice (what Rayo calls Metaphysicalism). If we accept his 
argument we can say that also Priority is defended by his approach.  
When it comes to Abstraction Essentiality things change. As we 
have already remarked, abstraction principles constitute a subset of 
‘just is’-statements. Nevertheless nothing, in Rayo’s theory, gives us 
reasons to think that they are essential for the justification of 
Platonism. Consider for example this ‘just is’-statement: 
DINOSAURS: for the number of dinosaurs to be zero just is for 
there to be no dinosaurs. 
This sentence can hardly be considered an abstraction principle. Its 
logical form is N(D) = 0 ⇔ ¬∃xDx. Clearly it’s not the form of an 
abstraction principle. Now the truth of Dinosaurs plus the truth of 
‘there are no dinosaurs’ is sufficient for the truth of ‘the number of 
dinosaurs is zero’. If we accept the Compositionalist doctrine, then the 
singular term ‘zero’ has a reference. Hence there are numbers (at least 
one). Nothing prevent us from introducing also other numbers in our 
ontology in the same way. Consider the following ‘just is’-statement: 
POPES: for the number of Popes to be two just is for there to be 
exactly two Popes. 
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The logical form of this statement is N(P) = 2 ⇔ ∃x,y[Px ∧ Py ∧ 
∀z(Pz → z=x ∨ z=y)] and this too is obviously not an abstraction 
principle. It should be clear from these examples that abstraction 
principles play no essential role, in Rayo’s framework, for the 
justification of Platonism. The thesis of acceptability of some ‘just is’-
statement and Compositionalism provide enough basis for it, there’s 
no need to attribute abstraction principles a privileged role. 
 
5.2 Eklund’s Maximalism 
As we have explained in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, Maximalism is 
the view according to which a sortal concept F is instantiated by some 
individual if and only if F is consistent and it doesn’t fail to be 
instantiated simply as a matter of empirical facts. This view seems to 
offer robust support to Priority. Consider for example the notion of 
temporal part. It is a consistent notion; its definition is not 
contradictory and doesn’t entail any contradiction. If we assume 
Maximalism, then there are temporal parts. From this, assuming the 
classical disquotational schema, we can deduce that ‘there are 
temporal parts’ is true. Now, what Priority ask for is that, if ‘there are 
temporal parts’ is true, according to ordinary criteria, then there really 
are things such that they exemplify the concept of temporal part. But 
this has been already guaranteed, thanks to Maximalism, by the fact 
that the notion of temporal part is consistent. Therefore, at least in the 
case of temporal parts, Maximalism offer a robust justification for 
Priority. Examples might certainly be multiplied and, among them, 
there might be many examples of abstract objects whose existence is 
justified in virtue of the coherence of their notion. 
Nevertheless I don’t believe that we are entitled to conclude 
that, in general, Maximalism entails Priority. I believe that there are 
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entities whose existence could be justified by Priority, but not by 
Maximalism. Consider the following example. Mathematical Analysis 
is an immense field of mathematics and it includes a number of 
theorems about analytic functions, integrals, limits, differential 
equations and the like. All of these theorems are true according to the 
ordinary standards of acceptability that rule mathematical discourse. 
Among the theorems of analysis, there are statements like this: 
limn→+∞ 1
2
1
1
=∑
=
n
i
i
 
It states that the infinite sum ...
16
1
8
1
4
1
2
1
++++  equals 1. More 
precisely: the limit, for n which tends to infinity of the summation of 
the inverses of all the powers of 2 is 1. Since it is a true statement in 
which ‘lim...’ figure as a singular term, then, if we assume Priority, 
‘lim...’ really refers to an item of reality. Hence there are limits. One 
could ask whether Maximalism is able to justify the same conclusion. 
The answer can hardly be fully affirmative. There’s no proof of the 
coherence of mathematical analysis. Consequently one cannot be sure 
of the compatibility of the existence of limits with all the other 
theorems of mathematical analysis. The notion of limit, individually 
taken, is consistent, but there’s no guarantee that it doesn’t clash with 
other notions of the same theory. Maximalism, as defined by Eklund 
(2006) requires, for the existence of Fs, only the coherence of the 
notion of ‘being an F’ individually taken, but, as shown in Chapter 3, 
there are couple of concepts which are coherent, if taken individually, 
but inconsistent if taken together. The emendation that we have 
proposed and defended requires the introduction of vague existential 
quantification. Such an emendation allows us to solve the problem of 
individually consistent, but collectively incompatible sortal concepts, 
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by claiming that both the incompatible sortals only vaguely exist. The 
case of sortal concepts involved in mathematical analysis might be 
certainly dealt with the help of vague existential quantification. We 
can say that, according to Maximalism, limits vaguely exist, i.e. it’s 
not perfectly determined whether they exist or not. But this claim (that 
is the strongest that Maximalism can support) is definitely weaker 
than that supported by Priority. Indeed, the truth of limn→+∞ 1
2
1
1
=∑
=
n
i
i
 
plus Priority entails the plain existence of limits, not their vague 
existence. I think that we can conclude that Maximalism offers only a 
partial support to Priority. 
It should be perfectly clear that, in Eklund’s theoretical 
framework, abstraction principles play no role at all. Maximalism 
doesn’t defend Abstraction Effectiveness, since it doesn’t articulate 
any notion of sameness of content. Moreover no justification is 
offered for Abstraction Essentiality. We could even say that 
Maximalism is a perfect disproval of Abstraction Essentiality, since it 
shows that the introduction of abstract entities in our ontology can be 
justified without any reference whatsoever to abstraction principles or 
to statements expressing the relation of sameness of content between 
two statements (like ‘just is’-statements do).  
Maximalism can be considered the simplest and the most 
extreme option that a NeoFregean can choose. It supports Platonism, 
at least if we are able to provide an acceptable solution for the 
problem of incompatible objects (and I believe we are), but at the cost 
of a significant departure from the classical NeoFregean view. 
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5.3 Linnebo’s Metaontological Minimalism 
In Chapter 4 we have analyzed an hypothetical situation in which a 
community of speakers, whose language allows reference to and 
quantification over inscriptions, extends its language, stipulating that 
two inscriptions count as inscriptions of the same letter if and only if a 
certain condition is met. It is argued that this stipulation allows a 
speaker of this community to really refer to (and quantify over) letters. 
The truth conditions associated with sentences in which letter-terms 
feature are such that, for an atomic sentence to be true, the letter-term 
must really refer to an item of reality. But for an atomic sentence to be 
true what is requested to reality is nothing more than a completely 
unproblematic condition involving only objects whose existence is 
undisputed. Hence Linnebo’s theory offers a good defence of Priority. 
It should be noticed that his defence doesn’t entails a wild ontological 
proliferation (as in Wright’s version of Priority), since the constraints 
imposed on the process of introduction of referring abstract term in a 
language are rather strict. In particular there must be identity 
conditions for the newly introduced entities and the truth conditions 
for the sentences of the extended language must be reducible to truth 
conditions valid for sentences of the base language. These two 
restrictions can be satisfied with the help of abstraction principles. 
Indeed abstraction principles are able to provide both identity 
conditions for the newly introduced entities and the root for the 
formulation of truth condition of the appropriate reductive fashion. 
Abstraction principles play an essential role in Linnebo’s justification 
of Platonism, therefore we can conclude that also Abstraction 
Essentiality is vindicated. 
On the contrary I believe it’s dubious that Metaontological 
Minimalism can adequately defend Abstraction Effectiveness. This 
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might appear surprising, since Linnebo’s effort to the end of defining 
an appropriate notion of sufficiency is noteworthy and fruitful. Let’s 
reconsider his final definition of sufficiency: 
SUFFICIENCY: ϕ⇒ψ (= ϕ suffices for ψ) if and only if there is a 
legitimate extension of our linguistic resources of the sort described 
in the example of the community of speakers such that ϕ provides 
the assertibility  conditions for ψ. 
Abstraction Effectiveness requires the sameness of content of the two 
sides of an abstraction principle. Using Linnebo’s conceptualization, 
we could say that the relation between the two sides of an abstraction 
principle must be of mutual sufficiency, not only of sufficiency of one 
side for the other. Now, his definition of sufficiency seems to be apt to 
justify only the sufficiency of one side of an abstraction principle (the 
“concrete” one) for the other (the “abstract” one). It’s hard to imagine 
how a language containing abstract terms to design letters, but no term 
for inscriptions, could ever be extended in the way described by 
Linnebo in order to enable us to speak of inscriptions. If sameness of 
content is explained in terms of mutual sufficiency, then abstraction 
principles like those presented by Linnebo or like Direction 
Abstraction cannot be such that their two sides share the same content. 
We cannot but conclude that Metaontological Minimalism doesn’t 
support Abstraction Effectiveness. 
 
5.4. Priority and Abstraction 
The following table summarizes the “performances” of the three 
examined theories relative to the four characteristic theses of 
NeoFregeanism. 
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Priority Abs. Eff. Abs. Ess. Platonism 
Compositionalism Yes yes No Yes 
Maximalism Partially no No Yes 
Metaont. Minimalism Yes no Yes Yes 
 
As we can see from this schematic recap, all the three theories are able 
to defend Platonism. Indeed, as I hope to have shown in the course of 
this dissertation, no objection is fatal for these theories and they all 
give sufficient justification for a Platonism about abstract entities.  
Eklund Maximalism has the worst performance when it comes 
to justification of the characteristic theses of NeoFregeanism. 
Abstraction is neither justified as a method of introduction of abstract 
concepts, nor it plays an essential role towards the justification of 
Platonism. Moreover, as we have shown before, Priority doesn’t 
seems to be adequately defended. 
The performances of Rayo’s Compositionalism and Linnebo’s 
Metaontological Maximalism are far better, since they both 
adequately justify Priority. The remarkable difference between them is 
about Abstraction Effectiveness and Abstraction Essentiality. While 
the former is well defended by Compositionalism, but not by 
Metaontological Minimalism, the latter is well defended by 
Metaontological Minimalism, but not by Compositionalism. A 
reasonable question is whether this is only a contingent fact or there is 
some substantial theoretical reason why it’s extremely difficult (if not 
impossible) to justify both. 
It’s not hard to see that there are deep theoretical reasons under 
this difficult, perhaps impossible, reconciliation. Consider first 
Abstraction Essentiality. A theory in which abstraction principles play 
154 
 
an essential role in the justification of Platonism is certainly a theory 
that employs one of the peculiar properties of abstraction principles to 
this end. As Metaontological Maximalism clearly shows, this helpful 
property is their asymmetry of ontological commitments. The right 
hand side of an abstraction principle is committed to the existence of 
(relatively) concrete and unproblematic objects, while its left hand 
side is committed to abstract entities. The justification of Platonism 
via abstraction requires that there are abstract entities in virtue of there 
being concrete ones. The right hand side has, loosely speaking, a 
foundational role. The truth  of the right end side of an abstraction 
principle requires the obtaining of a certain state of affairs; the 
abstraction principle as a whole assures that nothing more that the 
obtaining of that very state of affairs is sufficient for the truth of the 
left hand side. Hence the additional ontological commitment borne by 
the left hand side comes for free.  
If we adopt an argumentative strategy along these lines, then it 
clearly becomes hard to show that the two sides of an acceptable 
abstraction principle have the same content, unless we adopt a very 
weak notion of content. The strategy above requires a different 
explanatory power for the two sides: one of them grounds the other, 
but not vice-versa. If we adopt such a strategy (and we must adopt it if 
we want to defend Abstraction Essentiality) then it becomes hard to 
justify Abstraction Effectiveness. 
Obviously this general observation is not meant to prove that a 
conciliation of the two theses is impossible, but only to show that here 
we face a substantial theoretical problem and therefore the fact that, so 
far, no broadly NeoFregean theory is able to maintain both of them 
should not surprise us. NeoFregeanism is not per se a coherent and 
structured theory, but rather a set of interrelated theses, still in need of 
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a systematization and nevertheless capable of offering a radical and 
fascinating view of the relation between language and reality. 
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